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37. 464/III/rev. THE  EFFECTS  ON  THE  UNITED  KINGDOH 
OF  HEHBERSHIP  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
In  May  1974,  the Directorate General  for  Research  and  Docurr.entation 
of  the  European  Parliament was  asked  to produce  a  study  of  the effects, 
in  1973,  on  the United  Kingdom  of membership  of  the  European  Corrmunity. 
This  study was  undertaken  as  part of  the Directorate General's  normal  task 
of producing  research  papers  for  Members  and  officials of  the  Parliament 
on  demand.  The  work  was  done  by  officials of  the Directorate  G~neral of 
different nationulities and  submitted  to  the  Political  Groups  in  the  Parlia-
ment  who  had  requested it,  in July  1974.  Subsequontly,  the  Din·ctora te 
General  was  asked  to revise  the  document  in  order  to  take accour,t  of 
developments  in  the Community's  activities and  their effects  on  Dritain1 
since  the original publication. 
In  effect,  many  changes  have  taken place since  the original  publication 
in  the various  spheres  of Community  activity and,  as  is well  known, 
negotiations  are currently  in progress with  the  aim  of  making  further  changes. 
The  Community  is,  of course,  a  developing  organisation and  is continually 
adapting  itself to changing  world conditions  and  introducing  nev1  policies 
and  activities.  Consequently,  it is difficult to undertake  a  revision of 
<t  study  of this sort and  not  end  up  with  a  document  which  is  i t!;elf out 
of  uatc  when  completed.  However,  the Directorate General  has  d<mc  its 
bn;,t  to  t<~ke  account  of all  m<~jor developments  in  the Community  r;ince  the 
first paper  and  attempted  an  assessment  of their effect on  Drito~in 
The  overall  plan  of this  study deals with  the various  sphe1·es  of 
Cormnunity  octivity  in  turn  and  is based  on  the  framework  adopted  by  the 
Co~~ission of  the Corrununitics  in  its annual  General  Reports,  particularly 
the  Seventh General  Report  for  1973.  This  scheme  not only  facilitated  the 
internal distribution of the work  among  the various  authors,  but  al~o had 
the  advantage  that readers  requiring further detailed factual  information 
could refer to the General  Reports. 
Chapter  I  treats  the  institutional and budgetary aspects  together 
because  of  the close  link between  them.  It also includes  an  analysis  of 
progress  achieved  in  the  field of political cooperation since  the  enlarge-
ment  of  the  Community.  From  the point of view of  the effect on  Britain 
of  the working  of Community  institutions,  it is  important  to note  the 
rlovclopmentn  which  havo  taken  place  in  the  functioning  of  the  Community 
1  For  thE"!  sake  of simplicity and  taking account of  the multinational authorship 
of the  document,  the  wor~ 'Britain'  and 'United  Kingdom'  have  been  used 
interch<mgeably. 
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the  Commission  alone would  possess  the  right to initiate legislation and  thus 
exercise  a  controlling  influence  on  the  Community.  If this were  in practice 
the  cane  the  fears  expressed,  in Britain in particular,  that sovereignty was 
being  lont  to a  'facclcso bureaucracy' would have  had  some  juntification. 
However,  as  in  pointed out in Chapter  I  developments  in the  way  in which  the 
Community operates,  an  opposed  to  the  theory laid down  in the  Treaties,  have 
reduced this danger  considerably.  The  Comminsion has  become  increasingly 
subject to  programmes  drawn  up  by Ministern  (responsible  to national  parlia-
ments)  at summit meetings which  lay down  not merely the  'initiati'Tes'  to be 
taken by  the  Comminsion but alr.:o  the  timetable  to be  follm-1ed.  !>lore over,  a 
multitude  of bodies  representing  tho  interests of  the  membcr-countrien  -
committecn  of  permanent  reprcscntntives,  management  committees,  expert '<TOrkinq 
parties  - few  of which  incidentally were  recognised  by  the  original Treaties, 
nav1  scrutinise legislation and ensure  that national  interests arc  fully 
nafcguardod.  'I'hc  most  novel  idea  in  the  Community Treaties  wa~ perhaps,  th<tt 
of legislation made  by  the central authority and  binding without  further 
ponnibility of intervention by  national  parliaments and  govcrnmentn  in member 
countries.  However,  the  ntudy  nhows  that these arrangomcnts  arc  perhaps  morn 
frightening  in theory than in practice.  Beforehand  there arc  the  exhaustive 
discussions rcferrred to and afterwards  the possibilty of dcrogati.ng  from  the 
b 
.  .  1  legislation or  superneding it by  su  sequent  prov~s~ons  . 
The  final  decision  on  leginlation taken by  the  Council  of  ~lininters in 
ugain  cubject to a  procedure  not envisaged by  the  Treatien.  This  in  the 
famoun  'Luxemb6urg  compromise'  which,  since 1966,  hat::  meant,  in effect,  thut 
any  one  country can  effectively block  in the council  of Hinistern any  Community 
legislation to which it objects  ntrongly. 
All  thin has  meant,  of course,  that Community nctivity hao  not  ucvcloped 
at the  pace  or  in  the way  cnvinagcd by  those who  drafted  the  Treaties,  and  the 
dclay.s  and vetoes  nO\'/  built into the  procedures arc certainly dis,lppointing  and 
fruntruting  for  those  who  look for  rt:tpid  progress in the direction of building 
a  united  Europe.  On  the  other hand  they do mean  that losses of  soverei.gnty, 
national  or parliamentary,  cannot be  said to be very great  . 
.Naturally,  all international  agreements  involve  nome  loss of  sovereignty -
that is to  say  a  losn  of  freedom  of action  - in exchange  for  specific advantages. 
The  Community Treaties arc not  unique  in this regard nor,  a~ Chapter  I  attempts 
to  nhm1,  in  there  <~  great difference of degree between  them  and previous treaties, 
such  as  the General Agreement  on  Tariff and  Trade  and  the  North Atlantic Treaty. 
In effect international agreements arc  'package deals' which  have  to be  looked 
nt  nn  a  whole,  at  the  ndvantagcn  em  the  one  hand  and  the conts  in  tcrmn  of 
IIOVcroic;nty  on  t.h(l  other.  _1 __________  _ 
'I'hc  most  otriking  recent  example  of derogation  occurred  in  !fJ74  when  one  mcmber-
ntatc felt compelled for balance  of  trade  reasons  to  impose  tcm]JOrary  import 
rentrictions.  Although  in clear contravention of  Community  lcgLolation,  no 
retaliatory mcasurcn were  taken and  proposals  for measures  to aid the Italian 
eco~amy were  made  by her Community partners. 
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disadvantages  is  that membership  is  Lound  to be  udvantageous  in  the  long 
run,  but  that  in  considering  the  'pockage  deal'  the  timing  of  81 itish 
entry  into  the  Community  has  to be  taken  into account.  On  1  Jar,uary  1973 
when  Britain  joined,  the  six existing member  countries  had  alre<ody  over  a 
period  of  several  years  successfully  overcome  difficult problem£  of 
adjustment. 
Quite apart  from  distinctive geographical  features,  they  h~d had  to 
take  account  of differing ways  of  thought,  legal  traditions  and  trade 
systems.  To cite only  one  example  in  the  economic  field,  Franc·e  and  Italy, 
with  their hi9h  customs  duties,  had  hod  to make  substi"lntiol  concessions 
to  the  liberal position  adopted  by  the  other  meml:H~r  countries  ar.d  to 
accept  the  full  implications  for  their  economic  development. 
Their  rapid  progress  towards  the  free  movement  of  goods  wiLhin  the 
Community,  the setting up  of  a  common  external  tariff and  the  various 
adjustments  made  to it as  a  result of  interna tiona  1  negotiation!; 
(particularly  the  reductions  made  in  the  framework  of the  GATT  <md  UNCTAD 
negotiations),  not  to mention  the  progress  made  towards  rationa~isation 
in agriculture,  were all made  possible by  the  favourable  econom:.c 
situation which  prevailed  in  the  ten years  between  1960  and  197(!. 
Thus,  when  Britain  joined,  Lhe  existing members  of the  Comnunity  had 
already  establishPd  a  system  to which  Britain had still to becone 
accustomed,  and  to do  so  in  a  muclr  less  favourRble  climate  for  Lnternational 
trado.  It  freenH~c1  clear  that  thin  <lcl·juntment  would  take  time  an·l  the 
l\cce.snion  'I'rcaty  tonk  care  tu provide  for  a  period  nf  <l<lilpt;:~tiott.  This 
gradual  introduct.ion  of  Conununity  rules  has  mear.t  that membershLp  of  tlw 
Communi ties cannot  be  said  so  fe~r,  after  only  two  years,  to hav•'  had  a 
dominant  influence  on  the  British  economy.  In particular,  the  ·~ffects  on 
the balance  of  trade  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the other nembers  of 
the  Community  caused  by  the  tariff reductions  provided  for  in  t'1e  Treaty 
of Accession have  so  far  been but minimal,  since  these  reductio;ls had  the 
effect of  reducing  the  average  level  of  tariffs by  only  2%. 
The  corollary of  this  (discussed  in  Chapters  II  and  IV)  is  t:hat  the 
trade deficit between  Britain  e~ntl  her  Common  ~1arket partners,  S•?rious  as 
it is,  cannot be  i'lttributed  to Corrununity  membership.  Other  fact:ors  have 
clourly hcen  cleciflivn.  I11  particulilr  it secmn  that  the  worst  d•1tcrior;"~tion 
in  1973  Rnd  1<)74  in  Britilin'n  Lradc  with  other  Conunon  Market  comtrie1~  h<11> 
occurred  in  five  !i iqni f icant  sec torn:  enerqy  imports,  chemical:;,  iron 
and  nteel,  du iry  products  and  cern.:~ls.  Oil  price  increases  acC•)Unt  almo~;t· 
wholly  for  the  energy deterioration  (Uritain has  to  import  fuel  from 
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iron  and  steel  imports  were  necessitated by difficult industrial conditions 
in Britain in 1974,  including  the  miners'  strike and  the  three day working 
week  in  industry.  In  the case  of cereals,  in particulur wheat  <~nd  maize, 
Community  suppliers were  ~ubstituted to  a  major  extent  for  traditional 
world  suppliers whose  prices  had  risen  above  the Community  level.  With 
these  rising  imports  the  trade  b<~lance with  the  Cmmnunity  appeared 
superficially to won:;en  \vhile  the  b;:ll<wce  with  the  rest of  the world  was 
improved.  In  fact,  since world  prices  were  largely higher  than  Community 
prices during  this  period  thorn  may  well  have been  a  considerable net 
1  soving  to the  United  Kingdom overall bal<mce  of  payments. 
It can  be  seen,  therefore,  (and  W<:ls  clear when  the  study  was  begun) 
that it is  more difficult to list credit  items  after  one  or  even  two  years 
of  membcr[;hip  than  to call attention to debit  item~;.  However,  some  of 
the  debit  items  which  were  originally  feared  before Britain  joined  hnve 
turned  out  to be non-cxiotcnt p:roblcms.  The  dramatic  economic  events  of  1973 
and  1974  have  rendered  some  of  these  fears,  at any  rate,  largely academic. 
Thus,  during  tho accession negotiations,  stress was  laid  on  the 
transitional provisions  for  implementing  the customs  union  or  adjusting 
to the  common  policies,  on  the mainteni"lnce  of relations  'VTith  the  Commonwealth, 
and  the  amount  of the  budget<:~ry contribution.  However,  since  then,  the 
upheaval  in the  pricef:l  of  raw matcriuls  and  agricultural products,  the 
energy crisis,  the  Llbsence  of  the  pound  sterling  from  the  'snub:!  in  the 
tunnel'  (the  lire w.nd  the  fr<tnc  too  <~re  no  longer  inside)  and  the  fight 
against  inflation,  have  held  the  stngc since i"lcccssion  and  as  a  result, 
the whole  problem hils  <~lterecl.  The  problem  hCis  not been  whether  or  not 
the  EEC  adjustment  tneclwnioms  <1rc  workinq  properly  but  how  to  face  up  to 
the  new  economic  circum.sti\nces.  Then·  e~ro  two  are<1r:  which  hnve  been 
particularly sen!litive  to events.  'l'lwse  arc  tho  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
and  relation£  ··,i.L:h  cc·rtnin  Cotmnonwca1 th  countries,  on  both  of  which  Uw 
Acccooion Trcuty  laid  down  0  wide  range  of provisions. 
1  Another  corollary  may  be  drawn  from  the  trade  figureo  set out  in  the 
study.  These  figures  show  that one  third  of  British exports  go  to the 
other  oight  members  of  the  EEC,  bt1t  h·!:!J  than  10% of  their  export::;  come  to 
Britain.  'l'hus  it would  appear  that  the  common  market  ot  the  EEC  is 
more  importnnt  to Britnin  than  t:o  her  purtnen;.  The  implicutions  of 
thin  if nritnin  Jwcl  to  r·cnegotiatc tri1ding  tcrm3  after having  left the 
Community  arc  obvi  n11~:. 
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adjustment mechanisms  created  on  the basis  of  low world  prices have  some-
times  worked  against  the British market,  since supplies at Community  prices, 
for  some  products,  have  been  become  lower  than  those  on  the world market. 
This  phenomenon  has  been particularly noticeable  in the case of cereals, 
with prices  in Great Britain sometimes  being higher  than  the average 
Community  price  level.  There  is nevertheless  no  doubt  that if Great 
Britain had  not  joined  the  Community,  prices  in  1973  would  have  become 
almost as  high  as  world prices  which had tripled since  1972.  This  confirms 
the  theory  that Community  experience will  show that the effect of  systems 
which are overconsciously adapted to a  specific situation  may  be  unexpected 
and  frequently out of  line with  the original goal,  if the situation changes. 
From  the point of view of exports  to the  Common  Market,  British 
farmers  generally benefited  from  accession  in  1973  because  of their  favourable 
competitive position,  at least until  increased production costs  made  them-
selves  felt,  as  was  the  case  in  1974. 
The  main  impression  gained  from  developments  in  1974  is that  the real 
problems  facing  British agriculture are exactly  the  same  as  those  facing 
the  Six  - in particular the rise  in production costs  - fertilizers, 
petroleum products,  agricultural machinery  - and  the resulting  imbalance 
compared  with selling prices,  especially in  the  livestock sector, 
difficulties with  feedstuffs  supplies  and monetary instability,  and  no 
longer  have  so  much  to do with  the  gradual  adjustment of the United 
Kingdom  to the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
Immediately  the  United  Kingdom  joined  the  common  agricultural  morket 
it wns  pos!J ible  to solve  tho  problem  of  the depreciation  of tho  pound 
against  the  par  value declared  to  the  International  Monetary  Fun<l.  The 
green  pound  created  in  February  1973  thus  took  uccount  of  the  fact  that 
the  pound  had  depreciated by  approximately  1~/o.  ~1ile this  rate  wus 
realistic  in  1973,  it was  found  in  1974  that,because  of  the special  rate 
applied  to agricultural products,  the British  farmer  was  receiving  a  lower 
domestic  price than he  would  have  done  if the  rate of  exchange  between  the 
Community's  'unit of  account'  and  the  pound had been based  on  the actual 
rate of  exchange  in  relation  to other currencies. 
The  agricultural rate of exchange also affected trade  relations with 
tho  other  Hember  States.  The  lower  lovol  of  priceo  in  the  United  Kingdom 
led  to higher  'monetary compensatory  amounts'  which,  as  regards  :-~gricultural 
products,  were  detrimental  to British exports  and  encouraged  imrorts  from 
tho other Member  States.  Moreover,  <1  downward  7.9"/..  chango  was  !T1i1de  in  this 
agricultural  rate of  exchange  in  September  1974.  llowover,  there'  is  some 
justification for  anking  if the  existing  arrnngcmcnts  do  not otill  allow~ 
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it is difficult to put  an  mcact  figure  to  the monetary  compensatory amounts, 
which  are charged  to  the Community  budget,  or  more  precinely  the  EAGGF,  the 
commission  estimates  them at £50 million per  annum.  nut this,  too,  is  a 
problem which  some  of  the  Six have  experienced  or are still experiencing, 
the  most  typical  example being  trade  in agricultural products  between 
Germany  and  Italy.  The  discunsion  on  the  fixing  of agricultural  prices 
for  the  1975/76  financial  year also  shows  the  importance  of monetary 
questions  for  the  functioning  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
All  in all,  the adjustment mechanisms  provided  for  in the Treaty 
of Accession  seem  to be  out of date as  a  result of  the  upheaval  in  the 
world  economy,  and  the  real problem  is  in  fact  oneof quickly  integrating 
British agriculture  into  the  common  agricultural nillrket. 
Some  British circles arc  even maintaining  that it would  almost be 
preferable  for  the transitional arrangements  to come  to an  end  immediately 
provided that the Common  Agricultural  Policy  as  a  whole  allowed  each 
Member  State greater latitude in applying  rules  jointly adopted,  a 
principle which  could not be called into question without affecting one 
of  the  only  common  policies that has  been  effectively established  since 
the creation of  the  EEC. 
As  for  the external trading  relationships  of the  UPited  Kingdom, 
it is striking to note  (See  Chapter  IV  - External Relations)  that  in  recent 
years  decreasing  trade bctv:cen  the  United  Kingdom  and  the Commonwealth  hns 
been  accompanied  by  an  almost  identical  increase  in  trade between  the 
United  Kingdomand  the other European  Community countries;  indeed,  by  1973, 
UK/EEC  trade figures  wore  roughly  double  those  for  UK/Commonwealth  trade. 
In  1973,  moreover,  we  saw  the  Commonwc<~lth sugar  und butter producers 
turning  towards  the more  profitable l\mcrican  and  Japanese  markets  and, 
for  the  first time  in  many  ycnrn,  failing  to meet  their contracts  with  tho 
United  Kingdom. 
Whether  in  or out  of the Communities,  the United  Kingdom  can  no 
longer  count  on  low ugricultural prices,  either by concluding  long-term 
contracts with  individual countries,  since  those would be  unwilling  to 
renew on  the  previous  price  terms,  or by  buying  on  the 'world market'  which 
in  the  final  analysis  is an  extremely  narrow market,  which  explains  the 
sudden  swing which  occurred  last year.  The  discussionn  which  hnve  taken 
place  in  the Council  as  part of  the  ncgoti. iltions  on  a  convention between 
the  Communit:y  and certain African,  Ct1ribboan  and  Pacific countrien have 
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particularly Je>mZlica  and  Mauritius,  had  to be  persuaded  to  undertake  to 
sell at a  price based  on  the  Co~nunity price.  For  its part,  the  British 
government  even  agrecc1  to pay  in  1975  approximately  double  the  Community 
price  in order  to guarantee supplies at  a  time  of  shortage. 
The  overall  economic  benefits which  a  country can  derive  from 
Community  membership cannot be  <~ssessed solely  in  terms  of  the  balance 
between  i tr;  contribution!:>  to  the  Conununity  budget  ;;-.nd  \"hat  it receives  ir. 
return.  Nor  is  thi~;  il  question  npccific  to the  Unitecl  1\ingdom contribution: 
it has  been  il  constilntly  recurring  theme  in  the  different phases  of  the 
construction of  Europe. 
Budgetary  problems  in  the  Cormnunity  beqan  in  earnest  in  1972.  In  what 
has  been called  the  'first Community  marathon'  (December  l9Gl),  a  clash 
occurred  in  the Council  between  those  who  advocated  financing  according  to 
the  scu. le  of contribution!;  set out  in  the  Treaty  u.nd  the  supporters  of  a 
method  of  financing  which  would  also provide  an  incentive  to abide  by 
Community  preference,  particularly  in  the  agricul tura  1  sector,  when'  the 
foundations  of  a  common  policy were being  laid.  1\.s  in  the  vast  m~1jority of 
cases,  the  solution adopted  was  a  compromise  between  the rival  views: 
it was laid  cbwn  that durinrJ  the  trilnsitional period,  Cornrnunity  expenditure 
would  be  met  by  steadily increasing  revenue  from  <Jgricultural  levies.  1\.t 
the  8iunc  time  the  principle was  1ai<1  c1own  (1\.rticlo  2 (I)  of  nequlalion  No.2';  -
o.J  No.JO  of  20.11.1962)  thilt.  at  tlw  final  nta<Jc: 
"1.  Revenue  from  levies collected  on  imports  from  third countries 
shall belong  to  the  Community  and  shall  be allocated  to Community 
expenditure  in  such  a  manner  that  the Community's  budgetary  resources 
shall  include  such  revenue  together  \"ith all other  revenue  determined 
to  <'~ccort1ani::e  wi  t:h  the  rules  of  the  'l'rc<1 ty,  and  financ  i<:ll  cont.r ibutions 
from  States  under  the conditions  laid down  in 1\.rticle  200  of  the 
'I' rea ty.  The  Council  shilll at the appropriate  tirne  undertaJc.c  tlw 
prcwcdun'  li1 ill  down  in 1\.rticle  201  of  the Treaty with  i1  view to 
implem0nt"in'l  t.hr..!  above  provisions. • 
It  if~  no  exaqqeration  to  say  thut  this article has  prompted  the 
amenclmonts  m.vle  over  the years  to  the  method  of  fin<:tncing  the  Co~nunity 
bur1qet.. 
Th('  point- at  if;stw  has  bcr.n  wlH'ther  financinq  !1hou1d  l>o  c<~rricd out 
accorclin<J  to  a  f;cale  of contributions  laid  down  in  the Treaty or  through 
own  rer:ourccs  I ink  eel  to  cormnon  policies.  The  principle of  own  re~>ources 
was  accepted  in  1962  but was  not effectively applied,  and  then  only 
progressively,  until  the  decision  of  21  1\.pril  1970. 
- 7  - PE  37.460/rcv. Apart  from  the  advantage  of giving  the  Community  a  certain measure  of 
autonomy  and  Parliament  a~ effective - and  later pPrhaps  a  crucial  - role 
in  the  adoption  of  the  Community budget,  own  resources have,  by  their  very 
nature,  a  certain  impact  on  trade relations between  the  Community  and  non-
member  countries  in as  much  as  they  come  from  levies  and  customs  duties. 
They  reflect better  than  a  fixed  scale of contributions  the  economic 
relationships between  the  member  countries,  in that  ~n additional  proportion 
comes  from  a  pcrce~tage 0f  VAT  or,  in  the  intermediate stage,  from 
contributions based  on  the  GNPs  of  the various  Hember  States. 
Furthermore,  this additional  share  may  later become  the chief  source 
of  revenue.  There  arc  two  reasons  for  this. 
On  the  revenue side,  the  amount  of agricultural  levies could  fall 
sharply.  Thin  was  the  case  in  1973  as  i'l  result  of  the  price  increases  of 
agricultural  products  on  the  world  markets  - ancl  revenue  from  customs 
duties could also fall  as  a  result of  international negotiations  aimed  at 
general  reductions  in  such duties. 
l~s  regards Community  preference,  this will act not  only  to the 
disadvantagE. but also to the advantage  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  that  the 
Community  of  Nine  will offer wider  markets. 
With  regard  to payments  to different member  countries,  the  introduction 
of  new policies  may  reasonably be  expected to increase the  total  amount  of 
tho budget,  making  it necessary  to raise  the  VAT  portion of  revenue;  in 
this vmy  a  more  even balance will be  sttuck between  the  two  main  sources 
of receipts. 
Coming  to the  second  element  of  own  resources,  viz.  the  percentage  of 
VAT  or  the contribution  on  the basis  of  the  GNP,  the  figure  of  14%  suggested 
by  the  United  Kingdom  Foreign Minister at the Council  meeting  of  4  June  l'n4 
as  the  likely relationship between  the  United  Kingdom  GNP  and  that of  the 
Community  ns  a  .,.,hole  in  1980,  is at first sight surprising.  The  figure 
was  19%  on  average  for  the years  1970,  1971  and  1972.  The  Commission  has 
calculatcd1  that  the  United  Kingdom's  relative share  of  the  Community's 
gross  product was  16.4%  in  1973  and  15.9%  in  1974.  The  estimate of  14/~ 
was  perhaps  projecting  a  medium  term  trend  on  the basis  of  the results 
expected  for  1974,  which  was  ~•rked by' the  energy crisis  and  its consequences 
on  the  level  or  employment. 
1  Inventory of tho Community's  economic  and  financial  situation since 
enlargement and  survey  of  future  developments  (COM(74)  1800/fin.) 
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rates,  admittedly  qveraged only  2.8  p~r cent  in  the years  1968  to  1973 
compared with  4.7  per cent  for  the  Community  of the Nine  as  a  whole.  But 
the  United  Kingrl0~ may  reasonahJy  ~xpect that,  thanks  to the  new  economic 
relationship in which it will  find  it!"el f  within  the  EEC  and  to  the  prospeC"'ts 
of North  Sea oil, it will  find  the  m~ans to  increase its growth  rate  to  a 
lf'v~J  clos,r to  the  maximum  figure  envisaged  for it  (3.5  per cent  per annum). 
whil£•  it is entimi'ltecl  that- the  growth  rate of the  Community  as  a  whol~ will 
be  b~twPen  4  and  4.5 per  c~nt. 
Irrespective of the  econorni  .....  dev<>lopment  of the  United  Kingdom  taken 
alone  and  compared with  that of the other Member  States,  the  Community  is 
not indifferent  to the problem broached by  the  British government  ln  con-
nection with  that part of its cor•tribnti.on  to  the  budget which  depends  on  GNP. 
In  <'lddit:i.on,  th<>  Commission  haf'  lookPn  into  the possibility of introducing 
a  correcting mechanism  designeo  to  prev~nt the possible development  of 
'situations unacceptable  for  a  1'1"!mber  State  and  incompatible with  the  amooth 
working of the  Community'.  l\  ~nr.recti.nq mechanism of this kind would  morf'ov~r 
apply  to all the  Member  States,  c;o  that  the  United  I<ingdom might  not  be  the 
only country to benefit  by it. 
In  fact,  the  solution  founr1  to  the  problem  raieed by  the British 
Government  may  appear  beneficj~1  to all  the  Member  States.  This  is perhaps 
truer at  the  psychological  l~vPl,  whicll  is particularly important  to  a 
Community,  than at  the  level of economic  and  financial  reality.  It should 
not  be  forgotten  that although  the  Community's  budget  reached  a  level of 
5,200 million u.a.  (£2,166 milUon)  in  1974,  this  sum  represents only about 
0.5 per cent of its gross  dome~tic  pro~uct.  For  the  purpose of comparigon. 
the consolidated public  sector budgets of most  Member  States are  above  30  p~r 
J  cent of the  domestic  pro~uct 
Much  nttention has  been  dn  .. .,ted  in  this introduction to  the  problems  of 
agricultural  prices,  as  they  h~~~ affarted  the United  Kingdom,  and  to  the 
financing of the  Communities'  Bw"get.  They  h  b  ·  1  d  '-'  ave  een  rang  e  out  for attention 
because  they  illustrate certain  important principles about  the  short-term 
effects of membership  on  Dritain.  In  the  study itself these  two  questions 
we  dealt with  in Chapter III,  "rhe  Development of Common  Policies',  In 
passing,  .i.t  in  inten~sting to  nntf'l  this Chapter  is more  extensive  than 
Chapter II,  'The  functioning  nf  thl"  rommon  Market •.  This  is not  l>y  chanC"'e. 
It  .iA  becausP,  although  the  Tr"'"'"Y  o11ly  provided specifically  for  three 
2 
Inventory of  t":-le  Community'r;  economic  and  financial  situation nince 
enlargement and  survey  of  f•,t-nre  ~f'velopments  (COM (74)  1800/fin) 
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transport policy,  the  Six had  made  efforts to  establish other common  policies 
by  referring to Articles of the Treaty to  give  a  certain legal basis  for 
measures which  were  becoming  more  and  more  necessary  in order  to  go  beyond 
the  stage of mere  cooperation in individual sectors. 
Chapter  IV  deals with  the  Community's  external  relations \\hich are 
becoming of increasing  importance as  the  Community  comes  to  form  a  genuine 
entity in  relation to  the  rest of the world. 
All  in all,  an  attempt has  been  made  in this paper to  cover  the principal 
fields of Community  activity and their effect on  Britain.  Finally,  however, 
it must  be  repeated  that  any  assessment of the benefits or otherwise of  these 
activities would  be difficult  to  make  after such  a  short period of membership. 
Any  such  assessment  would have,  in  any  event,  to  take  into account  not only 
the  results of being  in the  European  Communities,  but  also  the  consequences 
which  might  result  from  not being  a  Member  - or  rather  from having been  a 
Member  for  a  short while  and  then having left the  Communities.  Assessment 
of these possibilities would  however be  somewhat  outside the proper  functions 
of a  Directorate General  for  Research  and  Documentation. 
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Introduction 
The  situatbn of  the  United Kingdom  in  1945  differed in two  irr. 1x)Ll.~:nt 
respects  from  that of her Allies  on  the Continent:  She  had  not  nuff·~j~·~,:  '"'·· 
vnstation resulting  from  fighting  on her soil  1  and  (with  the  cxcept.iull  <•l~ 
France)  she was  the only country with close  links with  an  extensive  t'"·f'~: u·  ,,c 
overseas  terri  torie!'l.  These  two  factors  inter alia exerted  a  sub!;t.· ::'  . :.:  ·l 
influence over British policy in the  post-war  decade  which  snw  the  lzn.·.,, .. , ..  i  cc.~ 
of  inter-governmental  and  supranational institutions  in Europe. 
Both  these  factors militated against the  United  Kingdom  sharin<J  LI,r 
nnme  enthtw:inmn  ns  other West  European  countric~• for  join:ing  any  .inteCJ:.c '.:,n:·1. 
orgnni!lnlion  wlticlt  miqltl  dnm<tqe  !tor  Jinks  w.i.Lh  Ute  Empire  and  which  w~u• 
primarily den i qttecl  Lo  prevent.  l:IH'  recurrence  of  u  disaster  from  which  [,],,  i::~<i 
ouffered  1  superficinlly at  uny  rate  1  less  than  the Continentnl  F.uropr:<tn 
countries. 
Notwithstanding  these  reservations  1  the  fears  of  a  n:-surgence  uf" 
German militnrism and  of Soviet aggression,  and  the  need  to  reconsl:ltJCL  •·\, 
shattered economies  of Western  Europe  led  to  the  establishment of the  Oc<"  n--· 
isation for  European  Economic  Cooperation  in 1948,  of  the  North AtJnntit' 
Treaty Organisation  in  19119,  of  thC'  Europenn  Coal  and Steel Community  .in 
1951  and  of Western  European  Union  in  1954,  all of which  (with  the  excq-.:; i:  .1 
of  the  ECSC)  Britain  joined as  a  founder  member.  However,  for  the  I'L:<!scm:; 
outlined,  the  British Government  of  the  dny,  ufter initially t:aldng  a  Jr:·td:i.-,q 
part in encouraging  the Council  of  Europe  to become  the  firRt  Parliam~11t  01 
Europe,  subsequently felt  unable  to support  continued  progress  in  thif;  dl.r-
ection and  felt unable,  also,  to  join the  P.uropenn Coal  nnd  Steel  CoJn;ntmj Ly 
which was  a  supranational institution  from  its inception. 
It should be  remembered  that in  1945  the only  independent  countries  i11 
the  Empire  (as it vms  then)  were  Canadu.,  Australiu.  1  New  Zealund  and  Sot!  I 11 
Africa.  There  were  few  signs  of  the  'wind  of change'  in African  po'l.~t.-;<':: 
and,  with the exception of India  and  Pnldstan,  the advance  of  indern'":n.:L:·,n~,~·  ci 
territories in the  Empire  ranging  in size  from  Nigeria  to the  BahaJlkw  ,,.,,;:-:  ,~,  .. ; 
yet unforeseen. 
Twenty-five  years after the  end  of World  War  II, the  relu.tion!;l, i r'  •n  ~-!~-.: 
United  Kingdom with her  European Allies  u.nd  her  former  Empire  had  unci<·- q  >!,,.  ;, 
dramatic  change.  The  British economy,  even tvith  the help of  the  Eun'ip~;;r, 
Free Trade Area  (EFTA),  had  progresser 1  slowly  ar:  compured with  t1w  c:con•.·n c·  ·· 
of  th,.,  Six  and  was  more  prone  to cyclical economic  disturbances whi{'h  11i  n;~tl'~l 
economic  growth.  Abroad,  Britain \vaf;  left with  a  few  P>mall  colonj <"r>,  t. iu.· 
- 1  - PE  37. 451/Vn· .·. remainder  of her  former  colonies  having won  their independence.  Her  links 
with Commonwealth  countries  as  a  whole  had  been weakening  for  at least a  de-
cade.  It was  only at this stage that all three political parties began to 
share  a  common  view that Britain should be  a  member  of the European  Commun-
ities. 
The  ngrecmcnts  reached  at The  Hague  in December  1969  had  opened  the VJily 
to enlargement of  the'  Community,  and  had  opened wider vistas  for it in  the 
direction of political cooperation and,  following  the  recommendations  of the 
Herner Committee  on  the  principles  of  the  Community's 'own  resources'  of 
Linances,  of  an  Economic  and Monetary  Union  and  of  a  corresponding increase 
in budgetary  powers  for  the  European  Parliament.  By  the  end  of  1969  there-
fore,  the  Council  of Ministers  of  the  Community  had  indicated  the  ncvr  paths 
along which  the  Community  should  advance,  building on  the  foundations  set 
by  the Treaty of  Rome. 
A.  The  Effects  of Membershin  on  the  United  Kingdom  since Januarv  1973 
------------------------~-----------------------------------L-----
(a)  Sovereignty 
( i)  Na tion~!_so\"_q.!:_eiqnty 
The  word  'snvcreiqnLy'  i~;  vario1wly defined  in the  Oxford  Englinh  Dic-
tionary as  'supreme  dominion,  authority or rule'  nnd  'nbsolute  and  independ-
ent authority'. 
Effect  of Treaties 
It will readily be  seen that any  trenty,  agreement  or  convention made 
with another country or group of  countries,  pnrticularly if such  a9recmcnts 
involve membership of  an  international organisation,  must  involve  some  dero-
gation of  sovereignty.  The  basis  of most  treaties and  agreements  is that, 
in exchange  for certain advantages  to be  gained by  a  signatory country, it 
voluntarily resigns  its  'absolute and  independent authority'  in certain 
spheres.  Equally,  by accepting  limitations  upon its sovereignty in acceding 
to an  international organisation,  a  country not  only gains  certain advantages 
from  membership  of the organisation as  such ,  but enters  into  a  closer rcla-
tionship with  the other member  countries.  This  is of particular importance 
to countries which  arc militarily weak,  which  depend  largely upon  trade,  thus 
rendering  them  vulnerable to economic  recessions,  or which  are  guarantor!::  of 
an  international currency. 
Since  1945  the most  outstanding  among  many  examples  of  such  treaty obli-
gations  (amounting  to  'package deals')  in which  Britain has  been  involv('d are 
the  North Atlantic Treaty,  the General Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT) 
and  the  United  Nations  Organisation. 
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obligations  towards  other member  countries  in the event  of their being 
attacked,  and  has  also bound herself to deploy her forces  according to NATO 
strategic  requirements.  The  need  to respect  such  commitments  to Britain's 
NATO  allies was  adduced  by British Governments  in  1968  and  1974  as  justifi-
cation for  reductions  in military commitments  in other parts  of the world, 
such as  East  of  Suez  and  in South Africa.  Also  the  British Government  has 
to seek the assent of  NATO  before  redeploying  forces  committed  to the Euro-
pean,  Mediterranean or Atlantic sectors  of the  NATO  defence structure. 
Britain pays  19%  of  the total budget  of  NATO  under  the  terms  of  the 
North Atlantic Treaty.  This  has  from  time  to time been described as  'unfair' 
in view of the growing disparity between the  GNP  of Britain and  of  other  NATO 
countries,  as  the British budgetary contribution to the  EEC  has  also been 
described.  It is at least arguable  that the  British contribution,  by  com-
parison with that of other member  countries  and  in relation to the  British 
GNP  has  become  inequitable.  (c.£.  the  USA  which  pays little more  than 25%). 
The  package  deal  offered by membership  of  NATO  has,  however,  been accepted 
despite the  loss  of sovereignty involved. 
The  General Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade was  entered into in 1947. 
The  contracting parties stated their will to enter into  'reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous  arrangements'  designed  to  reduce tariffs and  other 
barriers to trade and  to eliminate trade discrimination.  (Article  1 (2)). 
As  an  example  of the  restrictions  upon  sovereignty  imposed  by  GATT,  it will 
suffice to mention Article 11(1),  which states that, with certain exceptions, 
principally for  emergency situations,'no prohibitions  or  restrictions other 
than duties,  taxes  or other charges,  whether made  effective through quotas, 
import  or export  licences  or other measures',  shall be  imposed by  any member 
country or any  product  imported  from  or exported  to another member  country'. 
In December  1968  Parliament  enacted  the  Customs  (Import Deposits)  Act 
1968,  which  for  a  period of  one  year  imposed  a  requirement  upon  importers  to 
deposit with  the  British Government  50%  of  the value  of  the  imported goods. 
In  1969  the Act  was  extended  for  a  further  year,  the  amount  of  the deposit 
being  reduced  from  50%  to 40%  of the value.  These  mensures  provoked  strong 
adverse  reactions  from  Brit~in's GATT  partners,  and  had  to be withdrawn as 
snon  as  practicable if Britain were  to retain the advantages  of membership 
of  GATT. 
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Britain is  considered to gain through  the  GATT  markedly  improved  trading 
position.  It is notable that,  despite  the  loss  of  sovereignty which would 
be  involved,  several countries  outside the  GATT  are  anxious  to accede  to it. 
By  reason  of developments  in the world  economic  situation it is  in fact  now 
the  case that  only the  USA  and  the  Community  (acting  as  such)  arc  strong 
enough  to renegotiate the  GATT.  Thus  Britain has  traded  in a  degree  of 
sovereignty  in exchange  for  the benefits  she  gains  by belonging to  a 
dominant  trading group within  the  GA'rT  as  a  whole. 
Membership  of  the  UN  has  imposed  obligations  on  the  UK,  for  example 
in the Middle  East  (Suez,  Cyprus,  Arab-Israel conflicts),  as  well  as 
bringing it the  support  of other nations  (sanctions  on  Rhodesia) •  Other 
exnmples  of  the  pooUn<J  of  sovorciqnty ns  11  consequence  of  obligations 
<~.risinq  from  members IIi p  or  "intern<~.tional  orqanisations arc  legion.1  It 
h<~.s  never been  seriously argued  that such obligations  have  brought  any-
thing  other  than advantage  to Britain,  or that Britain would  be  better 
off without  them. 
Sovereignty and  the  EEC 
The  concept  of  nations  sharing sovereignty in order to achieve  long-term 
aims  in the  interest of all is most  clearly set out in the  Preamble  to the 
Treaty of  Paris  1951,  which  established the  European Coal  and  Steel Community. 
The  Six States declared themselves  -
'Resolved  to substitute for age-old  rivalries  the merging  of  their 
efHJential  interests;  to  create,  by  establinhing  an  economic  commun-
.ity,  the  l'v.sjn  for  n  hnmclor  and  donpflr  cnmmnnity  nmonq  pooplos 
long divided  by  bloody conflictn;  and  to  lay  tho  foundations  for 
institutions which will give direction to  a  destiny henceforward 
shared.' 
As  in the  case  of other international treaties,limits are  set to the 
degree  of sovereignty to be  shared by the  establishment of an  EEC  Council  of 
Ministers,  comprising  representatives  of  the  national governments,  who  arc 
responsible  in most States to an elected  Parliament  - as  indeed  in Great  Bri-
tain.  Since many  of  the political and  economic  problems  facing  Britain 
cannot be  solved by  British Ministers  taking decisions  in isolation but only, 
1  An  interesting contrast  can be  drawn  between  the  conditions  exacted by  the 
International Monetary  Fund  in  1968  when  the British Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer  sought monetary  support  for  Britain and  the  fact  that in January 
1975  the Chancellor,  representing the  EEC,  won  the agreement  of  the  Fund  to 
a  scheme,  originally proposed  by  him,  for  recycling petro-dollars. 
- 4  - PE  37.461/I/rev. at the  least,  after consultation with Ministers  of other,  particularly Com-
munity,  countries,  membership  of  the  Community  could  be  considered to give 
the  British Government  more  rather than less  control  over British affairs. 
Despite  the  present weaknesses  in the  system  of scrutiny of EEC  legislation, 
the Government  ha~ given  an  undertaking  to the !louse  of Commons  that they will 
reserve the  British position in the Council of Ministers  on  any matter which, 
in the view  of the  Commons  EEC  Legislation Committee,  'raises questions _of_ 
political importance'.  This  is an  important  safeguard,  which materially 
strengthens  the  control of  the  House  over the  process  of legislation in the 
EEC.  Furthermore,  since the British Parliament  can call Ministers  to account 
in relation to the exercise  of their powers  in the Council of Hinisters,  'par-
liamentary sovereignty'  could well be  considered to have  become  more,  rather 
than  less,  extensive in this  respect  following  accession. 
Treaty safeguards  for  national sovereignty 
In  the  case  of  the  EEC,  however,  additional safeguards were written into 
the Treaties setting up  the  ECSC,  the  EEC  and  the  European Atomic  Energy 
Community.  In the first place an Assembly was  constituted of delegates  from 
National  Parliaments  to exercise  'advisory and  supervisory powers'  (Article 
138  EEC  Treaty) •  Although  the Treaty states that the obligation on  the 
council of Ministers  to consult the Assembly
1 
is  not absolute,  the Council 
has  now  agreed to  consult  the  Parliament  on virtually every proposal made  by 
the Commission. 
While  up till now  the  European  Parliament's  powers  fall short of  those 
exercised  by  a  national  parliament,  the  EEC  is  (apart  from  Western  European 
Union)  the  only  international organisation to possess  an  institutionalised 
parliamentary assembly  and  is thus  able  to exercise at least  some  direct 
democratic  control,  particularly over  the  Community  Budget  (sec  paragraphs 
below),  and  the  1974  Suwmit  held  out  the  prospect  of greater  legislative 
powers.  The  Parliament  in January  1975  fulfilled  its obligation under Article 
138  of the  EEC  Treaty to adopt  ~ draft convention  on direct elections which 
takes  account  of enlargement.  The  recent  Summit  decided  that the first direct 
elections,  using existing national electoral systems,  could be held  in or 
after 1978.  Thus  the  first steps  towards  fully effective democratic control 
of the Commission  and  Council  have  been  taken,  and  further  progress  is 
planned. 
1  The  Assembly  resolved  in  1962  that its title should  henceforth be  the 
'European  Parliament'. 
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'Question Time',  based  on  that  in  the  llonse  of  Commonn,  at  which  Memborn  put 
oral  qucslion~1  to  tho l'onncil  111Hl  <.'onunhwion.  1\ll'itton c 1um1t.io1111  can  nlno  llo 
put,  and  there  ure  several mcthodo  o~Jen  t:o  bnck-bonchoro  to ini·t.into  dobatoo on 
matters  of urgent or general interest.  For  example,  a  debate  on  political 
and  on  economic affairs is held  almost  every session.  Energy and agricultural 
policy arc  frequently discussed,  giving members  opportunities to question 
Commissioners  and  Council Ministers  on  the  progress  of Community  policies. 
In addition,  the Committees  of the  Parliament meet  two  or three times  a  month 
to study the  proposals  of  the  Commission  in detail,ancl  can question the appropriat 
Commissioner  or officials of  the  Comm1'ss1'on.  Th  t  ·  ·  ese  oppor  un1t1es  exceed  in 
some  respects  the  opportunities  available  in the  British parliament. 
The  Economic  and  Social Committee  of the  Community  unites  the  'social 
partners'  (representatives  of  employers  and  employees)  in advising  the Council 
and  tlw  Comminnion  of  thnir  viowR,  wh.icfl  nro  nino  taken  .into  nccount  by  the 
ParliZtment. 
Non-Treaty  safeguards  for sovereignty 
{a)  Usc  of the veto 
In the  16  years  of the  EEC's  development,  various  safeguards  for  national 
sovereignty additional to those written into the Treaties have  been developed. 
They have  had  the effect of  limiting the  loss  of sovereignty attributable to 
Community membership.  Of  these the most  important has been the  'Luxembourg 
Compromise'  of  1966,  by which  any  .t-lember  State has  the right to veto any 
proposal which  in its view  impinges  on its  'vital national interests'. 
The  operation of this arrangement  imposes  in practice  a  unanimity  rule in the 
Council  of Ministers,  which  has  acted as  a  most  effective safeguard  for 
national  institution~ 
{b)  Control  of  the  Commission 
The  intention of those who  framed  the  EEC  Treaty was  that the Comminsion 
should  take  the initiative in making  legislative and  other proposals.  This 
intention has  fallen  in  recent years  far short of realisation,  as  the 
council has  to an  increasing extent developed methods  of supervising and  even 
instructing the  Commission.  This  has  been done by the  expedient  of  Summit 
Meetingn  of  Heads  of Government,  of which there have  been  four  since  1969. 
These  have  tended more  and  more  to give directions to the Commission  (and 
to  the Council of Ministers)  as  to the  subject,  scope  and  content of legisla-
tive and  other proposals,  together with  time  limits  for their implementation. 
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•aining behind closed doors which  ensues  between it and  the Council before 
Commission  proposals  are  promulgated.  ny  sketching out in advance  to the 
Commission  those aspects  of  any matter  on  which  the  Council  is  likely to 
agree,  the  latter is pre-empting  the  initiative of the Commission.  Yet 
another  example  of  the declining  influence  of  the Commission  in the  recourse 
- made  by it and  the  Council  alike  - to  committees  of experts,  who  are  Gov-
ernment officials  from  the  Nine  Member  States,  for  advice  and  information 
often on  technical matters.  These  expert  committees  are  now  used  to a 
growing  extent by the Commission,  which  as well  receives  advice  from 
M~nagcment Committees,  composed  of national  government  officials,pn the ad-
ministration of Community  policies.  Thus,  at a  'pre-legislation'  stage,  a 
national government  can  steer an  embryonic  Commission proposal.Jn 
a  desired direction,  and  ensure  that national intercots are  safeguarded. 
The  importance of all these developments  is that the Council  is gaining 
pownr  and  influence at  the  expense  of  the  Commission  and  it is  the Council 
which,  in view of  the  present weakness  of  the  European  Parliament,  is princi-
palJj influenced by National  Parliaments.  Thus  the theoretical inroads 
mudc  by  the  EEC  Treaty into national sovereignty are  being substantially:. 
,.J· 
counter-balanced by the practical opportunities  open  to National  Parliam~nts 
to influence and  control  the Council  of Ministers.  These  safeguards  seem  to 
be  growing  (inevitably at the  expense  of  the decision-making  powers  of  the 
Community) . 
It is  of  course  no  argwnent  against  a  loss  of sovereignty  in  a  particnlr.r 
field,  namely  Community  legislation,  to point to  losses  of  sovereignty in 
other fields  and  by  other means.  However,  in considering where  the  United 
Kingdom  may  have  lost  some  control over  legislation made  by the  Community, 
one  must  see  this  in relation to changes  which  have  occurred  in recent  times 
in Britain's sovereignty,  particularly in  the  economic  field.  The  pervasive 
pn'-'' 1r  of  comparatively  few multi-nationa  1  companies  to exercise  a  strong,  or 
even  decisive,  influence  on  the  economy  of  an  individual state is  now 
generally accepted;  it has  been demonstrated  frequently,  for  example  by 
the  operations  of the  international oil companies,  motor manufacturing 
firms  and  chemical  companies  in Western  Europe  and  in developing  countries. 
Only  in two major  industrial sectors  is  control of such operations  now 
exercised by  a  public international organisation in the  interest of  the 
European  peoples,  this  being  achieved  by  the  European Coal  and  Steel 
Community.  r.1r  Maurice  Edelman,  MP,  has  recently given an apt illustration 
of multi-national  company  power  - 'It is quite certain that in terms  of 
sovereignty,  the multi-national Chrysler,  Detroit will have  more  to say and 
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more  power  to act  in  conncction
1
with Chrysler  UK  than has  the  Brussels  Commission 
or any other organ  of  the  EEC.' 
There has  always  been  a  close  relationship between  national sovereignty 
and  economic  strength.  But  in the  1970s  even the  economic  strength of the 
USA  has  proved  an  inadequate bulwark against the  coordinated actions  of  the 
oil Producing  and  Exporting Countries  in cutting oil supplies to  the  USA  and 
increasing oil prices at will.  Britain's vulnerability to  such  economic 
pressure  is greater than that of  the  USA.  Further,  for  the  last ten years, 
Britain's weakening  economy  has  increasingly been exposed to the effects  of 
decisions  on  currency and  financial matters  taken in New  York,  Zurich,  Paris 
and  Bonn.  'The  best protection against decisions  taken neither with our 
agreement  nor.  in our interest,  is the economic  power  to withstand foreign 
pressures',  in the words  of  the  British Minister Mr  R.  Hattersley.
2 
It is 
difficult to sec  how  Britain could,  outside tho  Community  and  relying prin-
cipally on  the goodwill  of  the  EEC,  the  Commonwealth  and  the  USA,  possibly 
muster sufficient  'economic  power  to withstand  foreign pressures'. 
It may  be  argued that membership of the  Community  has  since  January  1973 
equally not  endowed  Britain with notably greater economic  or political power. 
But  in  1974,  every Community  country except  Ireland  and  the  Netherlands  suf-
fered  a  change  of Government  (in  some  cases  more  than  one) ,  inevitably 
involving  a  period of political instability.  Further,  the  economic  pres-
sures  caused by  increased oil prices,  inflation,  unemployment  and monetary 
difficulties have  resulted in severe difficulties for  national governments, 
and  also for  the  Community. 
The  potential of  the  Community  for  increasing Britain's political free-
dom  of action in concert with her partners  remains  substantial.  The  Summit 
Conference  of December  1974  reaffirmed  the  political will of the  Heads  of 
Goverrunent  to realise this  potential.  The  achievements  in each  sector in 
the  last two  years  and  the  future  possibilities are outlined in later para-· 
graphs.  It is essential to emphasise  not  only that Britain can  lose 
sovereignty involuntarily, but also that a  theoretical loss  of  sovereignty 
to an  international organisation may  be  counter-acted by  a  gain  of  sovereign-
ty  flowing  from  the  increased political and  economic  strength derived  from 
membership. 
New  Statesman,  17  January  1975 
2  h  .  T  e  T~mes,  7  January  1975 
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Over  large areas,  Government  activity is necessarily carried  out  in 
modern  times  by Statutory Instruments  made  by Ministers,  many  of which  In-
struments  do  not  even  have  to be  laid before  Parliament,  let alone  be  subject 
to approval  or  annulment by either House.  Customs  duties,  transport,  public 
health,  and  many agricultural price decisions  are  just  some  among  many 
examples  of this process.  Legislation in these  fields  by the Community 
since British accession should  thus  not affect  'Parliamentary sovereignty' 
to any measurable  extent if a  comparison is made with  the situation before 
accession.  This  was  certainly the experience,  after similar doubts  had 
been expressed,  in the  six former  Member  States  of the Community,  as  shmm  by 
a  study made  by  the Directorate General  for  Research  and  Documentation in 
1 
1974. 
A  further 'threat' to parliamentary sovereignty lies in the  'hiving-off' 
of nationalised industries  in Britain from  direct control by the Government 
and  indirect control by  Parliament.  The  re-establishment as  independent 
corporations  of  such  industries  as  the  Post  Office,  without  compensatory 
provision  for  Parliamentary control in  some  form,has  narrowed  the  range  of 
Parliament's control over  Government  expenditure  and administration. 
d  l  t  has  been  the  ~ncreasing tendency since  1945  A  more  important  eve  opmen  ~ 
·  lt t'  on  proposed  legislation to be  carried out  for  pre-legislat~ve consu  a  ~ons 
by the  Government with pressure  groups  and  organised  interests outside  Par-
liament,  in particular with the Confederation of British Industries  and  the 
Trades  union congress.  As  a  result of this widespread practice,  Parliament 
is presented with  a  fait accompli  in the  form  of  a  Bill which,  in terms  of  the 
deals made with the interests concerned,  is susceptible only to limited  amend-
mcnt  by  Parliament.  Much  of  the  legislative control of Parliament is thus 
weakened.  In contrast,  Mrs  winifred Ewing,  MP,  stated recently that she 
could obtain as  a  westminster MP  better information on  EECmatters  from  the 
2 
European  Parliament than  from  Government Departments  in London.  Further, 
the proliferation of Royal  commissions  and Committees  of Enquiry,  which 
recommend  policy decisions  on matters formerly  referred  for·conside~~tion by 
r~~fCS~~~a~ive select committees  of  Parliament,  have  furth~r.underm~ned the. 
influence  -~~dprestige o:t;  both the  Lor?s  and  the  Commons,  to  some  extent.  All 
these arc  inevitable developments,  but it is against  them  that the  €1if~c.t  of 
•  4'  '  ~  .... --~ 
1 
!llembership  of  the Community  ori  British sovereignty must  be  seen. 
Over  2~0?0  Statu~ory Instruments were  made  last year.  It is true that 
the  Br~t~sh  Parl~ament could,  in theory,  and  in the last resort  revoke 
these,  but  legislation also is subject  in practice to  derogatio~s and  to 
amendment  by  subsequent  legislation.,. 
Press  Statement,  Luxembourg,  11  December  1974. 
- 9  - PE  37.461/I/rev. The  conclusions  to be  drawn  from  this brief study are that Britain has 
already pledged  considerable  elements  of her  national  sovereignty under  the 
terms  of Treaties and to various  international organisations.  The  necessity 
for this process,  forced  upon  Britain largely by  political and  economic 
pressures  since  1945,  has  rarely been challenged.  The  Community  offers 
considerably more  possibilities for  democratic  control of its institutions 
than any  other international organisation.  The  sovereignty of the British 
parliament is  now  subject to ever increasing limitations,  mainly  flowing 
from  an accretion of  power  to the central government. 
The  Second  Report  on  European political cooperation on  foreign  policy1 
contained proposals  for  measures  of political cooperation which were  agreed 
by  the  Nine  Foreign Ministers  and  subsequently approved by  the  Nine  !leads 
of State or of  Government.  Most  of  the developments  in the  foreign  policy 
of  the  Community  have  been within  'the  framework  of political cooperation', 
i  ~. based  on  recommendations  by the  Political Committee  (the  'Davignon 
Committee'),  composed  of  the  Directors of the Nine Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs.  Political cooperation is thus  conducted  on  an  inter-governmental 
rather than  on  a  Community basis, but there arc  signs  that the distinction 
between political cooperation  and  Community action is becoming  less clcar.
2 
After every meeting  of  the Nine  Foreign Ministers  in the  framework  of 
political cooperation,  the  President-in-Office of the Council  of Ministers 
meets  the  Political Affairs Committee  of  the European  Parliament  to  report  on 
the Committee meeting.  These  'colloquies'  offer a  valuable  opportunity to 
Members  of  the  Parliament to gain  - and also to seek further  - information on 
current foreign  policy matters.  British Conservative  and  Liberal Members 
havo  participLlted  fully  in the  colloquies  and  have  gained  information there 
noL  available  to  MembcrM  of  NL~.tional  Parliamcntn. 
Pulitical cooperation was  launched  only  in  1970  but  in  1973  and  1974  has 
developed  strongly.  It has  been  important  for  Britain to be  represented at 
the experts'  consultations  and  the Foreign Ministers'  meetings  on  political 
coopera'tion  for this is where  the  foreign  policy of  the Nine  has  been evolved. 
Following  the  1974  Paris  Summit  Conference,  political cooperation is  likely 
to increase in importance  as  a  means  of  forging  a  common  Community view in 
foreign  policy fields  of vital interest to the  UK  and,  in the  longer term,  of 
making  P:t:"_~9Eess  towards  a  European  Union. 
1  Seventh General  Report:  of  the  CommisGion  (Doc.  3GB/73),  Annex  4  to Chapter 
II,  September  1973;  Command  Paper  S432. 
2  e.g.  the  inclusion of  representatives  of both  the Council  and  the Commission 
in the delegation of the  country exercising the  presidency of  the Council 
at the Conference  on  Security and Cooperation  in Europe at Geneva. 
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Following Secretary of State Kissinger's  speech  in April  1973  suggesting 
that  a  joint Declaration of  Principles be  drawn  up  on  EEC-US  relations,  the 
Community  response  has  been  prepared within the  framework  of political coop-
eration.  Discussions at expert and at Foreign Minister  level resulted in the 
Declaration  on  European  Identity,  agreed at the Copenhagen  Summit  Conference 
in December  1973.  In  paragraph  14 it is stated that  'the  Nine  intend to 
maintain their constructive dialogue  and  to develop their cooperation with 
the  US  on the basis of equality and  in a  spirit of friendship'.  Hnd  Britain 
not been  a  member  of the Community,  she  could  never  have  hoped  to cooperate 
with  the  USA  'on the basis  of equality'. 
On  11  June  1974  the  Nine  Foreign Ministers agreed  on  a  formula  for 
consulting the  US  by which,  if one Member  State considered it essential that 
a  non-Community State should  be  consulted  on  any  issue, it would  inform  the 
other  Member  States.  The  Nine  would  then try to agree  on  joint consultation 
before finally deciding  on  the  issue in question.  Dr  Kissinger agreed  to 
this  formula  as  a  basis  for  future  consultations with  the  Nine  on matters 
arising within Europe  or  else~tere.  Britain's voice might  have  been con-
siderably more  muted  had  she  not  been able to add  it to those  of  the other 
Eight  in claiming  a  position of equality with the  USA  in these matters. 
(d)  The  Near  and  Middle  East 
The  Community  is  involved in the Middle  East  in various ways.  First, 
several of its Member  States,  particularly France  and  Great  Britain,  have 
had  close political and  economic  ties with Arab  countries  such as  Egypt, 
Syria,  the Lebanon  and  Sudan,  and with Israel.  Second,  Turkey,  Greece  and 
Cyprus all have Association Agreements with the Community,  which  has  a 
special responsibility to follow closely their political and  economic  fortunm. 
In the third place,  the  Community is,  as  part of its external economic 
policy,  on  the  point of  launching  a  comprehensive  'Mediterranean policy', 
forging closer economic  links with  the countries  along  the  southern and 
eastern shores  of  the Mediterranean  Sea  includincJ also  Malta.  l~ourthly, 
the  Community wishes  to  embark  on  a  'dialogue'  with  the  twenty member  coun-
tries of the Arab  League.  This  dialogue was  originally proposed  by the 
Arabs  in December  1973  during  the  Copenhagen  Summit,  but has  been held in 
suspense  since  November  1974  until the status of the  Palestine Liberation 
Organisation in the  dialogue  has  been determined.  Its purpose is to offer 
Western industrial and  technological facilities  and  'know-how'  to the Arab 
countries,  in return for Arab  agreement  on  arrangements  for mitigating the 
economic effects  of the  increase in oil product  prices. 
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between Turkey  a~d Greece  over Cyprus  in July  and  August  1974.  Her  position 
was  Btrcngthcned by the  support  of her  Community  partners,  which  helped to 
offset the  predominant  influence in the  Middle  and  Ncar  East  of the  USA. 
Equally,  Britain's InembcrBhip of  the  Community  hu.s  enabled her not  only to 
offer preferential trading agreements  for  the benefit of developing Mediterra-
nean  countries,  but to profit  from  the  increased political influence which  the 
Mediterranean policy will win  for  the  Community  Hcmbcr  States  in  perhaps  the 
most critical area  of potential conflict at present. 
(c)  Conference  on  Security and Cooperation  in Europe 
Within  the  framework  of political cooperation  ~10 Nine  coordinated their 
policy before the  preliminary meeting of the Conference  in Helsinki  in July 
1973.  Since  then,  in the  second  ~1a13e of  the  Conference  in Geneva,  the Nino 
have  Bpoken,  principally in the  Economic  Commi ttec, vli th  one voice.  This 
remarkable  cooperation has  been achieved by meeting!;  of experts  from  each of 
the  Community  Member  States,  held by  the  Commission,  to  prepare  Community 
positions  in advance.  As  a  result,  the united  policies  of  tho  Nine  have 
immeasurably greater weight,  particularly in discussiom;  with  the  USSR,  than 
the  individual viewpoint of any  single Member  State.  At  the  conference, 
substantial concessions were  made  by  the  USSR  to the Western  countries  in 
December  1974,  relating to  freedom  of movement  of  individuals  and  of circula-
tion of  information.  Once  again,  it has  patently been  to the benefit of the 
United  Kingdom  to \vicld  considerable  influence at  the  Conference 
Community  member  rather  th<:m  to attempt  to  put  forward  its views 
ted state on  the  north-west  fringe  of Europe. 
(f)  The  Commonwealth  ----------------
a c•  ,,  n  leading 
as  nn  isola-
Misgivings  have  been expressed  since  19Gl  nbout  the  prejudicial effects 
on  Commonwenl th countries of British membership  of  the  Coirmmni ty,  particularly 
on  the  economieB  of  New  Zealand  and of developing  Commonwealth  countries in 
Africa and  the  Caribbean.  Butsince Accession Day  on  1  January 1973,  the 
increase in world  prices  of  foodstuffs,  oil and  other  co~nodities has  complete-
ly overturned the  previous  relationships between developed  and developing 
countries  and also within  the Third World.  The  developing Commonwealth 
countries arc  now  asking what  Britain can  do  for  them  politically in a  rapidly 
changing  and  more  challenging world,  and  Britain's membership of  the  Commun-
ity is alreu.dy  acknowledged  u.s  being  of  great  potential u.ssistance  to  them. 
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Government  of  1966-1970,  told  the  Royal  Commonwealth  Society in April  1974 
that there were  'u lot of Commonwealth  and  Francophone  countries which  now 
see  in British membership of  the  Community  u  means  of breaking through  into a 
wider  relationship with  Western  Europe  as  a  whole'.  Economic  and  political 
considerations  can  never be divorced,  and  the  Community has  never forgotten 
the  intention stated in the  Preamble  of the  Rome  Treaty  'to ensure  the devel-
opment  of  the prosperity of overseas  countries'.  The  Paris  Summit  Conference 
pledged  the  Community  anew  to political links with  the Third  World.  Britain's 
relu.tions wilh old  uncl  new  Commonwculth  countries  have  in many  cases  been 
ultercd  and  in some  cases weakened.  !Jut  the Community  has  offered her  a  new 
outlet for her political experience  and  technical knowledge  in furthering the 
interests  not only of the developing  countries  of the  Commonwealth  but of the 
old Commonwealth  countries  such as  Canada,  Australia  und  New  Zealand. 
Mr  George Thomson  put  the political advantages  of British membership of 
the Community  in another light, when  speaking of the  negotiations  between  the 
Community  and  43  Third World  countries  (mainly  in Africa,  but  including ulso 
West  Indian and  Pacific Ocean  Commonwealth  countries)  to replace  the  Yaound~ 
Agreement.  Not  only were  the  43  countries more  united  than  the  Nine  of the 
Community  in face  of the  negotiations,  but  in his  experience  'in twelve months 
in Africa  the Commission  has  done  more  to break down  the barriers  left behind 
by  European  colonialism  than  twelve  years  of  independence  has  done.'  The 
final  agreement  in  February  1974  on  a  new  Convention was  warmly welcomed  by 
the Third World  countries  and  by  Mrs  Hart,  the  British Minister  involved  in 
the  negotiations.  Mr  cheysson,  of  the  European  Commission,  said  'this agree-
ment  is unique  in the world  and  in history:  for  the first time,  an  agreement 
between  industrialised  countries  and  the Third World  has  been  reached with 
perfectequality between  the  two  parties.'  Thus  British membership has,  in 
the short  time  since accession,  helped her  Commonwealth  partners  in Africa, 
the Caribbean and  the  Pacific to make  a  bold step forward,  in unity with 
other developing African countries,  towards  a  stronger political position and 
more  favourable  terms  of  trade  and  uid  than  they could  have  hoped  for before 
British entry. 
Accession  to the  Community  has  had  little immediate  effect on  the working 
of the British legal system.  The  legislative  powers  granted  to the  Community 
institutions are  limited by  the  EEC,  ECSC  and  EURATOM  Treaties  to certain de-
fined  purposes,  which are mainly economic  in nature.  Community  law operates 
only in the  field covered by  the Treaties,  the  principal fields  being  customs 
duties;  agriculture;  free  movement  of labour,  services  and  capital;  and 
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British domestic  law has  remained  unchanged.  In any  case,  Community  provi-
sions having direct internal effect arc  considered  by  the  UK  Courts,  upon 
which  is  laid  the  duty  of  interpreting Community  provisions  and  relating them 
to United  Kingdom  law.  Moreover,  the charnctcr of British legislation and 
the  nature  of  the  British legal  system arc,  following  accession,  fully  taken 
into account  in  the  preparation of  Community  lccrislation. 
The  legal  impact of Community membership is considerably simplified by 
the  fact  that most  of the  Community  law having direct internal effect,  in so 
far as it imposes  obligations,  does  so in relation to industrial and  commer-
cial activities,  and  does  not  touch citizens in their private capacities.
1 
Such  Community  laws  as directly affect private individuals  confer rights 
rather than  impose  obligations.  Thus  a  worker  in a  Community  country  is 
entitled to take  up  employment  in any other Member State;  and  Community 
citizens benefit  from  reciprocal arrangements  enabling  them  to obtain medical 
treatment and  care  from  the health services  of  any  Community  country. 
()._ . )._. )  d  f  th  1.  t 2 
Bu  getary powers  o  e  European  Par  lamen 
On  6  June  1973  the Commission made  proposals  to the Council  on  the 
strengthening of  the budgetary  powers  of  the European  Parliament
3
•  These 
were  the  subject of  a  report  of  l:he  Parliament's  Committee  on  Budgets which 
was  debated  in October  1973.1)  Parliament  adopted  a  rc::;olu-
tion which  covered  the  creation of revenue,  the  approval  of expenditure,  the 
discussion and  adoption of the  Budget  and  the supervision of its implemcnta-
tion5  The  first  point. in the  resolution  wn~  that  common  procedures 
should be  used  to adapt the Community's  common  resources  to the  needs  of  com-
man  policies.  Such  procedures would still allow the Governments  of !'!ember 
states to refer the matter to their National  Parliaments  and  therefore,  once 
the  Commission had made  a  proposal  for  the  rnising  of  revenue,  the Council 
should first give their unanimous  consent  (having if necessary referred to the 
National  Parliaments)  before  the  Parliament took  any decision. 
1  Command  Paper  3301;  Legal  and  Constitutional Implications  of  UK  Membership 
of the  European  Communities 
2  Whereas  the  British  Budget  deals  principally with  the  raising  of  revenue, 
the  Budget  of  the Community  covers  revenue  and  expenditure. 
3  COM(73)1000 
4  Doc.  175/73 
S  OJ  C  87/8,  1973 
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of disagreement,  a  'conciliation committee',  with  equal  representation of 
Parliament and council,  in the  presence  of the  Commission,  should meet  to seck 
a  solution.  Failing an  agreed solution at a  second attempt,  the  first 
attempt  having  failed,  the  Opinion  of Parliament,  if supported by a 
considerable majority of its Members,  could only be  modified  by the Council 
unanimously.1  Parliament  further  asserted its right to adopt  the  draft 
Budget  or  to reject it in whole  or  in part.  Parliament accepted the 
Commission's  proposal  to set  up  a  Court  of Auditors  as  an  effective and 
independent  externnl  auditinq  llocly,  ancl  insisted thnt  the  Court  Hhould 
report to Parliament  and  should assist  nnd  advise  it at all times. 
The  Commission accepted  most  of  Parliament's  proposals, modified its 
original scheme,  and  submitted it to the  Council.2  In June  1974,  the  Council 
3  agreed  to Joint Guidelines  on  Budgetary  Powers,  which were  then  the subject 
of  a  series of discussions between  the Council  and  a  delegation of the  Parlia-
ment.  As  a  result, most  of  the  points at issue have  been settled on  the  lines 
proposed by  Parliament.  Parliament however  is still considering its response 
to a  draft Joint Declaration  (by  Parliament,  Council  and  the  Commission)  on 
the conciliation procedure,  which  was  in January  1975  proposed  by  the Council. 
50.  The  Joint Guidelines  of June  1974  contained draft amendments  to certain 
articles of  the Treaties,  a  draft  text  in the  form  of Treaty amendments,  with 
the  object of setting up  the  European  Court  of Auditors,  as well as  a  Joint 
Declaration  on  the  conciliation procedure,  which  has  since been  superseded  by 
the draft of  January  1975. 
In the Joint Guidelines,  it is  proposed that  Parliament  should  have 
power  -
(a)  to require  the  Council  to act  by  a  qualified majority when  'rejecting' 
any modifications  proposed  by Parliament  where  they do  not  increase 
the total amount  of the  budget. 
(b)  to reject by different specific majorities  the draft budget  in toto if 
there is  'substantial justification'.  In this case the  Parliament must 
give  'particularly clear reasons'  for  its action. 
1  Following  consultations between  the Council  and  Parliament,  this  particular 
aspect will  probably be  re-examined  after a  trial period. 
2  COM(lOOO)  final 
3  Doc.  135/74 
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appointed. 
(d)  to request the  Court  of Auditors  to deliver  an  opinion  on  any matter,  and 
request their assint:ance  in  the exercise of  Parliament's  control over  the 
implcmcnlat:ion of  the  lludqct. 
(e)  to request that  the conciliation procedure with  the  Council  be  initiated 
in the event of  the  Council departing  from  the  Opinion of  Parliament  on 
any  proposal with major  financial  implications. 
The  conciliation procedure  can be  initiated by the Joint Declaration of 
Parliament,  Council and  Commission without  reference to Member  States in the 
form  of a  'gentleman's  agreement';  this will probably be  achieved quite soon. 
on  the other hand,  the  amendments  to the Treaties outlined  in sub-paragraphs 
(a)  to(d)  above  must  be made  in accordance with Article  236  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
By  this Article,  the Council,  after consulting the Assembly  and  the  Commission, 
must  first deliver an  opinion  in favour  of calling a  conference  of  represen-
tatives of  the Governments  of  Member  States.  If the Council decides  on  this 
course,  its President  convenes  the  conference  for  the  purpose  of  seeking 
agreement  on  the Treaty amendments  to be made.  It is not  known  where,  or 
when,  this  conference will be  convened. 
Since  Britain's accession to the  EEC,  therefore,  significant steps have 
been  taken  towards  effective control of  the  revenue  and  expenditure of the 
Community  and  towards  supervision of the way money  voted by  Parliament is 
spent.  Parliament has  also voted to set  up  a  special committee,  similar to 
the  Public Accounts  Committee  - a  peculiarly British institution - to advise 
it on  the  adequacy  of the control of Community  revenue  and  expenditure. 
British members  of  the  Parliament  played  a  leading role in these developments, 
which  have  resulted in some  immediate  tightening of budgetary control by 
Parliament  and  provided  the prospect of considerably more  effective control 
in the  future,  provided that the Member  States'  Governments  agree  to the 
amendments  to the Treaties. 
The  theoretical,  but  rarely used,  power  of the  House  of Commons  to 
reject thC!  British Government's  revenue  proposals  contained in the  Budget, 
and its expenditure  proposals  embodied  in the Estimates will,  it is hoped, 
soon  be  matched  by the  practical  power  of the  European  Parliament to 
exercise greater  influence  over  or to reject the  Community  Dudget.  Equally, 
Parliament will  be  moving  towards  conciliation on all proposals  with 
financial  implications.  As  an  example  of the  use  by Parliament  of its 
new  powers,  it voted,  in  December  1974,  to increase expenditure  on 
nuclear  safety measures  at the  Joint Research Centre at  Ispra,  Italy,by 
£~m.  This  prospect  is  a  considerable  advance  on the situation in January 
1973  when  the  United  Kingdom  joined the  EEC,  and  provides  a  great 
potential  safeguard  for  the  British taxpayer.  It now  rests with  Member 
States to agree  swiftly to the  draft Treaty amendments  in order to achieve 
this  important  step forward. 
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The  main point at  is~me is Article  129  of  the Act  of Accession,  which 
fixes  the financial contribution  of  the United Kingdom at 19.32%.  This 
percentage,  which  is  a  point of reference  and not the  actual rate applied, 
is considered several points higher  than  the  contribution which  the United 
Kingdom feels it should  'correctly'  be paying at the  end  of  the transitional 
budgetary period  (1980).  The  'correct'  level of  the  contribution would 
depend  solely on  each Member  State's ability to contribute,  the best 
indicator for  which  would be  the gross national product.  On  4  June  1974 
Mr  callaghan,  Foreign Secretary,  stated that the United Kingdom's  share of 
Community gross  domestic product in 1980  - and  thus  its ability to con-
tribute  - would be  14%. 
As  regards  expenditure  - payments  by  the community to the  Member 
States  - it has been  established  that in  1973  the United Kingdom did not 
receive  as  much  from  the  community  as it contributed to it. 
These points  arc  considered below  from  the point of view of Community 
budget revenue  and  in respect of payments  made  to  the United Kingdom. 
A.  Community budget revenue  from  the United Kingdom 
The  complexity of  the rules governing  the  financing  of  the Community 
budget render  necessary  a  summary  of  the provisions  in  force before con-
sidering the United  I<:ingdom'~;  contribution. 
l. summnry  of provisions  in  fore(~ 
By Decision of  21 April  1970  the  system of financing  of Community 
expenditure was  fundamentally  changed.  The  Act  of Accession  signed by 
the  three  new Hember  States  confirmed this  change,  while  making certain 
arrangements  allowing  them to make  a  reduced  contribution to the budget 
for  a  transitional period. 
(a)  The  Decision of  21 April  1970 
Until the  end  of  1970  the Community  budget was  financed  solely from 
contributions  from  the Hember  States,  marked  as  expenditure against their 
own budgets.  To  put an  end  to this dependence  and  to give  a  degree  of 
autonomy  to  the Community,  it was  granted certain items  of revenue  as  'own 
resources'.  These  resources  include,  in  the first place,  agricultural 
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levies  and  customs  duties_.  The  creation of  the  customs  union  and  the 
common  agricultural policy could  have  given rise to disputes  as  to who 
should benefit from  such  revenue.  A  levy  or  customs  duty  charged at 
Rotterdam might well have  applied  to  an  item of  merchandise  admitted in 
free  circulation to the Community  and  destined for  consumption  in Germany. 
Without  a  customs  union,  the  item concerned would have been  subject to 
duty at the German border. 
Funds  from  these  two  sources  constitute  the  first part of  Community 
revenue.  They  amounted,  for  the  Nine,  to approximately  2,500,000,000 u.a. 
in  1973  and have been put at  2,900,000  u.n.  for  1974.  A  figure  of 
3,800,000,000 u.a.  is  forecast  for  1975.
1 
Since  these  two  sources  arc  insufficient to  finance  the budget  (5,000  m 
u.n.  in  1974  anc1  5,800 m u.a.  in 1975), tho  Community  was  granted another  source 
of revenue,  namely  one  percentage point of  value  added  tax  (VAT).  One 
condition  has  to  be  met before this  share of  VAT  could be  levied, 
however:  the basis  for  the  assessment of  VAT  hus  to be harmonized 
in all Member  States,  because  otherwise  inequalities  in  the relative 
amounts  appropri-ated  to  the Community  could  appear.  This  job of harmoniza-
tion is taking time,  not least because of  the  need  simultaneously  to 
facilitate  the  free  movement  of  goods.  As  a  result,  the  Community 
wnll  not  nowreceive  its share of  VAT  for  the first time  in 1975,  as  had been 
planned.  An  alternative solution,  provision for  v7hich  had been made  at the 
outset,  is  therefore being <:~pplicd, whereby  the  amount  not covered by  levies 
u.ncl  cuntoms  duties  is  financed  hy  il  contribution  from  the  Member  States 
2  cnlcu.lato(l  111  JH'opm:t.lon  to  Lhoir  ro!lpective  GNI'u. 
It should be pointed out in conclusion  that,  to prevent  the  total 
relative contribution of  each  Member  State  (levies,  customs duties,  VAT 
or  contribution based  on  GNP)  rising  - or  falling  - sharply  from  one year 
to  the next,  provision is made  for  any  increase  exceeding  2%  compared with 
the previous  year  to be  compensated financially by adjustment  among  the 
Member  States  when  settling accounts.  This  provision will be  in force  from 
1975  to  1977. 3 
(b)  The  Act of Accession 
The  accession  in 1973  of  the  three  new  Member  States  involved no 
change  in the  system of  finance. 
lasting until the  end  of  1977. 
They were  granted  a  transitional period 
Levies  and  customs  duties were  made  over  to  the  Community  on  a  progressively 
increasing scale:  50%  in 1971,  62.5% in  1972,  ..  87.5% in  1974  and  100% 
in 1975.  Agricultural levies have  been made  over entirely to the  Community 
since  1971. 
2  From  1971 to  1974  this  amount  was  apportioned  among  the  Member  States  on 
the basis of  a  fixed  scale. 
3  From  1971  to  1974  the  rate  of divergence  was  1%  upwards  and  1.5% downwards. 
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modified  on  the  following basis: 
- the bases  for  calculating contributions arc: 
19.32% 
2.44% 
0.61% 
for  the United Kingdom 
for  Denmark 
for  Ireland 
- the resulting contributions arc reduced  to 
45% 
56% 
67.5% 
79.5% 
92.0% 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Since  the Decision of  21  April  1970  has  not been  amended  in any way, 
the annual rate of  increase  (or reduction)  stipulated is similarly 
applicable  to  the new Member  States.  In  1978  and  1979,  moreover,  they 
enjoy  a  specially limited rate of increase  (Article  131  of  the Act  of 
Accession). 
2.  Calculation of  the United Kingdom's  contribution 
The  Community budget is financed  in the first place  from its own  resources 
(at present customs  duties  and  agricultural levies):  it is financed  in the 
second place  - whore  own  resources  arc insufficient to meet  expenditure  -
by financial  contributions  from  the  Member  States worked  out according  to 
a  fixed scale.  Financial contributions are  to be replaced during  the  next 
few  years by  a  rate of value  added  tax not exceeding  1%.  In this way  the 
Community budget will be  completely financed  from its own  resources. 
For  the  1973  budget,  the  amount payable by  the United Kingdom was  431 
m u.a.1 ,  which  represented 8.78% of  the total budget.  This  amount is 
derived  from  the following  calculations: 
- 19.32% x  45%  (Articles  129  and  130  of the Act  of Accession) 
8.69% +  8.69  =  8.78% 
8.69% 
100 
The  first calculation  involves  the  application of  the  45%  rate for  the 
first year  of  the transitional period  (1977-78) •  The  second applies  the 
maximum  annual  increase of  1%  of each  Member  State's relative share,  as 
provided for by Article  3  (3)  of  the Decision of  21  April 1970. 
1 m u.a.  :  million units of account 
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(7,500  m u.a.  in 1973),  it was  not necessary to supplement  own  resources 
by  a  financial contribution.  Moreover,  the  75%  of  own  resources  appro-
priated to the Community  in  1973  (Article  3  (1)  of  the Decision of  21 
April  1970)  did not reduce  the United Kingdom's  share  (5,625  m u,a.). 
The  other Member  States  - with  the exception of Ireland  - made,  in  1973, 
a  financial  contribution  in addition to  own  resources. 
17.  It should be noted that the total relative share for  the United 
Kingdom  is based on  a  percentage  of  19.32 during  the transitional 
period,  to avoid adversely affecting its vitally important foreign 
trade.  This principle,  which  also works  to  the  advantage  of Ireland, 
has  been  applied since  1971  to Germany,  which  also has  highly developed 
trade  links with third countries.  The  reference scale for  calculating 
the German  share was  fixed at 31.5%  (Article  3  (3)  (c)). 
The  percmntage  share for  the United Kingdom was  fixed at 11.03, 
based  on  the  following  calculations: 
1  8.78  x  2£  (Article  130  of  the Act of Accession)  =  10.92% 
45 
- 10.92  +  10,92 
100 
11.03% 
11.03% of  the budget amounts  to  553.7  m u.a.,  entirely covered by 
revenue  from  customs  duties  and  levies. 
1 
The percentage  applied in 1973. 
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Two  changes  occur  in  the calculating procedure: 
the  annual  change  in  the  relative share  in relation to the  previous  year 
may  rise to  2%  (Article  4  (1)  of the Decision of  21  April  1970): 
- the  reference  scale of  19.32% is  replaced by  the United Kingdom's  GNP  as 
a  percentage  of total Community  GNP. 
21.  This  share,  calculated on  the basis  of Regulation  No.  2/19711,  comes  to 
19.70%.  This  figure  is  used  in calculating  the share payable by  Member 
States  when  own  resources  are insufficient. 
The  calculations  for  the  previous  years  thus  change as  follows: 
- 11.03  X  67.5  13.29% 
56 
- 13.29  X  2  X  13.29  13.55% 
100 
Estimating  the  1975 budget at 6,000  m u.a.,  the United Kingdom's  share 
would  rise to  813  m u.a.,  payable entirely on  the basis  of  own  resources. 
It can  thus  be  seen  that the figure  of  19.32% will never have been 
applied prior to 1975,  thanks  to  the weightings  reducing  the  United Kingdom's 
share,  nor will it be  after  1975,  given  the  introduction of  the  system of 
shares based  on  VAT  or,  provisionally.  GNP.  It will have  served only as  a 
reference  for  the calculation of  the  contribution owing  for the first year 
of membership. 
Working  out the  amount  a  Member  State would contribute  in tho  period 
1976-1979 would be  extremely complex.  The  number  of hypotheses  which would 
have  to be  made  to provide  the necessary data is  too high to permit accuracy. 
In particular,  it would be  necessary to possess  the  following  information: 
- the difference between agricultural prices  in the  Community  and  on  the 
world market,  so  that levies  could be  worked  out: 
- the  development of United  Kingdom  trade with  third countries  in order to 
calculate customs  duties: 
1  Regulation No.  2/71  of  the  Council of  2  January  1971  implementing  the 
Decision of  21 April  1970  on the replacement of  financial  contributions 
from  Member  States by  the  Communities'  own  resources.  (OJ  No.  L  3, 
5  January  1971) 
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of  fiscal duties.  Total duties  levied by  the United  Kingdom  on  goods 
originating  from  third countries are expected  to amount  in  1974  to  some 
7,000m  u.a.,  this amount  being  composed  of: 
- fiscal duties  or excise duties  of more  than  6,000m  u.a. 
-protective duties  of  some  700  or  BOOm  u.a.1 
From  19BO  onwards  own  resources  are  to be  appropriated  to the  Community 
without  limit.  If the  United  Kingdom  does  not  amend  its legislation on 
excise duties  (either abolishing  them,  or extending  them  to goods  produced 
on  its own  territory),  its share  of  the budget  in  19BO  will be  out  of all 
proportion to the  needs  of the  Community. 
the !lize of  the  Community budget; 
- the date  on which  a  harmonized  rate of  VAT  is introduced; 
- the  evolution of GNP,  etc. 
However,  one  could  put  forward  for  197G  a  schematic hypothesis  based  on 
the  1975  model  and  assuming  that  the  problem  of  fiscal duties  is by  then 
!"lOlved. 
1:n§._~~~~~~~ 
Budget  of  6,500m  u.a. 
United  Kingdom  relative share: 
- 13.55  x'79.5  = 15.94  +  2  x  15.94  = 16.25% 
67.5  100 
- 16.25% would  constitute the  'maximum'  rate which,  applied  to  6,500m  u.a. 
would  come  to  1,056m  u.a. 
With  BOOm  u.a.  of  own  resources  from  customs  duties  and  levies,  the 
balance  payable by  the  United  Kingdom  would  be  256m  u.a. 
1:~12.-~~~~~~~ 
Using  the  same  system,  the  United  Kingdom's  'maximum'  relative share 
would  amount  to  19.17%. 
197B  and  1979  Revenue  ---------------------
The  rate of  increase  from  one  year to the  next  is based  on  the  principle 
laid down  in Article  131  of  the Act  of Accession.  According  to this,  the 
United  Kingdom's  relative share of the  Community  budget  could  again  increase 
by  several  points  and  thus  exceed  the  19.32% rate  laid  down  in Article 129 
of  the Act.  This  would  be  due  exclusively to  the high  level of  the  United 
Kingdom's  trade with  third countries  and  to its fiscal  system.  As  far as  the 
other  Member  States  (with  the  exception of  Ireland)  are  concerned,  the 
tendency  to  a  reduction  in  customs  dut.ies,  and  particularly in  levies,  will 
I 
result  increasingly  in  the  operation  to their advantage  of  the  breakdown  based 
on  the gross  national  product. 
1  See Annex  to this  section. 
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The  system set up by the Decision of  21  April  1970  and  the Act  of 
Accession  incorporates  a  number  of regulative factors.  Some  of these  are 
temporary,  others  permanent. 
The  temporary factors  include: 
- Article  130,  which  grants  the  new  Member  States  a  reduction in their to-
tal share of the budget until 1977:  in the  years  1973  to 1977  this  share 
is reduced  to  45%,  56%,  67.5%,  79.5% and  92%,  reaching  100% in 1978.  The 
outstanding balance  is  met  by  the  old Member  States: 
- Article  3  (2)  and Article  4  (l)  of the Decision of  21 April  1970,  and 
Article  131  of  the  Act  of Accession,  setting  a  percentage  limit on  the 
unnuu.l  incn'<HH~  .in  conlrilHtlion~;  until  ·I'J79  ill  Lhc  lalcsl. 
Other  factors  are  permanent  and  apply  to all Member  States.  The  most  im-
portant of  these  is trade with third countries,  which  determines  the  revenue  from 
customs  duties  and  agricultural levies.  The  adoption of this principle in 
Community  legislation was  designed to  emphasize  Community preference,  thus 
benefitting agricultural and  industrial production in the  Community. 
Where  trade with  third countries  stands  at a  high  level,  revenue  from 
customs  duties  and  levies will be greater,  thus  increasing  a  Member  State's 
relative total share. 
Another  permanent  factor which  could reduce  the British contribution is 
application of  the principle of non-discrimination in  a  fiscal sense between 
imported  and  domestically produced products.  This  aspect has  already been 
referred to above  in the  note  on fiscal duties.  At  present fiscal duties  form 
part of  customs  duties,  because  they are  levied only  on  imports  into the 
United  Kingdom. 
The  third regulative factor is each  Member  State's contribution capacity, 
which  can be seen in terms  of: 
-either gross  national product  (provisional solution), 
- or value  added  tax  (definitive solution). 
The  authors  of  the  Treaties  chose  VAT  as  the definitive method  (Decision 
of  21  April  1970,  ratified by the parliaments  of  the  Member  States)  of giving 
the  Communities  financial  independence. 
VAT  has  the  advantage  of being calculated on  the basis  of  a  rate estab-
lished during  the budgetary year,  whereas  the scale derived  from  the  GNP  will 
always  be  on  average  four  years behind  the  current budgetary year because  of 
the  time  needed to draw  up  comparable statistics.  The  percentages  used  for 
the  1975 budgets  thus  correspond,  more  or  less,  to  the  data  for  1971. 
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of  the  GNP  and  its variations.  Compare  the  following  figures: 
- 19.32  U.K.  relative share  as  laid down  in Article  129  of  the Act  of 
19.70 
Accession: 
1 
U;K.  relative share  as  calculated by the  GNP  formula  for  1975  : 
- 19.40  U.K.  relative share  as  calculated by  the  Commission,  assuming 
harmonization of  VAT  (See  'Multiannual  forecasts  for  1974-1975-
1976',  p.l8). 
In its account  of  the  economic  and  financial  situation in the  Community 
since  enlargement  (COM(74)  1800 final),  the  Commission  casts  some  doubt  on 
the  absolute  fairness  of  the  own  resources  system.  On  page  28  it points  out 
that the  fiscal structure of each state is different and gives  a  different 
weight  to  VAT.  It goes  on  to say  that  charges  other  than  VAT  form part of 
tho  added  value  on  which  VAT  is based.  Thus  France  and  Italy,  where  direct 
taxation is  low  and  excise  duties  relatively few,  have  a  lower basis of 
assessment  for  VAT  than  the  UK  and  Ireland,  where  excise duties  and direct 
taxation play  a  more  important part.  Alignment  of  the  situation in  these 
countries  is also desirable  from  an  economic  and  social point of view. 
Structural  changes  of  this  nature,  the  Commission  concludes,  have  always 
proved difficult to  achieve  and  can only take  place  slowly. 
This  view appears  rather surprising if one  looks  at the  Commission's 
study  comparing  not  only fiscal  charges but also social  charges  in the  nine 
Member  States  of  the  Community. 2  In  comparison with  Italy and  France, 
where  direct  taxation is  low  and  social contributions  are high,  the  United 
Kingdom  collects  a  high  percentage  of direct taxes,  but social contributions 
are  considerably  lower.  Social  charges,  like direct  taxation,  surely form 
part of  the  value  added,  and  the basis  of  assessment  for  VAT  remains  valid as 
a  fair expression of  the  contributory capacity of  each  Member  State  in 
relations  to  the  others. 
1  Regulation  No.  2/71  quoted  on p.6 provides  that  the  rate applicable shall 
be  the  average  of  the  last three years,  in this  case  1970,  1971  and  1972. 
2  Fiscal statistics  1968-1972  - Yearbook  1973 
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Tho  U.I<.  contribution to the  Community budget  is at present  fixed  as 
a  percentage  of  the total expenditure  shown  in  the budget  (approx.  13.50% 
in  1975).  It is  expressed  in units  of  account  and  converted to pounds  using 
the  m~chanqe rLitc:  t.l  "'  2.4 u.a.,  which  corresponds  to the official parity 
for  Lho  pnu1td  d<'clan·d  Lo  Lhe  Intcrn;1t.ionnl  Monetary  Fund.  Because  of  the 
r~u  ill  Lllu  V.\lll<'  or  \\\(1  pound  t:ii\CL'  il  Wi\H  rloi\ll~d  01\  tile  oxchnngo  mnrl~ot, 
the  market  rate  is al present  about  El  =  1.9  u.a~ 1 
Tho  difference between  the  official rate used  for  calculating the 
British contribution to  the budget and  tho actual market rate definitely 
\YOrks  in  favour  of  the  United  Kingdom.  This  'artificietl over-valuing'  of 
the  pound enables  the  U.I<.  to cover  its debt at lower  costs,  since it is 
paying  a  smaller  sum  in pounds  than  that which would result from  the 
application of  the  actual market  rate for  tho  pound. 
This  advantage will persist for  as  long  as  the  U.K.  pays  its contribution 
by  the present method.  On  tho  other  hand,  it will disappear  in the medium 
term in respect  of  the supplementary  contribution the  U  .1~.  may be  called 
upon  to  pay  i.n  addition  to  the  customs  duties  and  levies by which  tho  U.K. 
will continue  to  cover its contribution to  the  Community  budget  for  several 
years.  This  supplementary  contribution will be  upportioned  umong  the  Member 
Stutes  according  to their gross  national  product  converted into units  of 
account.  The  United  Kingdom's  supplementury  contribution will therefore 
vary according  to  tho  pound/u.a.  conversion rate applied;  assuming  that 
the  rate is  £1  2.4 u.a.,  the gross  national product of  the U.K.  will be 
over-valued and,  therefore,  its  supplementary contribution increased.  This 
increase will be  cancelled out,  however,  if the  same  pound/u.a.  conversion 
rate is applied to the  payment  of this  contribution,  since the  over-
valuation of  the  pound will then work  in favour  of the U.K.  The  same 
argument will apply when  tho  supplementary contribution is paid  on  the 
basis  of harmonized  Vl\.T;  an  over-valued tax basis will be  matched by  an 
over-valuation of  tho  real  amount  of  currency. 
1  The  financial  regulation of l\.pril  1973  provided  for  the  payment  of  'own 
resources'  and  Member  States'  contributions  in national  currencies; 
payments  arc  calculated on  tho basis of  the  exchange  rate quoted by  the 
International Honetary  Fund  in  force  on  tho  day  of  payment. 
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,.  '  Equilibrium is not  achieved  in  two  further  respects.  When  the 
Community  pays  agricultural aid to the United Kingdom,  the  rate used  is 
£1  = 2. 0053  u.a. As the aid is  fixed  in units  of  account,  the British farmer 
will receive  more  pounds  than if the rate of  2.4 were  applied.  This  there-
fore  represents  a  gain .to the  United Kingdom. 
·,  Moreover,  in  197  3  the United  Kingdom  paid more  into the  Community 
budget  than it received.  The  negative balance has  therefore to be  changed 
into French  francs,  Dutch  florins  or Danish  crowns,  i.e.  into the  currencies 
of states which  were  net beneficiaries  from  the  Community  budget.  Because 
of  the  notional over-valuation of  the  pound,  the  Community  suffers  a  loss 
which  is  fortunately more  or  less offset by  the  DM  paid by  Germany,  which 
arc valued below their real value  and  are  changed  into Dutch  florins,  French 
francs  and Danish  crowns  because  the Federal  Republic  of  Germany  also pays 
more  than it receives.  Here  again  the United  Kingdom derives  a  financial 
d  1  1  h  .  d'  1  1  a  vantage,  a  t1oug  1n  1rect y. 
5.  Conclusions  concerning  assessment  of  revenue 
A  Hember  State can manipulate  several factors  to adjust the  revenue 
which it has  to pay to  the  Community.  Apart  from  the  extreme  case with  one 
Member  State  demanding  renegotiation  of  the  own  resources  system so  that 
it is based solely on  each  Member  State's contribution capacity  (GNP  or  VAT), 
there arc  the  following  two  possibilities: 
- either to reduce  external trade with  third countries  in favour  of  intra-
Community  trade,  both  for  agricultural products  (levies)  and  for  industrial 
products  (customs  l1uties)  and  follow  the  prlndplc of  Community  preference: 
- or  to abolish  excise duties which  arc discriminatory with respect to  the 
other  Member  States  (Article  7  EEC)  and which,  in trade with third 
countries,  increase  the  customs  protection. 
The  total contribution by  each  Member  State is not  fixed by the 
treaties solely on  the basis of contribution capacity.  It is also based  on 
the  two  principles referred to above  - Community  preference  and  non-discrimina-
tion - precisely to strengthen  Community solidarity and,  to  some  extent, 
confirm its financial  independence,  which  in turn  provides  justification 
for  the  European  Parliument's  budg<:tary  powers. 
In spite of  the  care  taken  in drafting  this  paragraph,  the  importance  and 
complexity of  the question  justify a  more  detailed study. 
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based  on  the  GNP,  there \vould be  a  risk of  loosening  the  bonds  between  the 
Member  States  and undermining  the principle at the basis  of  the  European 
Parliament's budgetary powers. 
In  this  section it has  been  noted  that the  transition in  1975  from  the 
fixed  percentage  (19.32%)  to  the variable  percentage based  on  GNP  and  later 
to  the  percentage  derived  from  VAT  should not  make  much  difference  to  the 
charge  on  the  U.K.  for  the  proportion not  covered by  customs  duties  and 
lcvies1 .  The  fixed  percentage  of  19.32  is  in fact  the  lowest of the  three 
percentages.  If a  Member  State were  faced with  economic difficulties 
having  the effect of  reducing  the  GNP,  the best way  of  ensuring  that such 
difficulties arc reflected immediately  in its contrinution to the  Communities' 
budget  is  to apply the  system of  financing  based  on  VAT. 
In  addition,  the fall in  the value  of  the  pound  has  the effect at 
present of  reducing  the  value  of  the  U.I<. 's  total contribution to  the 
Community budget.  This  reduction in value  can be  assessed by  the  following 
formula:  fall  in value  of  the  pound  x  negative balance  of  the U.K. 
D.  Communities'  budget  expenditure  in  favour  of  th_c  W<. 
There  arc  a  number  of budget  i terns  which,  by their  na turc,  cannot  produc(~ 
payments  for  the benefit of  a  Member  State.  These  arc: 
- administrative  expenditure, 
- food  aid, 
- research and  investment expenditure. 
The  expenditure which  can be  calculated as  reverting to  a  Member  State 
is  mainly  that of  the  Social Fund  and  the  EAGGF.  The  operating budget 
expenditure  of  the  ECSC  should also be  mentioned. 
l.  The  1973  budget  2 
According  to the  report  on  the  implementation of  the  1973  budget 
submitted by  the  Commission  in April  1974,  Community  expenditure  amounted 
to 4,227.8  m u.a.  (payments  and  appropriations  carried forward).  (The 
initial budget  estimates  were  5,134  m u.a.).  The  revenue  was  slightly 
higher:  4,472.2  m u.a.  As  the  own  resources  collected by the U.K. 
(making  up  the entirety of its share,  to the exclusion of  the supplementary 
1  It is  assumed  that between  1975  and  1979  the U.K.'s  relative share will 
increase  to  the  point were  customs  duties  and  levies will no  longer  cover 
its entire contribution. 
2  A  study of  the  results  of  the  1974  financial  year,  giving  the  relevant 
figures,  is  not  possible  at  tlw  time  of writing  (,Tanuary  1975). 
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collected but to the  total expenditure of  the  Communities,  the  resources 
actually pa:i.d  in by the  United  Kingdom will have  been 
4,472.3  x  431  m u.a. 
5,134.5 
The  expenditure which  might  produce  a  return  amounts  to: 
3,838 
4, 277.8 
Expenditure  lost amounts  to 439.8  m u.a. 
89.7% 
The  United  Kingdom  could therefore expect  370  x  89.7% 
the  most  as  a  'fair return',  that is  £138m. 
1  370  m u.a. 
332  m u.a.  at 
The  United  Kingdom has  received £82.5  m  from  the  EAGGF.  This  figure 
is  taken  from  the  'Annual  Review  of Agriculture  1974';  it relates to the 
financial year April  1973-March  1974  (p.35).  The  figures  obtained  from  the 
.  .  .  '1  2 
Comm~ss~on are  very  s~m~ ar  . 
The  UK  received  aid  only  from  the  'Guarantee'  section  of  the  EAGGF; 
nothing  could be  given  under  the  'Guidance'  section,  as  the  decisions  on 
commitments  had  not yet been  taken  for  1973  because  of  the delay  involved 
in the examination  of projets  and  the  approval of expenditure. 
The  U.K.  has  received  57.40  m u.a.,  or  £24m,  in the  form  of  commitments 
from  the Social Fund for  1973
3
. 
The  total'revenue'  of  the U.K.  amounts  to £82.5  +  24  =  £106.5  m, 
compared  wi~1 the  £138m whicl1  it might have  expected  as  a  'fair return'. 
The  gross  deficit would be  £31.5  m,  from  which  must be  deducted  the  10% 
drawback  on  the  customs  duties  collected by  the  Member  States.  This  10% 
represents  £15.5 m. 
The  net  loss  of  the  U.K. can be  estimated at 31.5  - 15.5  =£16m,  that is 
38 million u.a.  or less  than  1%  of the  Communities'  budget  (not  including 
the  'lost expenditure'  listed at the beginning). 
1  431  m u.a.:  U.K.  contribution provided  for  in  1973  budget. 
2  For  1973  the U.K.  received 151.8 m u.a.  from  the  'Guarantee'  section of 
the  EAGGF.  As  very little wns  received  in the  first  3  months  of 1973 be-
cnuae  of the  time  needed  to set up  the machinery the  fig\';ro  for  tho fi.rst  3 
months  of  1974  should bn  added  to this.  Advances  nmdo  to  the  U.K.  during 
these first  3  months  were  53.5  m u.a.  Actual expenditure will probably 
be  very ncar  this  figure.  It can therefore be said that  in the first 
year  the  U.K.  will have  received 151.8 +  53.5  ==  205.3  m u.a.  or £85.6 m. 
Sec  Cha.ptcr  III,  Annex  on this  (common  agriculturnl. poli<~y). 
3  Since  the  UK  only  contributes  custom duties  and  levies,  the  10%  reim-
bursement  is applied  to all the  contributions to the  Community budget. 
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The  Act  of Accession  (Articles  50  to  64)  provides  that agricultural 
pri~cs in the  new Member  States shall be progressively aligned  (in six 
stages)  with  the  common  prices.  To  allow free  movement  of agricultural 
products  having different prices,  compensatory amounts  may  be granted or 
levied. 
On  imports  into  the  UK  from  a  Community  country,  the  exporting 
country may  grant  a  compensatory  amount,  covered by  the  EAGGF,  to bring 
the price to  the  lower  level applied  in  the  UK. 
In  1973  the  compensatory  amounts  on  accession financed by  the  EAGGF 
amounted  to  264.3  m u.a.  A  large proportion of this expenditure  thus 
enabled  the British consumer  to buy agricultural products at a  relatively 
low price,  'Vlhereas  the ur.ices  on  the world murket  showed  a  spectacular 
rise for  some  products. 
It should  he  noted,  however,  that agricultural  imports  into the  UK 
from  the  Community  involve,  as  a  corollary,  a  potential reduction  in export 
refunds  (intra-Community  trade reduces  the sale of products  to  third 
countries) ,  and  a  reduction in the  levies  on  imports  into  the  UK  from 
third countries. 
The  sum  of  264.3  m u.a.  cannot therefore be considered in isolation. 
The  total effect should be  determined. 
to estimate it. 
3.  The  1Guidnnce'  section of  the  EAGGP 
Unfortunately it is not possible 
Of  the  important  items  in the  budget,  the  'Guidance' Section of  the 
EAGGP  did  not benefit  the  UK  in  1973  because of the  time-lag  involved  in 
the  preparation of  the  documentation by each  Member  State  and its examination 
by the  commission. 
It is interesting,  however,  to know what  this country can  hope  to 
receive as  a  contribution  to  the solution of its financial  and  agricultural 
problems. 
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lying the establishment of  the  'Guidance'  section of  the  EAGGF.  Regulation 
No.  25  of  4  April  1962  on  the  financing of  the  common  agricultural policy 
laid down  the one-third rule,  under  which the  aim was  that the  annual  con-
tribution to  the  guidance  expenditure  should as  far  as possible represent 
one-third of  the  amount  fixed  for  guarantee  expenditure.  This rule was 
abandoned  in 1966.  A  ceiling was  fixed far  the  'Guidance'  section at 
285  million u.a.  In  1973  this  amount  was  raised to 325 million u.a. 
The  one-third rule had been  laid down  to establish  a  balance  in the 
financial  advantages  obtained by the various producers.  Agricultural 
prices arc  fixed at  a  level enabling the  less well-placed producers  to 
receive  a  decant  income.  The  result is,  admittedly,  that tho better-
placed producers  can  draw  inccmc  from it, but  the one-third rule  harr  the 
effect of giving  the relatively weak  producers  assistance  to offset their 
structural deficiencies,  with  a  view to  a  reduction in the relative  level 
of prices  in the  m~dium term. 
When  the  'Guarantee'  section grew to  2,000 million u.a.  per  annum,  it 
was  considered expedient to limit the  'Guidance'  eh~enditurc to  a  fixed 
annual  amount.  The  aim of  the  'Guidance'  section is nonetheless still the 
same.  The  Nctherlands,·Prancc  and Denmark  have!  a  net value .added  (NVA)  per 
agricultural work unit  (A\•lU)  \vhich  is higher  than  the  EEC  average  and  these 
two  countries  arc net beneficiaries  from  the  Co~~unity budget  (the  'Guarantee' 
section represents  70%  of  the total budget) •  In principle,  therefore,  the 
other states  should be  the main beneficiaries of  the  'Guidance'  section. 
The  latter statement would  seem not to  apply  to  the  UI<,  where  the 
NVA  per  AWU  is much  higher  than  the  Community  averago
1
,  although thin high 
figure  docs  not moan  there are no  structural weaknesses  in certain regions 
or certain agricultural sectors which  may  justify u.  contribution by the 
'Guidance'  section where  u.pplicable. 
In  answer  to  an  oral question with  debate by  Mr  Gibbons2  (Ireland, 
Group  of European Progrensive Democrats)  on  the  'Guidance'  section of  the 
EAGGF,  Mr  Lardinois,  Member  of  the Commission  of  the Communities  replied 
that there were  170  million u.a.  for  individual projects in  1973;  150 
million would be granted  to  tho  old Six and  20  million  to  the  three 
1  NVA  per  AWU  in u.a.:  1971:  EEC  (Six)  2,826 
UK  4,121 
Source:  Agricultural  income  in  the  enlarged Community 
2 
Sec Report of Proceedings  of  the European  Parliament,  24  April  1974 
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States)  hud  formed  the  subject of an  'ugreement'.  The  Hember of  th~ commission 
added  that  following accession  the  total  sum  for  the  'Guidance'  section had been 
rnised by  14%  (from  285  to  325m u.a.)  and  that  any  change  in the pattern of 
distribution of appropriations  could cause difficulties  among  the  former  Six. 
Nevertheless it seems  that  the  Commission  are  (in July 1974)  on  the point of 
redistributing the appropriationn  in  a  sense more  favourable  to  thf'  ncv 1-lP.mber 
States.  It is believed thut  31m  u.a.  will be  provided  for  the latter, of which 
20m  u.a.  will be  allocated to  the  United  Kingdom. 1 
In conclusion,  the transactions of the  'Guidance'  section of the  EAGGF 
should not,  taken overall,  be  expected to  provide  a  contribution to  the  UI< 
that would  be  likely to produce  much  improvemenl  in its net  nccount  with 
respect  to  the  Community  budget.  It 1ihould be  noted,  however,  that  the  UK 
can  derive  importunt  advantages  from  the  implementation of the directive on 
hill-farming and  farming  in other less  favoured  areas. 
4.  The operational budget of the  ECSC 
This budget  is finetnced  by  resources  derived mainly  from  the  ECSC  levy, 
the rest  coming  from  interest on  investments  and  rele<lse of part of the 
reserves.  In  1973  the product of the  leV'_{  was  62.9m u.a.  The  UI<  industries 
contributed 14.68m u.a.  or nearly one quarter.  Total  resources were  nbout 
75m  u.a.  in 1973. 
The  appropriations  for  expenditure  in  1973  were: 
- administrative expenditure  18  m u.a. 
- aid  for  roatlaptation  38  m u.n. 
- aid  f  1 )  steel  or resenrc1)  coal  18.5 m U.il. 
- aid for  coking  coal  4  m u.a. 
- aid towards  the payment of interest  6  m u.a. 
It is very difficult to  determine  the  amount  of aid  for  research 
uccruing to  any one  Member  State.  Administrative  r~xpenditurc has  to  be 
considered as overheads which it is impossible to divide between  the  Hember 
States.  Aid  for  readaptation was  of little benefit to  the  UK  (0.65 million 
u.a.)  as  the latter had  delayed  the  submission of its applications  for  1973. 
Up  to  the  end of 1972  aid  for  coking coal only  benefit~d the Federal 
Republic of Germany  and  Belgium. 
Aid  towurds  the  payment  of interest was  of no  benefit to  the  nc\v  Hcmbcr 
States because of the normal  delays  involved  in examining  financing projects. 
The  draft budget  for the  1974  financial  year  shows  that  the United 
Kingdom  should  receive about  20m  u.u..  a1J  u.id  for  readapt<ttion of workers. 
1  Confirmation of this position is given  in the  ;:tnswer  to  Mr  Drewit~'  I·Jritten 
Qurstion No.  349,  Q,J  No.  C  145,  22  November  1974. 
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by  the United  Kingdom  could  amount  to  1,200m u.a.  rather than to  BOOm  u.a. 
This  increased  amount would  have  the effect of delaying the moment  when 
resources  calculated on  the basis  of  the  GNP  and  VAT  would  begin to cover 
a  part of the  United  Kingdom's  contribution. 
2.  Article  38  of  the Treaty of Accession  provides  that duties  of  a  fiscal 
nature  (described as  'excise duties'  in the  chapter  on budgetary matters) 
must be  removed  at the  latest by 1st January 1976,  except  for  those  on 
tobacco.  The  latter, which bring in  an  annual  revenue  of about  3,000m  u.a. 
to the British Government,  may  be  retained until  1  January 1978. 
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PE  37.462/rev. SECTION  I  -THE  ACHIE~~N~OP~_QQMMON MARKBT 
ONE  YEAR  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
European  integration is not  a  matter of  a  single year.  Nor  can much 
be reasonably concluded concerning  the benefits  and  disadvantages  of membership 
in  the Europe<m  Community  from  one  year  in  the  EEC.  Accession  leads  to  a 
certain restructuring of  ~10 economy.  This process of adaptation  eventually 
produces  advantages,  but it m;~ cause  temporary difficulties. 
Great Britain takes part as  a  full member  in  the decision-making process 
in the  Community,  but does  not yet  form  part of  tho  customs  union.  It is 
not until  1977  that the  link-up with  the Community will be  completed.  It 
would,  therefore,  be  just as  incorrect to  expect miracles  from membership 
in  the  short  term  as  unreservedly  to credit favourable  developments  which 
took  place  in  the British economy  in  1973  to  the  Community.  It is attract-
ive,  but not warranted,  to  ascribe  the  economic  growth of  approximately  6% 
in real  terms  in  1973  to  the  accession.  Accession  undoubtedly did have 
some  effect last year  (especially as  a  result of  anticipation of  the situation 
which will have  arisen  in  a  few  years).  nut it seems  probable that the 
principal economic  indicators  in  the period since  1  January  1973  have boon 
more  subject to  the effects of  tho rise in raw material prices,  the  deprecia-
tion of the  £,  and  tho  short-term reflationary measures  taken by  the British 
Government  in  autumn  1971  and  in  the  1972  budget  than  to  that of the  as  yet 
incomplete  membership  in the  Community. 
A •.  FREE  MOVEMENT  OF  GOODS 
The rapid  achievement of  the  customs  union  is frequently mentioned  as 
one  of  the great achievements  of  tho European  Community.  In  fact,  customs 
union has  not yet been  fully realized,  even  among  the original Six.  We 
have  not progressed much  further  than  a  tariff union.  For  customs  union, 
harmonized  customs  legislation  and  customs practices are still necessary. 
The  Commission  hopes  to  have  harmonized customs  legislation sufficiently 
by  1  January  1975  for  the  system of  tho  Community's  own  resources,  insofar as 
these  are  derived  from  the  external duties,  to  function  in  an  equitable 
manner. 
Free movement within  the Community  (even  among  the original six Member 
States)  is still hindered by controls connected with fiscal differences, 
currency ragulations,  the presumed necessity or  otherwise of maintaining 
national statistics,  Community regulations  in  the  areas  of transport and 
agriculture,  and  finally,  with  technical obstacles  to  trade  and  those relating 
to health  and plant health. 
- 1  - PE  37.462/I/A/rev. The  final  elimination of all these controls in  intra-Community  trade 
can  only be  expected  from  fairly thorough-going  harmonizu.tion of r-tember 
States'  legislation in  these  fields. 
Some  steps have certainly been  taken to facilitu.te intra-community 
movement  of goods  and persons.  Regulation  No.  542/691  means  a  considerable 
simplification in the movement of goods. 
A  very important condition which must be mot before  the  free movement 
of goods  can be  achieved is the  abolition of technical obstacles  to  trade. 
This  process is slowly but surely till(ing place,  and  at the moment,  all the 
remaining  obstacles  arc  due  to be  removed  in  the next five  years.  Although 
9Xpcrience with time-tables  in this area has  not been  altogether satisfactory 
in  the past,  thoro  is  some  reason  to  take  the  time-limit seriously on  this 
n<"CcHJi.un,  tdiiC'tl  t·Iw  C<umniHHi<lll  in  now  ovic1ontly  rnacly  to  harmonize  only  as 
llllll'"  dll  i H  lltH'tllllldi"Y  I,,,.  I  tlolll<llldl>l (I  lliiWl" i ()II j 11'1  or  tho  Common  Mnrkflt,  itnrl 
has  ollminnt.od  <Ill  por.(octiuni:nn. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Community  hns  met  with much  criticism 
because  of the attention it has  given  to technical obstacles to trade.  In 
most  instances quite  unjustly,  the  Commission  isportrayed as  seeking to 
limit consumer  choice  by  imposing  a  uniform  'harmonized'  product  on all the 
citizens of the  community.  In  fact,  its aim is almost  always  to prohibit 
Member  States  from  restricting the  importation of a  product  from  one  of the 
other  Member  countries  for  irrelevant  reasons;  the  harmonization relates to 
provisions which  restdct imports,  not  to the  actual product.  To  the  extent 
that  the  comminsion  is successful,  the  consumer  getn  more  choice  and better 
protection. 
So  far,  the Council has  approved  35  directives in  tho  area of  technical 
obstacles  to  trade in industrial products;  34  proposals  are still waiting 
to be dealt with by  the Council. 
A  customs  union  (i.e.  an  economic  area with  free internal movement of 
goods  and  a  common  external tariff)  increases  the  all-round prosperity of 
its members.  This  can be  attributed to  'economies of scale',  sharper  com-
petition in  a  larger  economic  unit and more rapid dissemination of 
industrial know-how. 
1  OJ  No.  L  77,  29.3.1969 
- 2  - PE  37.462 /IlA /rev. The  effect of  free  movement  of goods  tends  to be underestimated, 
since  frequently it is only  the  abolition of customs  tariffs which  is  taken 
into consideration  in this  connection.  However,  the non-tariff obstacles 
to  trade arc at least as  important.  These  are  (a}  the  technical  and health 
regulations which  products must  comply with if they arc  to be  admitted into 
a  country by way  of trade,  and  (b)  the  numerous  stipulations made  by public 
customers  (the  source of  a  continually rising proportion of business 
orders)  to national suppliers.  Since  too  little account is  taken of  these 
non-tariff obstacles  to  trade  in  evaluating  the effects of  a  customs  union, 
the prosperity benefits of  a  customs  union  for  its members  arc  probably 
undercstimated1 • 
The  'economies  of scale'  (more  efficient production  from  longer  runs) 
which  are possible in  a  customs  union  lead to  lower  production costs.  It 
has  admittedly been  concluded  from  the  fact  that giant enterprises  do  not 
always  work  more  efficiently than  smaller  ones  that not  too  much  can  be 
expected  from  economies  of  scale.  This is inaccurate insofar  as it is 
not the  size of the enterprise but the  degree  of division of labour,  i.e. 
of  specialization,  which  is at issue. 
siclerable cost reductions  in  Europe. 
This  process  can still lead  to  con-
A  third reason  to  entert<1in  some  cxpcct<1tions  of  the  customs  union 
lies in the  fact  that,  in  some  branches  of industry,  the  optimum  size of 
the production unit has  rapidly increased.  While  in  1958  a  steel works 
with  a  capacity of one million  tons  had  more  or  less reached optimum  pro-
ductivity,  it is now  assumed that a  capacity of  approximately  twelve 
million  tons  is necessary to  be  able  to produce  optimally.  Similar 
increases of scale are also  apparent in  the  chemical  and other  industries. 
This  means  that many  industries must,  if they wish  to be profitable,  work 
for  a  large market.  The United Kingdom  also has  such enterprises,  and 
their prospects  are better if they can  produce  from  and  for  a  large market. 
1 
This  is true,  for  example,  for Tinbergen's calculations.  He  came  to  the 
conclusion  that in  a  common  market  a  reduction  in production costs of 
approximately  5%  can be  achieved.  But,  he  adds,  this figure is no  more 
than  a  'wild guess'  (J.  Tinbergen  'The European  Community:  Conservative 
or progressive?'- Wickscll Lectures,  p.  22).  For  the  above reasons, 
J. Williamson's  estimate  also  seems  to be  on  the cautious  side.  He  is 
of  the  opinion that integration can  add  £750m.  or  1!:2'/o  to  the British GNP 
at the  end of  the  transitional period  (Article by Williamson  in  'The 
Economics  of Europe',  1971). 
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States docs  not necessarily take place at the  expense of  third countries. 
A  confidential  document  sent,  according  to  'The Economist'  of  l  June  1974, 
by  the British Porcign  Secretary to his colleagues  in  the other Member 
States  says  that the  increase  in  intra-Community  trade is in  large part 
'new'  trade:  the  trade creation/trade diversion ratio is said to  amount 
to  around  3.5  l.  This  estimate confirms  the  view  that the United 
Kingdom still has  something  to  expect  from  participation in the  customs 
union. 
The  increase in  trade between  the United Kingdom  and  the  other members 
of the Community  does  not date  from  the  time  of  accession  (sec Annexes  I 
and II).  Between  1967  and  1973,  the United Kingdom's  total imports  increased 
in value by  146%.  In  the  sume  period,  United Kingdom  imports  from  the 
European  Community  increased in value by  204%. 
As  a  result of the fall in the  terms  of trade,  the  proceeds  from 
exports  from  the  United  Kingdom  to the other  Member  States cover an 
JncrcaHinqly  mnall<~•- nhart•  ol·  t•xpcn<lilurt!  on  imports  from  lhe.uc  countries 
(sec  Annex 11).  The  Conununity is an  important market  for  the  nritinh 
economy;  in  1973 1  imports  from  other  Member  States constituted 32.7% of 
total British imports,  and in the  same  year,  the  other  Member  States 
of the  community  likewise  took around one-third of the  Unitod  Kingdom's 
exports. 
In  1973  the British terms  of trade  showed  a  deterioration of 12% with 
consequent  adverse  effects  on  the balance  of trade.  £1,400 million of the 
deterioration in the  terms  of trade is accounted  for  by  a  rise in world 
market  primary commodity prices and  by the  depreciation of the  pound.  The 
remainder  (£300  million)  of the total fall of £1,700 million can  be  ascribed 
to the  remarkable  real  growth  in the  GNP  in  1973  (5.8%) 1 . 
1974 is also going  to be  a  bad  year as  far as the  external balance  of the 
British economy is concerned.  The  terms  of trade  have  worsened this year  too, 
and the production cutback at the  beginning of the year  (the  three  day week 
in January and  February)  with  no  reduction in  home  demand  has  stimulated 
imports. 
The United  Kingdom  has  long  had  a  large surplus  on  its 'invisibles', 
so  that the balance of current payments  always  looks better  than  the  trade 
balance.  In  1973,  the  curr.ent  account also  showed  a  deficit,  for  the 
first time  since  1968  (see Annex III). 
1A  '  .  I  nswer to wr1tten quest1on  No  104  74  by  Lord  O'Hagan,  OJ  No  c  131/74,  p.3. 
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UNITED  KINGDOH 
IMPORTS  (CIF)  (£ million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Total i'>'orld  6,436.7  7,897.5  8,315  9,036.8  9,821.1 
Total  EEC  (9)  1,706.9  2,062.8  2,151.6  2,440.2  2,916.1 
EXPORTS  (FOB)  (£ million) 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Total  l'i'orld  5,229.6  6,433.9  7,339.4  8,061.1  9,181.4 
Total  EEC  (9)  1, 391.1  1,740.2  2,065.7  2,355.7  2,660.1 
Source  Central Statistical Office  (Monthly  Digest of Statistics) 
x  January to September  inclusive 
ANNEX  I  (1) 
1972  1973  1974~ 
11,155.4  15,845.4  17,089 
3,523.5  5,197.1  5,651.7 
1972  1973  l974!t' 
9,745.7  12,436  11,998.6 
2,939.7  4,030  4,032.9 ANNEX  I  (2) 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Imports  (C.I.F.) 
1973  1974 
January  to September  incl.  January  to September  incl. 
£  million  %  £  million  % 
World  11,231.02  100  17,089.00  100 
E.E.C.  3,684.74  32.8  5, 651.70  33 .o7 
E.F.T.A.  1,682.74  14.9  2,219.74  13 
u.s.A.  1,135.23  10.1  1,610.73  9.4 
COMMONWEALTH  1,975.45  17.6  2,453.56  14.4 
EXPORTS  (F.O.B.) 
1973  1974 
January  to September  incl.  January to September  incl. 
£  million  %  £  million  % 
World  8,958.59  100  11,998.58  100 
E.E.C.  2,846.06  31.8  4,032.90  33.6 
E.F.T.A.  1,229.65  l3. 7  l,  64 7.11  l3. 7 
U.S.A.  1,104.86  12.3  1,303.15  10.9 
COMMONWEALTH  1,526.32  17  1,937.05  16.1 
Source  Central Statistical Office  (Monthly  Digest  of Statistics) 
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26.5  27 
1967  1968 
26.5  26 
Cover 
1967  1968 
with world  81.2  81.4 
with 
EEC  (9)  81  84 
Exports  to  EEC  (9)  (FOD) 
(%  of total exports) 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
28.1  29.3  28.3  30.1 
Imports  from  EEC  (9)  (CIF) 
(%  of total  imports) 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
25.8  27  29.6  31.5 
EXTERNAL'  TRADE 
Rate  Exports  POD/Imports 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
88.2  89.2  93.4  87.5 
95.5  96.5  91.2  83.4 
ANNEX  II 
1973  1973 (!!:')  1974 (x) 
32.3  31.8  33.6 
1973  1973 (x)  1974  (~) 
32.7  32.8  33.1 
CIF 
1973  1973 (x)  1974(~) 
78.4  79.8  70.2 
77.5  77.3  71.'1-
Source  Central Statistical Office  (Monthly  Digest of Statistics) 
(!t)  January to September inclusive 
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Visible  operations  - 659  -
Invisible 
operations  +  375  .._ 
BALk~CE  - 284  + 
BAIJI..NCE  OF  PAYHENTS 
Current account  (seasonally  adjusted) 
(£  million) 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
143  - 9  +  285  - 677 
594  +  706  +  808  +  791 
451  +  697  +  1093  +  114 
Source  Central Statistical Office  (~lOnthly Digest of Statistics) 
(1)  second half 
(2)  first half 
ANNEX  III 
1973  1972 (1)  1974 (2) 
- 2375  - 1625  - 2647 
+  1165  +  794  +  611 
- 1210  - 831  - 2036 B.  CAPITAL  MOVEMENT 
The  situation 
Article  67  of the  EEC  Treaty makes  provision  for  the liberalisation 
of capital movements,  but only insofar as  is necessary to  ensure the 
efficient working of the  common  market,  with the proviso that payments  on 
current account must  in all  cases  be  freed  from restrictions. 
In  1960  u.nd  1962,  the Six clarified these provisions  by adopting  two 
1  directives  'for the implementation of Article  67  of the Treaty'. 
These provided  for  uncondi tiona! liberali sation of:  Direct investm0nts, 
investments  in  real estate,  personal  capital movements,  short-and  medium-
term credits  in  respect of  commercial transactions and  guarantees  connected 
with  them,  transfers  in  performance  of insurance  contracts  (list A)  ; 
acquisitions  and  import  and  export of securities quoted  on  a  stocl:  exchange 
(excluding units of unit trusts),  as well  as  the export of bonds  issued on 
a  foreign  market  and  denominated in  the national  currency  (list D)  .  List 
C  sets out the  following  categories of capital transactions:  issues  of 
securities by undertakings,  all security transactions not  contained in 
list B,  long-term credits  related to  commercial  transactions,  medium- and 
long-term loans  and  credits not related to  commercial  transactions  and 
guarantees  connected with  them.  The  capital movements  referred to  in 
list C  are also  to be liberali  sed  in principle.  Where  such  free  moveme:1l: 
of  capital might  form  an  obstacle to the  economic  policy of  a  Member  State, 
the latter may  maintain or  reintroduce existing restrictions.  This  reserv<J.-
tion is particularly important  in  the  case of bond  issues  and  loans  in  the 
national  currency. 
Since  1962  no  further progress  has  been  made  towards  the liberalisa-
tion of capital  movements  within  the Community.  On  the  contrary,  monetary 
crises have  led repeatedly to  the reintroduction of exchange  controls. 
The Accession  Treaty provides  a  transition period for Great Britain 
(and the  two  other new  Member  States) •  Dy  virtue of Article 124  of the 
Treaty,  Great Britain may: 
1  OJ Special Edition 1959-1962,  page 49. 
- 9- PE  37.462/I/D/rev. (a)  control direct British investment in other  Member  States 
until the  end of this year, 
(b)  restrict inter-Community transactions  related to  invest-
ments  in real estate,  until 1.7.1975, 
(c)  defer the liberalization of the operations  set out in list B 
of the above-mentioned directives of 1960  and  1962,  until 
the  end or 1977. 
The  consequences  for  the United  Kingdom 
The United  Kingdom is by  far  the  largest centre of financial operations 
in  the  Community;  'the City'  overshadows  in  every respect the much 
smaller  centres  of Frankfurt,  Paris,  Milan,  Amsterdam and Brussels.  It 
would  seem obvious  that London  ought to  become  the  dominant  financial 
centre of the  Community of the Nine.  In  the year  and  a  half since Britich 
entry,  little progress has  been  made  in this  respect,  for  obvious  reasons. 
Only when  capital  can  circulate reasonably  freely within  the  Community 
and  the monetary situation  in  the Community is once  again  reasonably 
stable  (yet another  argument  for  EMU)  can  the United  Kingdom  take  full 
advantage of its position.  Until  these  conditions  are met,  economic 
activity in all the Member  States will be  concentrated mainly on  the 
domestic market. 
With  regard to direct investments,  it may be that in the United 
Kingdom,  the effects of the first year of membership were  expected to be 
greater than  they in fact were.  The  great influx of foreign  capital did 
not materialise,  probably mainly because of the unfavourable  industrial 
relations in Englnnd.  Moreover,  British enterprises wishing  to  extend 
their activities abroad  seem to  show  a  preference  for  taking over  existing 
firms,  whereas  continental  enterprises incline more  towards  new  direct 
investment.  These  require  longer preparation,  so that the  concomitant 
capital flows  cannot  get  going  immediately. 
- 10- PE  37.462/I/B/rev. Even  so,  actual  foreign  investment by private persons  in  the 
United  Kingdom  amounted  to  £1,365  million in 1973,  compared with 
£1,008  million  in  1971  and  a  mere£  729 million in  19-72.  In  the past year, 
direct private investment by British persons  abroad  amounted  to  £1,253 
million.  (See Annex I).  Neither  the Statistical Office.of the  Community 
nor British sources  can  provide  a  breakdown  of these  figures  in  terms  of 
comparative  investment  in  the  Community  and  in other countries,  so  that 
it is difficult to  reach  meaningful  conclusions  on  this point1 
To  sum  up,  London  hLls  a  l1cad  start as  a  financial  centre,  but it 
can  take  advanl<t<JC  of  this  only  in  conclibons of relative monetary 
stability and  freedom of capital movement.  This will only be  achieved 
when  social  and  economic  conditions  in  the United  Kingdom  improve.  If 
this docs  not happen,  the long  term outflow of capital will  continue 
and it may  then  appear necessary to  apply the restrictions  provided in 
Article 124 of  tl1e Accession  Treaty or to take  even  stronger measures. 
1  Trq,de 
A  speech by  the present/Minister,  Mr  Peter Shore,  asserts  that Britain 
invested around  £300  million  in  the Community  in  1973.  It is not quite 
clear  from  the  context whether  this  sum  involves  only investments  in 
real estate:  'British money  is now washing  across  Europe;  office blocks 
in Brussels,  city centre  developments  in Germany,  ho·tels  and  farms  in 
France.  Vast acquisitions of over  £300m.  were  made  last year  and  the 
forward  commitments  in the  years  ahead,  as  major projects move  towards 
completion,  will be greater still'.  News  Release,  Labour  Party 
Information Department,  London,  Feb.  1974. 
-11  PE  37.462/I/B/rev. Foreign  investment 
in UK 
- public occtor 
- private sector 
-------------------
Total 
- ·-·-
Britiah  investment 
abroad by private 
persons 
Long-term public 
capital 
-------------------
Total 
BALANCE 
1968 
+  16 
+  567  + 
INVESTMENT 
(£  million) 
1969  1970 
- - 10 
673  +  725 
f--------f--------- --------
+  583  +  67 3  +  715 
- 727  - 679  - 773 
f  16  - 99  - 204 
---·---- ------------------
- 711  - 778  - 977 
- 1.28 I - 105  - 262 
ANNEX  I 
--
1971  1972  1973 
+  179  +  113  +  301 
+1,008  +  729  +1,365 
-------- ----·---- -------··---
+1,187  +  842  +1,666 
- 875  -1,450  -1,253 
- 27 3  - 25',6  - 254 
-------- -------- _____ .. ________ 
-1,148  -1,706  -1,507 
+  39  - 864  +  159 
Rcurcc:  Central  Statistical Office, London,  1973 
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BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS 
Total  investment  and  other capital  flows  (not  seasonally  adjusted) 
(£  million) 
Source 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1973  (second half) 
1974  (first half) 
+  1853 
707 
+  1071 
+  250 
+  1751 
Central Statistical Office  (Monthly  Digest  of Statistics) 
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A.  COMPETITION  POLICY 
In  the  paragraph  on  the  'free movement  of goods',  keener  competition 
in  a  broader  economic  framework  is cited as  one  of  the  advantages  of  economic 
integration.  This  compP tl  Lion  must  l1e  fonlered,  otherwise it will gradually 
disappear.  1~e community  competition  policy  in  therefore  in  the  intcrestn 
of all Member  States.  The  competition policy also  shows  that the  Commission 
is genuinely capable  of pursuing  a  strong policy in the  interests of the 
whole  Community,  provided that the  Member  States arc  prepared to give it 
the  necessary powers.  The  practice of Community  competition policy -
investigation of the practices of IBM  and the big oil companies  - also 
shows  that the  commission  does  not  in fact try to satisfy the big 
corporations at any price as  has  been  made  out. 
The  general  aims of British competition policy  do  not differ in 
essence  from  Community  competition policy,  so  there is no  reason  to 
suppose  that  British business would  be  more  likely to  come  into conflict 
with the  commission  than  with  the national  authorities.  Moreover,  a 
British undertaking  cannot  acquire  a  dominant  position in the  common 
market  as easily as  on  the  much  smaller  English markct
1
. 
The  Commission  has  shown  that it is not  against  take-overs  and 
mergers:  but it docs  wish  to have  some  control  over  the  concentration 
process.  This  explc-lins  the  Commission' n  proposal,  which  has  been 
approved  by  Parliament  but  not  yet  by  the Council,  to  make  concentrations 
with  combined  turnovers of at least one  thousand million units of account 
subject  to prior notification.  This has met  with  some  opposition in 
certain business circles,  particularly in the  U.K.  As  regards certain 
details this criticism is certainly justified,  as the relevant reports 
by the  European  Parliament's Committee  on  Economic  and Monetary Affairs2 
show,  but  British public opinion  can  scarcely have  any  objections to the 
idea of keeping  the  concentration process within  bounds.  In  the interests 
both of the  British consumer  and,  ultimately,  of the  competitiveness of the 
British  economy,  it is essential that  steps  should be  taken to prevent 
excessive concentrations of  economic  power. 
1Provided  the  common  market  is 
the  case. 
2 Doc.  263/73  and  Doc.  262/73 
the  'relevant market',  which  is not  always 
- 14  - PE  37 .462/II /A /rev. Cartels 
In the  15  years  since  the  Community  was  founded,  competition policy 
has  above  all been  a  cartel policy.  In this period  the Institutions of the 
community have  given  clear expression to Article  85  of  the  Treaty  in 
numerous  regulations,  reports  and  decisions.  Sections  of  the cartel policy 
which still require  further elaboration are  those  relating  in particular to 
licensing  and  know-how  agreements,  research cartels and  purchasing  and 
selling agreements. 
Business  in the  UK  is quite highly cartellised.  In  the  coming 
years  the  European  Commission will  therefore undoubtedly have  to prohibit 
a  number  of cartels or at least insist that certain agreements  are 
amended.  This  can  be  expected  to have  a  beneficial effect on  the British 
economy. 
A  community  arrangement  that greatly exercises  the  British Government 
is that relating  to  regional  aid.  The  purpose of  the  Treaty  (Articles 
92-94)  is to prevent the  Member  States bidding against each  other  to attract 
foreign  industries,  and  to eliminate distortions in competition.  The  value 
of  such  legislation is self-evident,  nor is it disputed by  the British. 
In  1971  the  Six  reached  agreement  on  an  initial measure  of 
coordination  for  regional aid:  no  'central region'  (i.e.  the entire 
community  except West  Berlin,  the  zonal  border area  of Germany,  the 
Mezzogiorno  and  areas  in  the west  and  south-west of Prance)  should  receive 
in  regional  aid  more  than  20'X,  of  the  amount  invested.  But  this division of 
the whole  Community  into  two  large categories  - central regions  and  border 
areas  - is  too  rough  and  ready.  The  true  facts  of  the  economic  and  social 
situation of regions which have  remained  or become  backward varies.  Thus 
a  more  subtle division is necessary  than  one  comprising  only  two  categories. 
Article 154  of  the Act  of Accession states  that this coordination must 
also be  introduced in  the  new  Member  States by  1  July 1973 at the latest. 
This  was  not easy  for  the  UK,  since it has  a  long  tradition of radical and 
divergent  government  measures  aimed  at reducing  regional differences  in 
prosperity. 
On  1  April  1974  Mr  callaghan stated his case  in clear terms  in 
Luxembourg:  'We  want  to make  sure  in particular,  that,  against this 
background,  we  can continue  to give  our  own  assisted areas  the help which 
they need'. 
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development  areas'  being classified as  central regions.  Although  investment 
aid in these  areas  seldom exceeds  20%,  other  financial  incentives are 
provided,  including  the  'regional employment  premium'  and  cheap loans. 
The  Commission has  strong  objections  in particular to the  regional 
employment  premium,  mainly because  such  aid is difficult to measure  and 
cannot  therefore be  compared with aid in other  regions,  but also because 
it has  in  fact  the effect of  a  'hard drug':  people become  accustomed  to it 
and  are  always  needing more. 
Regional  aid will be  a  difficult point to settle but  a  solution is 
undoubtedly possible.  The  UK  can be  expected  in the  foreseeable  future 
to replace its complex aid measures with  more  transparent forms,  while  the 
other  Member  States  and  the Commission  must realize - as  they  do  in fact 
already - that a  division of the  Community  into two categories of  area does 
not  make  allowance  for  the wide  spectrum of differences  involved,  that the 
problems  of backward agricultural areas  and  industrial regions  that have 
fallen behind do  not call for  the  same  solutions  and,  finally,  that very 
strict harmonisation  is not needed.  If an  arrangement  in this spirit can be 
adopted  on  this point,  the negotiations  on  a  European Regional  Fund will  also 
have better prospects  of  success. 
On  28  June  1973  the Commission took  a  decision with  a  view to defining 
central  and peripheral regions  in  the  new  Member  States. 
In Britain,  central regions  cover that part of national territory to which 
no aid is given  and  'intermediate areas'.  Geographically,  the regions 
receiving aid include most  of  Scotland,  Wales,  the north-west  and  south-west 
region of  England  and  Northern  Ireland. 
The  other Brit ish regions will be  included in a  subsequent classification 
forming part of  a  coordination system for  all territories of  the  enlarged 
Community. 
The  Commission  must  define  the  relevant principles by  31  December  1974 
at the latest to permit  immediate  implementation. 
Meanwhile,  no  further  'opaque'  aid may  be  granted,  and  any  changes  in or 
renewals  of existing aid systems  must be  completely transparent. 
Sectoral regional  aids 
The  Commission  decisions  on  sectoral aids were  influenced by  four 
principles: 
- aids  must be selective and be  granted only to undertakings  which have  a 
future  and can withstand competienn in the  long term: 
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situation; 
- they must be transparent so as  to be recognized  and  readily grasped by 
undertakings  and have  measurable costs  and results; 
- finally,  they must be well  adapted to the objectives pursued  and have the 
least possible effect on competition and  intra-Community trade. 
In 1973  the Commission  took  a  decision in favour  of Britain in  two  specific 
cases:  one  in the woollen  industry  and  the other in favour  of industrial under-
takings  in Northern Ireland using products  of the steel industry. 
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1.  The  EEC  Treaty  (Articles  95  to  99)  prohibits  tax discrimination 
affording protection to national products either when  imported  or exported. 
These Articles deal only with  taxes  on  production  (turnover  tax,  excise 
duty and  other  forms  of  indirect taxation). 
The  Treaty proposes  that this  indirect taxation should be harmonized 
(Article  99)  in the  interests  of  the  common  market by directives. 
2.  The basis  for  the harmonization of  indirect taxation is as  follows: 
(a)  establishment of  a  common  market with healthy competition  and 
characteristics similar  to  those  of  an  internal market; 
(b)  harmonization of  tax legislation so  as  to eliminate  as  far  as  possible, 
at both national  and  Community  level,  factors  liable to distort the 
conditions  of  competition; 
(c)  the abolition of  taxes  on  imports  and  remission of  tax  on exports  in 
trade between the  Member  States  and  the abolition of frontier controls; 
(d)  financing  of  the  Community budget by  a  harmonized tax  (VAT)  reflecting 
the  capacity of  each  Member  State to contribute. 
J.  Tho  hannoni:t.olion  of  lurnovor  lax  hns  led  to  tho  adoption  of value 
added  tax  (Vl\'J'),  ninco  Lhi~;  ny~!l.om o[[onl  mux.imum  nimpUcity  and  impar-
tiality in respect of  the origin of goods  and  services when  tho  tax is 
levied as  widely as  possible. 
Harmonization is achieved progressively:  first come  the structures 
then  the rates  of  tax  and  exemptions.  In the final stage,  the state in 
which  goods  acquire  an  added value will benefit  from  the  tax revenue. 
Tax  revenue  on  any  one  item may be  shared between several states.  At 
present,  as  a  result of remissions  and  reimposition of  tax at frontiers, 
tax  revenue  goes  to the state of destination. 
The  draft sixth directive  submitted by  the  Commission with  a  view to 
harmonization of  the basic rate of  VAT  creates  for  the United  Kingdom  the 
problem of  taxation of  foodstuffs.  The  rapid  increase  in  food  prices would 
make  it difficult for  a  government  of whatever political persuaaion to 
accept  any  solution other  than  zero rating.  The  Labour  Government has 
indeed fulfilled its intention of  retaining  the  zero rating for  foodstuffs. 
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at the  proposal stage- has  the  same  objectives  as  indicated in  2(a),  (b), 
(c) • 
The  criteria for harmonization would  be  the  tax yield,  collection 
costs,  non-taxing  of primary products.  Consequently,  unimportant excise 
duties would be  abolished;  only excise duty  on  mineral  oil,  alcohol, 
beer,  wine  and  manufactured  tobaccos  would be  retained and gradually 
harmonized.  The  state where  the  goods  arc  consumed  would benefit from 
the  tax  and  this would not be  changed by harmonization. 
Parliament  examined  the  Commission's  proposals  on  this question in 
April  1974  and  asked  for  the  abolition of excise  duty  on wine.  For  the 
United  Kingdom  the question  then arises  of  tax  on  alcohol,  purticularly 
Scotch or Irish v;hisky.  In  the  opinion of  the Conscrvutive  Group,  the 
cquul  treatment  o[  products  would  require all  alcoholic beverages  to be 
subject  to  tho  snme  sy:> lcn1. 
5.  Passenger traffic has  formed  the  subject  of  two  directives  on  duty-
free  sales.  It >·ro.s  necessvry to make  people  in the  EEC  more  avrare  of the 
reality of the  common  market.  The  principle of  taxu.tion in  the  country 
of origin is being  applied because  of  lu.ck of progress  in harmonization. 
When  this has  been  achieved,  duty-free  concessions will  no  longer be 
justified,  at least not  in principle,  and  tax receipts will be distributed 
as  stated in paragraphs  3  and  4  with  regard  to  Vl\.T  and excise duty. 
6.  Harmonization is also being  applied,  on  the basis  of the criteria in 
paragraph  2(a),  to  indirect taxation  on  ruising  capital.  The  levying  of 
stamp duty by  one  state on  securities  introduced  into or  issued vithin its 
territory by  other  Member  St.u.tes  has  been  judged  to be  contrary to the 
principle of  2(a).  Stamp  duty has  been declared undesirable  in any  case 
from  an  economic  point of  view.  It is  therefore being abolished.  Tax  on 
capital formation  must  not  lead  to double  taxation and  is therefore being 
harmonized.  c.t:mr  indirect taxation  on  raising capital has  been prohibited or 
abolished in order  to clarify the situation. 
7.  Criteria  2 (a)  and  (b)  ( 'laisscz-faire'  on  taxation)  led  the  Corrunission 
to submit  two  proposuls  aimed  at abolishing  tax  arrangements  liable to  impede 
mergers,  divisions  and  contributions  of assets  as  well  as  the  acquisition of 
holdings. 
These  proposals  on  indirect taxation have  not yet been  adopted. 
8.  In  the  field of direct  tu.xntion,  economic  and  monetary union  provides 
for 
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influence  on capital  movements  within the  Community;  in particular, 
harmonizu.tion  of  the  fiscal  arrangements  applied to interest  from  fixed 
interest transferu.ble securities  and  to  dividends; 
(2)  further harmonization  of  the  structure of  company  tax. 
Direct  t<1x<1tion  has  been  the subject of several  communications  from  the 
Commission  u.imed  at harmonization  (1967).  The  Commission  seems  now  to be 
about  to  submit  a  ne1r1  communic<1tion  which will break with  the principles 
contemplated hitherto.  Preparatory work  is  continuing but is unlikely to 
lead to  Community  legislation in the  immediate  future. 
9.  The  requirements  of  the various  policies  envisu.ged  should be  reflected 
in  the  tax  systems  : 
- the structure  and  level of  taxes  on  commercial vehicles  or  on  fuel  used 
by  them should be  determined exclusively  in  terms  of  the  charging  of 
infrastructure costs; 
- mineral oils,  as  ru.w  materiuls  or process  agents  should not be  subject to 
excise duties  u.s  these constitute  u.  tax  on  consumption,  not  on  production; 
- direct tuxu.tion  systems  should not artificially influence the  choice  of 
place of work  (free  movement  of  lubour). 
10.  Fiscu.l hu.rmonization  measures  in the  Community  ure  taken by directives 
and  therefore  leu.ve  the  Purliu.mcnts  of  the  Member  States with  the  formal 
right to  intervene  in order  to  amend  legislation. 
The  Parliamentary tradition of  the United  Kingdom  is however  opposed 
to  too  much  interference by  the  Community  institutions,  which  have  a  tendency 
to  assume  certain discretionary powers  in  the  fiscal field in respect of, 
for  exumple,  the  interpretation of  texts  und  rulings  on  matters  of dispute. 
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A  start has been  made  on  a  community  consumer  policy.  At  the  end of 
1973  the  Commission  made  proposals  for  a  preliminary  Community  Programme 
for  Consumer  Information  and  Protection.1  In its report  the  Commission 
rightly emphasised  the  need  for  improved  legal protection  for  the  consume:::-; 
this  is precisely  the  kind of action  the  Community  should be  taking.  Legal 
protection does  not of course  mean  the cosseting of  the  consumer by  the 
uuthorities;  on  the  contrary,  the  main  concern is  to provide  the  consumer 
with  the  legal  means  of protecting his own  interests. 
1bc  European  Commission  is of course  in  a  good  position to organize 
the  comparative  testing of  products  in the  Community,  but  this already 
functions  fairly well at an  international level  and  the  consumer  organizat-
ions  are  suspicious  of  any  form  of intervention by  the authorities in their 
province. 
1'he  consu!1"e r  in  Great  Bri tnin has better representation  than hin 
counterpart in various  other member  states of  the  Community,  and it is 
likely that Great Britain will be able  to contribute much  of  importance  in 
this  field.  'l'he  Commission's  preliminary programme  is on  the same  lines  as 
British consumer  policy  and  there would  seem  to be little likelihood of 
conflicting views  on  the  subject. 
The  British people  have  in  common  with  the  rest of  the  community  the 
fact  (at least)  that they  are all consumers.  Although  the  consumer  in the 
community is nowadays  better informed  than in  the  past and is also more 
critical about what  he  buys,  the  complicated nature of many  products,  the 
great variety of makes  and  persuasive  advertising make it increasingly 
difficult for  him  to  make  the  right choice  of product.  It is here  that  the 
need arises  for  a  consumer  policy making it clear that the  Community  does 
not exist only  to  serve business  interests.  The  ambitious  proposals  of  the 
European  Commission  together with  Parliament's  amendments, 2  arc  a  !ltep in 
this direction. 
1 Doc.  308/73 
2 Doc.  64/74 
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(l}  Participation in  the  common  market  automatically affords  a  number  of 
advantages,  but  above  all it offers  opportunities which  can,  if so desired, 
be  allowed  to  go  begging.  If the  economic  practice of  a  Member  State is not 
geared  to seizing  these opportunities,  all  tl1e  advantages  of  membership  of 
the  European  Community arc called  into question. 
(2)  Particip~tion in  economic  integration is ultimately a  question  of self-
confidence.  Paradoxically enough,  it could  be  that the  British anti-
markcteer3  have  in fact  too high  an  opinion of  the  Community,  i.e. of  the 
economic  capacity of  the  Member  States  on  the  one  hand  and  of  the harmoniza-
t  j..-m  of  economic  ond  monetary policies  nchieved  so  far  on  the  other. 
(3)  It is understandable,  if only because we  are dealing with concrete 
figures,  that many  Britons  are at present busily  calculating whether  the 
United  Kingdom  is getting back  financially  something  like the  amount it i~ 
putting into  the  Community  (the  UK's  net contribution is  in fact rather  on 
the high  side) •  But  these are  petty calculations  irrelevant to  the  real 
problem,  since  integration has  consequences  for  the  economy  and  prosperity 
of  the  British citizens  of  an  entirely different order of magnitude.  More-
over,  membership  of  the  European  Community  enables  the United  Kingdom  to 
play  an  effective role,  albeit shared with  others,  in the  international 
decision-making  pt-ocoss  in  the  ficltl  of world  trade  (Nixon-Round),  the 
international  monetury  sy~>tem,  energy  rcscnrch,  food  supplies,  etc., 
(4)  The  advantages  of membership arc  scarcely quantifiable  in  the short  term 
and  for  the most part become  discernible only  in  the  medium  term.  These  are 
not  the  sort of advantages  with  ~1ich politicians customarily win votes,  but 
they arc  no  less  real  for  that. 
(5)  Britain's  economy  in  1973  was  not uffectcd primarily by  the accession, 
which  is in fact still far  from  complete. 
(6)  The  gain  in  prosperity resulting  from  a  customs  union  is probably 
greater  than  is  assumed  where  calculations  take  account only of  the  abolition 
of customs  duties.  ll.  considerable contribution is also  forthcoming  from  the 
abolition of  technical  and  public-health obstacles  and  from  the  opening  up 
of government contracts.  Moreover,  the  optimum  size of  the  production unit 
has  rapidly  increased in certain branches  of  industry;  these branches  can 
only operate profitably on  a  large market.  The  amount  of  trade created  by 
accession outweighs  any  loss  in trade.  The  Community  is  a  large  and 
increasingly important market  for  the United  Kingdom,  which  cannot afford  to 
stund  u.loof. 
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now that British voters will be  deciding  for or against withdrawal  - is that 
the  UK  plainly has  no alternative to the  European  Community: 
- If the  UK  withdraws,  it would  almost  certainly not  be  able to negotiate 
as  good  a  settlement with the  Community as Norway.  That  country never 
accepted the  Community's  accession conditions,  and  furthermore,  the 
Community could afford to adopt  a  magnanimous attitude towards  a  small 
country.  The  British negotiating position is not  strong:  a  third of 
the  United  Kingdom's  exports goes  to the  Eight,  and that share is 
increasing;  only  8%  of Member  States'  exports  goes  to the  United  Kingdom. 
- In a  period of threatened p:r::otectionism  and  sharpening competitive conflict 
on world markets,  a  strong international negotiating position is vital. 
It is the  United  States,  the  community and  Japan that are  making  the 
running  and this means  the  UK  too if it is a  member  of the  co~~unity;  once 
out,  the country would  in practice have  to put  up  with what  others decided. 
- Medium-sized countries  like the  UK  have  already lost part of their  sover£>igr 
in a  number  of areas  (international monetary policy,  multinational 
undertakings).  They can  only regain it as  a  part of  a  larger entity.  That 
larger entity can only be  the  European  Con~unity. 
(B)  Excessive concentration of economic  power  can  be countered  more 
effectively in  the Community  than  in  the  individual  Member  States · 
separately.  Even  the  Community's  cartel policy can  only have  positive 
consequences  for  Britain.  The  existing Community  agreement  on  regional 
assistance is not differentiated  enough;  an  arrangement  of greater differ--
entiation could  go  a  long way  towards  satisfying British demands.  The 
United  Kingdom  can  reasonably be  required  to make  its regional aid 
transparent  and  quantifiable. 
(9)  The  Community  is gradually acquiring  another  image;  it no  longer 
exists  for  the benefit of industry  and  commerce  alone,  it now  pays 
serious attention to  such  things  as  consumer  policy as well. 
(10)  The  loss  of  powers  in the field  of  economic  and  monetary  policy 
has  so  far  been  more  imagined  than real.  In  a  way,  Member  States are 
regaining at Community  level  an  influence  they had  in  fact  already lost 
at national  level. 
(11)  It is also in Britain's interests that the  Community  should  become 
an  economic  and  monetary  union.  However,  the process  of evolution will 
certainly not  follow  exactly the  pattern  laid  down  in the resolutions 
on  the realization by  stages  of economic  and  monetary  union. 
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A.  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  POLICY 
(a)  Present situation 
The  articles of the  EEC  Treaty  (Article  103-109)  dealing with  economic 
and  monetary policy state in essence that the Member  States must  regard 
their policies  in this  field  as  a  matter of common  concern requiring 
co-ordination and  mutual  consultation;  however,  they  should  continue to 
implement  their policies  independently.  If a  Member  State  finds  itself 
in  economic  or monetary difficulties,  needs  help  from  other Member  States 
and/or wishes  to  take protective measures,  the powers  of the Council  and 
Commission  are  increased  (Article 108). 
What  the British  found  in  the way of  'Community patrimony'  on  joining 
the  Community was,  besides  the  above-mentioned  articles of  the  Treaty,  a 
medium  term  economic  policy programme,  decisions  to co-ordinate the  economic 
and  monetary policies of the  Member  States  and  two  resolutions,  dated 
Mard1 1971  and  March  1972,  on  the  achievement by stages of  economic  and 
monetary  union  in the  Community. 
In  fact,  the  Community  medium-term  economic  policy programmes  have 
played only  a  very minor  role  in  shaping  the  economic  policy of the  Member 
States.  Individual  governments  obviously felt the programmes  to be 
scarcely binding  on  them,  all the  more  so  since  the directives which  formed 
part of the programmes  were  hardly quantified,  and where  they were  quanti-
fied  (e.g.  in the last programme,  adopted  in  1971  1 )  the directives were 
respected only very partially.  So  the  programmes  imposed  few or  no 
restrictions on  the  freedom  of action  enjoyed by  the  governments  and  the 
nation<~.!  p<trliaments.  Whil0  these programmes  have  no  little impact,  there 
is little to  he  expected  from  their extension to  the  Community;  at  the 
same  time,  however,  there  is little cause  to  be  concerned  about  the 
restrictions which  the programmes  might  impose  on  the governments. 
In  1971,  the  Six had  adopted  three decisions  under  which  the Member 
States undertook  to  make  greater efforts to coordinate their economic 
policies  and  if necessary to  lend  each other financial  assistance  2 
These  texts,  which  have  little practical value,  were  superseded at the 
beginning of this year,  and  hence with  the  United  Kingdom's  agreement by3 
l  OJ  N°.  C  49/71 
2  o,J  N°.  T.  73  of  27  M<trch  1<)71 
3  In  addition  to  tlw  decisions  mcnlioned  below,  there  is also  the  rcgulu-
tion of  3  April  1973  'establishing  a  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund' 
(OJ No.L  89/73)  which  is,  however,  of little signifiance. 
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degree of convergence of  the  economic policies of  the Member  States of 
0  0  1  the European  Econom1c  Commun1ty 
- a  Council  directive of  18  February 1974  on  stability,  growth  and  full 
employment  in  the  Community1 
- a  Council  decision  of  18  February  1974  setting up  an  economic  policy 
0  1  comm1ttee  ; 
a  Council  resolution of  18  February 1974  concerning  short-term monetary 
2  support 
These  decisions  require  the  Member  States  to  engage  in intensive 
consultation  on  their economic  and  monetary policies,  thus providing  the 
necessary basis for  a  common  policy.  Actual powers,  however,  remain where 
they were,  i.e.  with  the  Member  States. 
(b)  Economic  and Monetary  Union 
The  Labour  P/'lrty  expressed  much  concern  about  two  other  texts:  ' ...  we 
were  deeply concerned by  the resolutions of March  1971  and  1972  which were 
confirmed  at  the  Summit Meeting of October  1972.  They  seemed  to  lay  down 
a  rigid programme  under which Economic  and  Monetary Union,  including per-
manently  fixed parities would be  achieved by  l98o3 •  The  resolutions of 
March  1971  and  1972  were  in fact  the  documents  mentioned  above  'concerning 
the  achievement by stages of  economic  and monetary union  in  the Community'. 
For  those who  prefer  to  do  everything  themselves  (even  though it no  longer 
proves  particularly effective)  and  who  feel  that integration between  modern 
industrialised countries can well be  limited to  customs  union,  there is 
every reason  to  l1e  concerned since it is stated in  these  resolutions  that 
full  economic  and monetary  union  is  an  important Community  aim.  Tho 
practical implications of such  a  union  are also indicated in  the resolution 
(see  Annex  I). 
With  regard  to  the objections  to  the resolutions  on  economic  and  mon-
etary union,  the  following  can be  said: 
(1)  The  resolutions of March  1971  and  1972  are far-reaching  declarations 
of intent and  not legislative texts  (that is why  they are  included in 
the  'C'  series of  the Official Journal).  The  goal  to  be  attained by 
1980  is clearly defined  in  the resolutions  and  a  number  of practical 
-1 
OJ  No.  L  63/74 
2  OJ  No.  C  20/74 
3  Speech  made by Mr  Callaghan  in  the Council of Ministers  on  1  April  1974 
in Luxembourg. 
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December  1973,  a  few  of which were  in  fact  achieved.  The  odd  thing 
about  the resolutions is that they  leave  a  large gap between  the first 
stage  and  the clearly defined  aim  to be  reached by  1980,  for  they say 
virtually nothing  about  the period  from  1  January 1974  to  1980,  the 
period in which  we  now  find ourselves. 
(2)  In practice it has  always  been  found  that the Member  States retain  . 
considerable  freedom  of action  to  take  such measures  as  they consider 
in  the national  interest.  Community coordination of economic policies 
has  rarely proved  the straight-jacket which  many Britons  feared.  Italy 
has  demonstrated  in  recent weeks  that Community procedures  can be 
applied  flexibly.  It is an  unwritten  law in the  community that no 
Member  State shall be  forced  to  adopt  for  Community reasons  anything 
which it considers contrary to an  important national interest.  nno 
this is likely to be  the situation  for  some  time. 
It could  even  be  asserted that the  aversion of Britain's anti-
marketeers results, in  a  way,  from  their tendency  to  talco  Community 
decisions  too  seriously,  something  for  which  not  they,  but the 
Community,  must  take  the  blame.  In past years it has all too often 
been  the  case that the  Council  or  a  Summit  Conference  formulated 
ambitious  plans only to  find  that they could  not be  implemented. 
(3)  Finally,  it should not be  forgotten  that,  now circumstances have 
changed,  the  Council  resolutions  on  the  achievement of economic 
and  monetary  union  have  to be  seen  in a  totally different light. 
In  a  world of floating  exchange  rates,  the call  for  gradual 
reduction  and  ultimate abolition of the  margins  of fluctuation 
between  currencies  is no  longer very relevant. 
But  these  arguments  alone  are not enough.  Economic  and  monetary 
union is still the  avm-!Cd  aim of the  Community.  Thi~~  means  complete 
integration of the  economies  of the  Member  States  - if not by  1980,  then 
some  time  later.  On  this point there  arc still sorr.c  mistaken  ideas.  'rhe 
fact that economic  and monetary union  has  slipped temporarily into the 
background has  led to  the premature conclusion that the project has  been 
abandoned.  .That is unlikely,  since  a  customs  union of industrialised 
countries can  never  be  the  final goal  of integration  (see  item 2  below). 
So  the  real question is whether  the  UK  would  be  better or worse  off 
in an  economic  and monetary union.  In order  to  answer  this question,  the 
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1.  Influence  on  economic  and  morwtary  development.  '!'here  is not  n 
single  smu.ll  or  medium  sized industrinlised country which  cnn  afford 
to cut itself off economically  from  the rest of  the \-mrld  unless it 
it prepared  to accept and  considerable drop  in prosperity.  International 
divinion  of  lnbour  is  incontravertibly an  important  source  of prosperity. 
Consequently,  ull Wentcrn  industriali~;ed countries  (the  United  Stntcn  to 
a  far  lesser extent)  are  dependent  upon  one  ;:mother  and  the  same  npplies 
to the  United  Kingdom,  whether  im; ide or  ontnic1e  the  Community.  'fhc 
principal difference between  the  two  posr>ibilitics  is  that membership  of 
tho  Community  gives  the  United  I\ingc1om  t1w  opportunity to participate  in 
dccir.ions  on  matters  t1wl will  anyway  affect  the  country'~•  economy.  'l'his 
applier;  equally  to  the  <Jbolition  oftechnical obstacles  to trade,  the 
fight against inflation,  monetary  integration  u.ncl  environmental 
regulations. 
Besides,  what  in  the  field  of  economic  and  monetary  policy  is coordinated 
in  the  Community?  In actual  fact  only  those matters  which  in practice 
can  no  longer be dealt with,  or at any rate dealt with efficiently, at 
nntional  level.  Tho  fight against inflation is an  e~:umple of this. 
In  the  final  analysis,  inflation is  in fact  a  problem of redistribution, 
which  mokes  it nn  evil not readily dinposccl  of  even  by  community action. 
nut  the hyperinflution  threotening  us  now  can  bo  fought  fur  more 
successfully at Community  than  ut national level. 
So  the  loss  of powers  is considerably  less  serious  than it appears  to be. 
Without  oxaggeruting,  one  could  even  say  that,  in  the  Community,  .Hembcr 
States  reg<~in  - even  if they do  share it with  others  - an  influence  they 
had  graduully lost at national  level.  An  example  of this  is  in the 
international monetary situution:  individually,  none  of the  .Hember 
Stater;  could  do  much  more  than  act as  dollur satellites,  having  not the 
slightest influence  on  the  exchunge  rate policy of  the  United  States. 
An  economic  and  monetary  union  of the  nine  Member  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  constitutes  a  bloc  c<1pable  of purr;uing  an  independent monetary 
policy  - if possible  in cooperation with  the  United  State;;,  though  not 
necessarily  on  u  course  ex<~ctly parallel  to  th<1t  country's  policy. 
2.  A  customs  union  is not  the  final  objective._  The  idea  of developing  the 
Community  into an  economic  and monetary  union  \'-'us  not  a  sudden 
brainwuve.  A  customs  union  of  modern  industriuliscd countries  is not 
a  viable proposition  in  the  long  run,  if only because  the  economic 
and  monetary policies  of  the  governments  affect. the  opcr<1tion  of the 
customs  union  too much  for  these policies  to be  left t:o  the  Member 
- 4  - PE  37.463/I/A/rcv. States without  jeopardising  the  smooth  functioning  of  the customs  union. 
To  be  an  advocate  of completely  free  movement  of goods  is  to be  in 
favour  of  economic  and  monetary  union. 
3.  Geographic  distribution of economic  activity.  It is possible  to 
acknowledge  the  advantages  of  a  customs  union,  yet still feel  that one 
of the  Member  States will lose by it.  The  reasoning behind this is 
that economic  integration,  if it is not controlled through  a  regional 
policy,  leads  to  economic  activity being concentrated in the most 
highly  industrialised areas.  This  tendency has  in  fact prevailed 
until  now. 
!lowovor,  thoro arc  three  reasons  for  assuming that a  reasonably  even 
distrubution of  economic  activity can  be achieved  in  an  economic  and 
monetary  union.  The  first is that typical  areas  of concentration 
become  saturated.  Hence  the measures  to discourage  the  establishment 
of industries  in these regions  (proposal  for  an  investment tax  in  the 
West Holland conurbation  (Randstad,  Holland) ,  system of  licences  and 
levy of  special  taxes  on businesses  setting up  in the  Paris  and  London 
agglomerations,  etc.). 
The  second  reason  is that in  the years  ahead  environmental policy will 
come  to the aid of physical planning.  Pollution is so serious  in 
industrial areas  that environmental  regulations  must be strict there, 
stricter than  in areas  which  have  less  industry and  no particular 
recreational value.  The  Commission's  draft recommendation1  'concerning 
cost allocations  and  action by public authorities  on  environmental 
matters'  expressly advocates  th~t environmental  standards be  variable 
from  regionato region.  Strict standards  mean  heavier charges  for  the 
undertaking:  in this way  environmental policy assists regional policy. 
The  third reason is that the Community has  always  assumed  that a 
regional policy would  form part,  and an  important part,  too,  of the 
economic  and  monetary  union.  Witness  among  other things  the  resolution 
of  22  March  19712 • 
4.  The  'stop/~o'  po~icy.  The  above  arguments  for  economic  and monetary 
union  apply more  or less  to all Member  States of the Community.  The 
United  Kingdom has,  furthermore,  an  additional interest in bending its 
efforts to achieving  such  a  union.  The  income  elasticity of British 
imports,  i.e.  the ratio between  the  increase in de·mand  for  imported 
products  on  the  one  hand  and  the  increase in the British GNP  on  the 
l 
2 
Doc.  17/74 
OJ  No.  c  28/71,  Resolution,  para.  I  (1  &  3)  and para.  III  (4) 
- 5  - PE  37.463/I/A/rev. is about  1.66  for  Gt.  Britain,  which  is  a  high  figure.  At  the  same  time 
the  ratio between  the  increase  in  demand  for  British export products 
and  the  increase  in  income  of  the  consumers  of  these products  is  about 
0  86  d  h  .  1  f.  1  •  an  t  at 1s  a  ow  1gure 
Assuming  that import  and  export proceeds  must be more  or  less  in 
balance,  the British economy will be able to  grow only half as  fast as 
that of Great Britain's trading partners.  This  is  one  of  the main 
reasons  for  the British stop/go policy of  the sixties.  However,  in 
recent year British governments  have  flatly refused  to be coerced by 
the balance of payments,  and  rightly so;  but the  new  approach  does  lead 
to  a  continuous  depreciation of sterling. 
'l'he  only  way  oul of  lhis  dilemma  between  stop/go policy  and  devaluation 
of  the  pound  is the  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  For  within  such  a 
union,  compensatory mechanisms  operate in  the  same  way  as  they  do  in 
a  national  economy.  And,  it is  a  well-known  fact  that nobody worries 
about  the balance of  payments  deficit or  surplus  of  a  region because 
the balance of such  a  region  is  'automatically'  corrected with  regard 
to other parts of  the country by means  of regional payments  to and  from 
the central bank,  inter-regional movements  of capital,  purchase  and  sale 
of  treasury bonds,  taxes  and public  expenditure2 • 
"Economic  Problems  of Britain's Accession  to  the  EEC"  (in  German) 
Gunther  Wehrmann,  Gegenwartskunde  3/73,  p.317 
T.  Sci  tovsky,  "Money  and  the balance  of payments";  and by  the  same 
author,  "Western  Economic  Integration".  See also Bela  Balassa 
"Theory  of Economic  Integration". 
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In  the  "Resolution  of  the Council  and  Representatives  of  the Governments 
of  the Member  States  of  22  March  1971  on  the Realisation by  Stages  of 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  in  the Community",  economic  and monetary  union 
is defined as  follows1 : 
1 
"The  measures  to be  taken  shall ultimately lead to  the  Community: 
1.  Forming  an  area within which persons,  goods,  services  and capital will 
move  freaJ.y  without  .distortion of competition  and  without causing 
structural or regional disequilibrium,  and  in  such  a  way  that the 
economic  agents  can  develop  their activities at Community  level; 
2.  Forminq  <1  separ<1te  entity in the  international monetary  system, 
characterised by  total  and  irreversible convertibility of currencies, 
the elimination of margins  of  fluctuation  in  exchange  rates,  and  the 
irrevocable  fixing  of parity rates, all of which  factors  are 
essential pre-conditions  for  the  adoption  of a  single currency; 
a  system of central banks  shall operate within this monetary  frame-
work; 
3.  Having  in  the  economic  and  monetary  field  the necessary powers  and 
responsibility to enable  its institutions to administer  the  union. 
To  this  end,  the decisions  required  in matters  of  economic  policy 
sh<Jll  be  taken at Community  level  and  tho  institutions  of fue 
Community  accorded  the necessary powers. 
Powers  and  responsibilities  shall be distributed among  the institutions 
of the  Community  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Nernber  States  on  the other  in 
such  a  way  as  to ensure  the  cohesion  of  the  union  and efficient operation 
of  the Community. 
The  institutions  of  the  Community  sh<1ll  be  given  the means  to discharge 
efficiently and  quickly  their economic  and  monetary  responsibilities. 
Community policy as  implemented within  the  framework  of  economic  and 
monetary  union  shall be  subject to the deliberations,  the decisions 
and  the supervision of  the  European  Parliament. 
The  Conununity  system of centrul banks  shall contribute within the 
framework  of its  own  responsibilities ot the  achievement  of  the 
Community's  aims  of stability and  growth." 
OJ  No.  C28  of  27  March  1971,  p.2,  para.  I,  second  sub-paragraph. 
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Tho  six original members  of the  Community  could reasonably claim to have 
achieved  a  high  and  continuous  rate  of  growth  and  one  that benefited its. 
citizens  as  a  whole.  From  1960 to 1970 the  GNP  of the Six increased in 
1  volume  at  a  rate  of  5.4%  per  year  and this had  been reflected in rising 
standards  of living. 
However,  this  progress  has  been  decidedly uneven  and  geographically 
unbalanced.  Tho  richest areas  in the  Community  have  an  income  per head 
about  five  times  that  of the  poorest2 ,  despite efforts  on  a  national 
scale  by tho  member  governments  concerned. 
On  a  Community  level,  there  was  no  comprehensive  regional  policy before 
enlargement.  This  was  because  tho  Treaty of  Rome  contained  no  specific 
provisions  for  the  development  of  a  common  regional  policy,  though in 
some  of tho  Treaty Articles  and  in tho  Preamble,  regional  balanced 
development  is mentioned in general  terms  as  an  objective  of Community 
activity. 
The  possibilities of  regional  policy action open to tho  Community  under  tho 
Treaty of  Rome  were  thus  limited.  Tho  Treaty of  Paris  (ECSC)  in turn con-
tains  tho  express  provision that its objective is to  'ensure  the  most 
rational  distribution of production at the highest  possible level  of pro-
ductivity'  (Article  2)  .  Consequently,  a  regional  policy within the  frame-
work  of tho  ECSC  Treaty could exist only in the  shape  of measures  designed 
to facilitate regional  adjustment  to processes  of rationalization 
(reconversion) .  The  Community Court  of Justice expressly ruled that the 
Paris Treaty did  not  allow the  Community  Institutions to apply a  general 
regional  policy. 
The  Conuuunity  Commission  in the  years  up  to 1972  prepared  a  number  of 
proposals  for  a  regional  policy,  but  none  of those  came  into operation. 
Nonetheless,  some  stops  were  taken:-
(i)  The  European  Investment  Bank  made  substantial  loans  under 
Article  130  (A)  of the  Treaty of  Rome  of which  1,900 million 
(£792m.)  (75%  of the total)  were  allocated between  1968  and 
1972  to regional  development  schemes; 
u.a. 
1  Sec  the Report  of  the Commission  on  Regional  Problems  in  the enlarged 
Cor.ununity  (Bulletin supplement  8/73) 
2  op.  cit., para.  G 
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ECSC  Treaty provided  finance  to create  110,000  new  jobs  and  made 
re-adaptation possible  for  nearly  500,000 workers  in the  coal 
and  steel industries; 
(iii)  The  Social  Fund  provided  265  million u.a.  (£112m)  for 
re-settlement  and  re-training of workers,  again mainly in poorer 
regions; 
(iv)  The  Guidance  Section of FEOGA,  th·O!  fund  of the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy granted  708 million u.a.  (£295m.)  in modernising and 
providing higher  living standards  in areas  with small,  uneconomic 
farms  with  low  incomes. (l)  Although this Section  does  not  seek to 
achieve  an  object which is essentially regional  by nature,  the 
choices  made  in the allocation of grants  (25%  and,  on  occasion, 
45%  of the total  for  individual  projects)  nevertheless  lend to 
these  operations the  character  of  a  regional  policy. 
Under  all these  schemes  Britain has  benefited and  some  examples  are  given 
in the  addendum.  However,  until enlargement,  or  rather until the Paris 
Summit  meeting of October,  1972,  held in view of the  forthcoming enlarge-
ment  of the  Community,  it remained the  case that  a  Regional  Development 
Policy as  such  did not exist. 
At the  Paris  Summit  meeting,  the  tl1en  British Government  fought  hard  for 
the  acceptance  of a  Community regional  policy to be  financed  from  the 
Community's  own  resources,  and it was  agreed that,  as  a  first step,  a 
regional  fund  would  be  set  up  by the  end  of 1973. 
The  arguments  which  the British Government  of the  day  put  forward  and 
which  were  accepted  in principle  by her partners  were  threefold. 
(il  Moral  Arguments 
"Reducing the  differences  existing between the various  regions  and 
the  backwardness  of the  less-favoured regions"  is an  aim  set out  in 
the  Preamble  to the  Treaty of Rome.  As  the  Commission  said in their 
Report,  cited above,  "It is  unthinkable  that the  Community  should only 
lead to an  increase  in  the  process  whereby wealth  is principally attracted 
2  to  places  where  it c'x.int:n  <11 rPnrly."  Furtlwrmorc,  if capital  Js  not  movod 
1 
2 
See  Second Financial Report  on  the  EAGGF  Financial Year  1972, 
Doc.  109/74,  pp.85-95 
See  Report  of  -the Commission  on  Regional  Problems  in  the enlarged 
Community  (Bulletin  Supplement  8/73)  para.l3 
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the  free  circulation of labour  in the  Community  can  be  based. 
(ii)  Environmental Arguments 
"The  continuous  improvement  in the  living conditions  of their peoples"  is 
also listed as  an  "essential aim"  of the Treaty of Rome.  There is thus 
a  direct obligation on the  part of the  Community to seek to improve  living 
conditions  and this  applies  not  only in depressed areas  but also in the 
great  conurbations  where  the  pressures  of  overcrowding and  industrial 
polution may equally lessen the quality of life. 
(iii)  Economic  Arguments 
If the various  factors  of  production of the  Community were  to be  more  fully 
used,  the whole  economy would benefit.  To  entrepreneurs  the advantages  of 
expanding in an  already crowded area  often appear attractive.  There  is, 
for  example,  a  network  of suppliers  and  a  ready-made  mass  market  on the 
doorstep.  But  if it were  practicable to make  them bear the  full  economic 
cost  of  'infra-structure',  roads,  hospitals,  schools,  etc., it would  be 
seen how  uneconomic  such expansion really is,  and how  much  economic 
benefit  a  regional  policy could produce. 
All  the  member  states arc  making  national efforts to counteract the 
increasing trend towards  centralisation.  It would  be  wrong to say 
that these measures  have  been  unsuccessfU4  yet it is true that  in general 
the  success has  consisted merely in preventing regional  imbalances  from 
deteriorating still further.  The  efforts  now  being made  in the  Community 
to bring about  Economic  and Monetary Union  should lead ultimately to a 
kind of  'economic  disarmament'  in the  policies  of member  states with 
respect to each  other.  This will  lead to the  emergence  of two  new 
factors:  firstly,  the means  of  guarding against concentrationist 
influences  from  the  other  countries will  be  lost and  secondly,  with 
l·:cotHllllic  "'"'  MonPl.tt'Y  Union,  P<fllill  condit:Jon':  of  competition will  only be 
pnnt1.ibll'  if nulional  mc<tsures  Lo  lwlp  Lllc  uinfavourcd  rcyions  arc  subject 
to the  laws  of  free  competition,  a  factor  which  is  bound  to reduce  the 
efficacy of these measures  in many  cases. 
The  obvious  solution is,  therefore,  to introduce  a  common  regional  policy. 
Clearly,  the  Community  cannot  allow the  bulk of economic  activity to go 
on  being concentrated in a  small  number  of conurbations.  Doth rationalisa-
tion of the  economy and the most  equitable distribution of  income  possible 
throughout  the  Community  as  a  whole  must  be  given equal  priority. 
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"that a  high priority should be  given  to  the  aim  of correcting,  in 
the  Community,  the structural and  regional  imbalances  which  might 
affect the  realisation of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union. 
The  Heads  of  State or  of Government  invite the Commission  to 
prepare without delay  a  report analysing  the regional  problems 
which  arise  in  the  enlarged Community  and  to put  forward  appropriate 
proposals. 
From  now  on,  they  undertake  to coordinate their regional policies. 
Desirous  of directing that effort towards  finding  a  Community 
solution  to regional  problems,  they  invite the Community  Institutions 
to create  a  Regional  Development  Fund.  This will be set up  before 
31  December,  1973,  and will be  financed,  from  the beginning  of  the 
second phase  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  from  the Community's 
own  resources.  Intervention by  the Fund  in coordination with 
national aids  should permit,  progressively with  the realisation of 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  the correction of the main  regional 
imbalances  in  the  enlarged Community,  and particularly those  resulting 
from  the preponderance of agriculture and  from  industrial change  and 
structural  underemployment." 
The  Council  of Ministers  accepted  (in principle)  that the Regional 
Development  Fund  should  grow  from  year  to year  and  that regional  expenditure 
would  one  day be  a  major  clement  in  the  Community budget. 
At  the  Paris  Summit  Conference  in December  1974,  a  final decision to 
establish  the Regional  Development  Fund  was  taken: 
"The  Heads  of Goverment  decide  that the  European Regional  Development 
Fund,  designed  to correct the principal regional  imbalances  in  the 
Community  resulting notably  from agricultural predominance, 
industrial change  and  structural  under-employment will be put  into 
operation by  the  institutions of  the  Community with effect  from 
1  January  1975." 
The  Fund will be  endowed with £125m.  in 1975,  with  £208m. 
for  each  of  the years  1976  and  1977,  i.e. £54lm.  (1,300m.  u.a.). 
~1is total  sum  of  £541  will be  financed  up  to a  level of  £63m.  by 
credits not presently utilised  from  the  EAGGF  (Guidance  Section). 
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the Commission: 
Belgium  1.5 "/o 
Denmark  1.3  "/o 
France  . . 15.0  "/o 
Irel<md  6.0  'Yo 
Italy  40.0  "/o 
Luxembourg  0.1  % 
Netherlands  1.7  "/o 
Federal Republic 
of  Germany  . .  6.4  % 
United  Kingdom .  28.0  "/o 
Ireland will  in addition be  given  another  £2.5m.  which will come  from 
a  reduction  in  the  shares  of  the  other Member  States with  the  exception 
of Italy." 
With  a  participation  of  28%  Britain will receive  the biggest share out of 
the  European  Regional  Development  Fund after Italy.  On  the basis  of the 
Fund's  total volume  of  £541m.  within  the  three year  period it 
is  envisaged  that Britain will  receive  from  the Commission: 
in  197 S 
in  1976 
in  1977 
in  1975-1977 
£35m. 
£58m. 
£58m. 
£151m. 
approx. 
approx. 
approx. 
approx. 
It should be noted  that the Regional  Fund  is not  intended merely  to  finance 
industrial activity in backward  regions:  its purpose  is rather  to stimulute 
investment  in  less  developed  areas.  Bilateral contacts between countries 
have  so  far been  unsuccessful  in achieving  this.  Thus  the British develop-
ment  areas  have  made  considerable efforts to attract industrial  investment 
from  Germnny  but these have  not bc'cn  very  pffective.  If, however,  Germany 
is  conunitted  to  "  l'onmnmity  [unc1  and  an  organisation  for  regional  develop-
ment,  it will be  mu~1 easier  for  German  investment  to be channelled  into 
Scotland,  Wales,  Northern  Ireland  or  Northern  England,  rather  than  into 
the already  overcrowded  Ruhr  area,  for  example.  To  assist in this process 
of  re-orienting  investment,  the  proposals  include  a  Committee  for Regional 
Policy  to be composed  of representatives  of Hember  States  and  of the 
Commission.  The  aim is not to try and stifle national initiatives  for 
giving aid to  industry,  but to compare  the efficiency of the different 
regional policies  of Hember  States,  and  to  try and  avoid  the wasteful 
bidding  for  outside  investment between  one  Hcmber  State and  another 
throuqh competition  in  incentives. 
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from  the beginning be  a  full partner  in  shaping  the Community's  regional 
policy and,  far  from being  a  limiting factor  on  Britain's  freedom  to assist 
her  own  industry,  the Community's  regional  policy should help Britain to 
avoid  unfair competition  from wealthier Member  States. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear  from  the  Heads  of  Governments'  decisions  that they are not 
intended  to be considered  in  terms  of  a  'fair return',  at least not  in  the 
narrow sense  of every  Member  State drawing  out  the  same  amount  as it 
contributes.  1  •ro  make  calculations  in this  way  would  be  to contradict the 
basic  purpose  of  the Fund,  which  is precisely the  redistribution of the 
means  of  economic  growth.  It is clear that,  in  the  long  term,  those 
countries which profit most  from  the overall  expansion  resulting  from  the 
rationalisation procedures  of the  Common  Market and  its enlargement, 
should be  the  ones  to contribute most  and benefit the least  from  a  regional 
policy.  This  would  be  even  more  essential  in  the  event  of further progress 
towards  economic  and  monetary  union,  which  would  otherwise  tend to effect 
much  of  the protection at present given by national  ~overnments to branc~es 
of  industry  in difficulties. 
It is to be  hoped  that the Regional  Development Fund,  together with  the 
other  instruments  of common  policy such as  the  European  Investment Bank, 
the Social  Fund,  the  ECSC  Treaty provisions  for  industrial restructuring, 
etc.,will make  a  fundamental  contribution to the more  uniform distribution 
of well-being  throughout  the  Community.  Details  of  some  of  the benefits 
which  Britain has  obtained  from  these latter instruments  of regional  policy 
2  are given  in  the Addendum  to U1is  chapter. 
1 
2 
The  Heads  of Governments'  decisions have  the effect that 74%  of  the 
total resources  of  £541  m.  will  go  to Britain,  Ireland and  Italy 
Por  the  'ne<Jativc'  aspects  of  the Conununity's  regional  policy,  by which 
controls arc placed  on  ~1e extent of assistance by  national  governments, 
and  their effect on  nritain,  see Chapter  II,  p.13 
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(~rticles 48  - 51  and  117  - 128 of the  EEC  Treaty and Articles  54  and  56 
of the  ECSC  Treaty) 
In  the  field of social policy,  the  three  new  Member  States  immediately 
adopted  the progress  made  by  the  Community prior to  accession  - subject to 
certain technical adjustments  contained in the acts of accession. 
The  Unit cd  ICingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland accepted and  implemented  the 
free  movement  of workers  and its corollary,  social  security for migrant 
workers.  They have  contributed to  and been  granted aid  from  the  European 
Social Fund,  the mainspring of community  social policy.  They  have  also 
received  funds  from  ECSC  appropriations  for the retraining of workers  in 
heilvy  industry and  the building of subsidized housing.  Finally,  following 
the Council  resolution of  21  January  19741  adopting  a  Social  Action  Programme 
for the years  1974  - 1976,  the United  Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Denmark will,  in 
the  near  future,  implement  a  number of directives proposed by  the Commission, 
approved by  the Council  after having  received  the opinions of the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  At  its mer.ting  on  17/12/1974, 
the  Council  of Ministers  for  Social Affairs agreed  on  the  first  two  dircctivos 
(concerning  equal  pay  and  m<lss  dismissals) .  These  new  directives will require 
the  new  Member  States,  particularly Great  Britain,  to  make  a  number of changes 
in social  legislation. 
There are thus  three aspects of Britain's accession to be  considered: 
1.  the  free  movement  and  social  security for migrant workers, 
2.  the European  Social  Fund  and  the  retraining of ECSC  workers, 
3.  the Social Action  Programme  1974  - 1976. 
1.  Free movement  and  social  security for migrant workers 
One of the  main  consequences of the  implementation of the  Rome  and  Paris 
Treaties is the  free  movement  of workers  throughout  the  Community. 
This  raiscn  the  interestinrJ question of the extent to which  the application 
of this prinicple has  resulted in an  influx of nationnls of other Member  States 
to  the United  Kingdom
2  It will be  seen  from  the  figures  supplied by  the 
British Government  th<J.t  the  free  movement  of workers,  which  came  into operation 
in 1973, has not  made  any  difference  to  the  steady decline  in the number of 
immigrants  from  Common  Mu.rket  countries  to the United  Kingdom  recorded over 
the last ten years. 
1 
2 
O.J.  No.  C.l3,  13  February  1974 
The  movement  between  the United  Kingdom  and  Irel<l.nd has  already existed 
for  a  number of years:  this movement  is not  therefore included  in  the 
figures  shown. 
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1Si3.  Thus  in 1972 12,600 workers  from the Community  (Ireland excepted) 
entered Britain as  against  a  mere  6,402  in 1973.  Only the Italians 
continued to  arrive in the  same  numbers  as before  :  2,800 Italians in 
1972,  2,000  in 1973  (one-third of the total number of  i~~.iromigrants).  But 
the  number of French  immigrants  dropped  from 4,400  in 1971  to 1,700 in 
1973,  the  number of German  immigrants  from  4,100  to 1,400,  the number 
of Dutch  immigrants  from 1,800 to  785  and  the  number of Danish  immigrants 
from  770  to  360,  in the  same  period. 
It can  thus be  inferred that the implementation of free  movement 
in the Community has not affected the  downward  trend of immigration  from 
the  EEC  Member States to the United Kingdom over the last ten years. 
The  most  likely explanation is the comparatively low rate of economic 
growth  in the United Kingdom in these ten years,  coinciding with  a  period 
of widespread prosperity in the Community.  It should be  added that 
Commonwealth  im."'Tligration  to Britain \vas  at a  peak during this period. 
It will also be noted thut  freedom of movement  has  not  produced  a 
greater flow of British workers  to  the Continent.  Accurate  figures  are 
not  available,  but the commission  estimates that the number  who  settled 
on  the continent in 1973  is only very slightly higher  (a  few hundred)  than 
in previous years. 
The  fact  that the  movement  of persons  between  the original Menfuer 
States  and  the United Kingdom has  not  increased is also reflected in 
the virtual absence of legal disputes  on  freedom of movement  between 
Member  States.  There has  been only one  submission to the European court 
of Justice on  the subject of  freedom of movement,  and that was  an 
application  from  a  British court for  a  preliminary  rulin~ concerning  a 
1  Dutch woman's  entry to the United Kingdom  in May  1973 
As  far as  social security for migrant workers  is concerned,  the 
commission states in its Report  on  the Development of the Social Situation 
in the Community  in 19732  that the Community  regulations have  been  imple-
mented in the  new Member  States without  any difficulty  (they took effect 
on  1  April 1973),  particularly as  technical adjustments had been  made  to 
allow for the special  situation of these countries. 
1  The  Van  Duyl  case  :  The  person. -e:r::moornoif  ....:as  coming to Britain to work · 
for the  'Church of Scientology'';  a  religious aect  whom:~ estnbliohrnent·-
in Britain has met  \-lith wide oppo-sition. 
2  Report  on  the  Development of the Social Situation  in  ·the  Community  in 1973, 
sec.  26  (English  edition,  p.  29). 
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The  Conununities  grant Nernbcr States  appropriations  under three 
main headings 
- aid from  the European  Social Fund, 
- appropriations  for  ·the  retraininG  of workers  in ECSC  industries, 
- ECSC  loans  for  the  construction of subsidized housing. 
Since their accession,  the  ;:lid  granted to  the  new  Member States 
from  those three sources,  particularly from  the Social Fund,  far  exceeds 
their contributions  (both  expressed as  percentages of the total). 
(q)  Aid  from  the  Social  Fund  in  1973  and  1974 
The  European Social Fund is  an  equalization  fund  for the Nine.  It 
was  originally set up  to  deal with  unemployment,  but since the  reorgan-
ization of 1971 it has  become  a  genuine  instrument of  regional policy 
(Art.  5  of the Council  Decision of  1  February 1971). 
In future,  therefore,  aid  from  the Fund \vill be  grunted  in  two 
eventualities: 
- when  Community policies affect or arc  likely to affect  cmplo~nent 
(Art.  4); 
- when  certain regions or branches  of industry are declining or undergoing 
a  prolonged period of structural decline  (Art.  5). 
'l'he  total aid granted to  each  Hernber  State  from  the Social Fund is 
shown  in the table in Annex  1  for  1973  and  in Annex  2  for  1974. 
This  table  shO\vs  that  : 
- in the  financial  year 1973,  the United Kingdom wns  granted more  aid 
from  the Fund  than  any other Member State  :  almost 1/3  (30.8%) •  or 
57.40 million u.n.  out of  lBG  million  (i.e.  £23.92 million out of 
£77.50 million1);  the United Kingdom's  contribution to the Conununity's 
budget,  on  the other hand,  was  only  8.78%.  It can  thus be said that 
in 1973 nritain  wa~;  the main beneficiary of the Corrununity' s  social 
policy; 
- in the  financi<1l  vear  1974,  the  United  Kingdom was  granted almost  25%  of 
::ire  total aid  from  the  Fund,  second only  to  It<'ly which  wan  gr~.ntccl 29%; 
this represents  a  sum of  62  million u.a.  out of a  total of 254.5 million 
u.a.  (i.e.  25.83  million out of 106.04 million1). 
1  On  the basis of the  rate of exchange  applied in the  Community  budget 
1  =  2.4 u.a. 
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Kingdom  falls  almost  entirely under the heading of Article  5,  i.e. 
regional policy:  £23.15 million.  were granted under Article  5  and 
only  £790,000  under Artible 4. 
- the  situation was  similar in 1974,  but what  was  of special  significance 
was  the  increase  in aid granted under Article  4  from  £790,000 
in 1973  to  £3.29 million  in  1974.  The  reason  for  this  increase was 
the  extension of Article  4  to  cover  some  programmes  in  favour of migrants 
and  the handicapped as  a  result of decisions  taken by  the Council  in June 
1974. 
It can  therefore be  said that,  as  a  result of the  reform of the Social 
Fund  in 1971,  in regard to  regional policy the  United  Kingdom is deriving 
immediate benefit,  even before  the  Regional  Development  Fund has  been  set up. 
(b)  Retraining of workers 
The  appropriations available  for the retraining of workers  in  ECSC 
industries are considerably higher than  in previous years.  Between  1  Janua~ 
and  31  December  1973,  a  total of  £15.58 million was  allocated for  the 
retraining of 41,600 workers,  and  in 1974  a  total of  £16.59 million was 
allocated for  40.173,  of whom  19.625 were  British. 
In  1973  and  1974  the coal-mines have  been  the  main  recipients of aid 
from  the  Fund. 
The  total appropriations  granted  for the retraining of workers  are  shown 
in the tables in Annexes  3  and  4. 
In  1973  the United  Kingdom was  allocated  funds  for  retraining in the 
steel industry  (534,393,60 u.a.,or £222,664)  and  the  iron-ore  industry 
(120,000 u.a., or  ~0,000).  This  represents only  1.7% of the  appropriations 
granted by  the Community. 
In  1974 on  the other hand,  the United  Kingdom was  allocated  58.2% of the 
total appropriations,  (i.e.  23,189,154 u.a., or £9,662,148).  The  reason  for 
the vast  increase in appropriations which were of benefit to  the United 
Kingdom was  that agreement  on  the actual  expenditure was  not  reached until 
early 1974. 
(c)  The building of subsidised housing 
The  table in Annex  5  shows  the  proposed allocation of funds  for  the 
period  1  January  1973  to  31  December  1974  for  the building of subsidised  ECSC 
housing,  and the way  in which  these  funds  are  to  be  used. 
This  table  shows: 
_  that Britain is to  receive  20%  of the total appropriations,  approximately 
the  same  as  France  (23.25%).  With  the agreement of the British Government, 
these  funds  are  to be  spent  entirely on  the modernisation of existing 
housing,  and  not  for  the  construction of new  housing; 
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subsidised housing  (35.75%). 
3.  Social Action  Programme  for  1974  - 1976 
On  21  January  1974,  on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  the Council 
ndoptcd  a  resolution laying  down  a  Social Action  Programme  for  the period 
1974  - 1976.  In  the  resolution,  the council undertakes  to  adopt,  in stages 
and  according  to  a  fixed  timetable,  a  number.of  social actions  on which,  in 
the meantime,  the  Commission will have  submitted proposals.  Some  of these 
actions will not,  strictly speaking,  involve  radical  legislative changes  in 
1 
the Member  States  ;  others,  however,  will  require  adjustments  to  the  social 
legislation in certain States.  The  Commission has  already  submitted an 
initial series of proposals  to  the Council,  which  gave  its decision at its 
meeting on  10  June  1974,  but  in the course of this meeting the Council 
postponed discussion of the first proposal  for  a  directive to its next 
meeting at the  end of 1974. 
The  proposals  for directives,  which are likely to entail major  statutory 
and  legislative changes  in the  laws of certain new  Member  States2  are  as 
follows: 
-a proposal  for  a  directive on  the harmonisation of Member  States'legislation 
on  equal  pay  for men  and women; 
- a  proposal  for  a  directive on  the  harmonisation of Member  States'legislation 
on mass  dismissals. 
- a  proposal  for  a  directive on  the  h?~n·oni.uation of Member  States  legislation 
on  the  retention of the  acquired rights and  advantages of employees  in the 
case of  merger~ take-overs  and  amalgamations. 
As  already  stated the  fi  r~1t  two  draft directives have  been  adopted  in 
principle by  the Council of Ministers  for  social affairs on  17  December  1974. 
Furthermore,  the Commission  has  submitted  to  the  Council 
- a  proposal  for  a  recommendation  on  the application of the principle of the 
40  hour week  and  four weeks'  annual  paid holiday. 
(a)  Equal  pay  for  men  and  women 
The directive on  equal  pay  for  men  and  women  provides that Member  States 
shall allow  legal action to be  taken  in  cnses of discrimination against women, 
and  repeal  any  regulations or administrative provisions which  may  prove 
detrimental  to working women.  Some  modification may  be  needed  in British 
1 
2 
For  example  the proposals  for  the  establishment of  a  European Foundation 
for the  improvement of the  environment  and  living and working conditions, 
or a  General European  Committee on  Safety at Work. 
and  also  in those of  some of the original Member  States. 
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(b)  Harmonisation of Member  States'  legislation on  mass  dismissals 
The  adoption of this directive has  created an  important  legal precedent, 
in that it implies that Article  100 of the  Rome  Treaty,  relating to  the 
harmonisation of legislation,  could  in  future be applied in the  social  field, 
which  the Council has hitherto  refused to  accept. 
The  main  provisions of the Directive are as  follows: 
- the  employer is obliged to hold consultations with workers'  representatives 
when  he is contemplating collective dismissals, 
- the  employer is obliged to  notify any  proposed collective dismissals to  the 
appropriate Government  Department,  it being understood that  the dismissals 
cannot  take place  for  a  specific period  (30  days,  which  may be  extended 
under certain circumstances) , 
- this period may  be  used  to  attempt  to  avoid or reduce  dismissals  and  to 
mitigate their consequences. 
The  Directive includes  a  definition of collective dismissals,  namely, 
dismissals effected by  an  employer  for one or more  reasons  not  related to 
the  individual behaviour of the workers  concerned where  the  number  of 
dismissals  - depending  on  the choice made  by  the  Member  States - is: 
- at least  10  in establishments normally  employing between  10  and  20  workers, 
- at least  10% of the  number of workers  in establishments normally  employing 
between  100  and  300 workers, 
- at least  30  in establishments normally  employing at least  300 workers, 
- or,  over a  period of  90  days,  at least  20  in any one  establishment, 
irrespective of the  number of workers  normally  employed  there. 
This Directive will not  require any  substantial modifications  in British 
legislation.  Its provisions  are  largely covered by  the Security of Employment 
Act,  1974. 
(c)  Harmonisation of l\lcmbcrs  Staten'  legislation on  the c:r::guired  rights of workers 
The  adoption of this directive at one of the  next  meetings of the Council 
of Ministers  for Social Affairs  in 1975 will  tend  to  have  even  more  far-reaching 
consequences  on the national  legislation than  the  two  directives already adopted 
in 1974. 
This proposal tries to protect the prior acquired entitlements of workers 
in the case of a  change of employer by: 
PE  37.463/I/C/rev. 
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employer; 
- protection of employees  against  dismissal  due  exclusively to  a  change  in 
the  structure of the undertaking  (by  compensation payments); 
- information,  and  consultation and negotiations with the  representatives 
of employees. 
This Directive,  if agreed by the  Council of Ministers  in its present 
form,  might  require  some  modification  in British legislation.  However,  it 
is still at the  stage of discussion at official level,  between civil servants 
of the member-countries affected,  which  (as  has been pointed out  in Chapter  I) 
univers~lly precede  Community  legislation. 
(d)  Recommendation on  the application of the principle of the  40-hour working 
week  and  four weeks'  annual  paid holiday 
As  far as  the United  Kingdom  is concerned,  if this recommendation were 
adopted, the only change  needed  in British legislation would be  in respect of 
paid holidays:  at present these arc  fixed at between  15  and  18  days  a  year. 
They would have  to be  increased gradually to  four weeks  before the  end of 1976. 
On  the other hand,  the  40-hour week  is already the  rule  in Britain. 
Conclusion 
As  far as  social policy is concerned,  Britain's accession may  have  aroused 
certain misgivings  in  some  British Members of Parliament,  particularly as  regards 
the  new  allocation of aid  from  the European  Social Fund  adopted by the Council. 
Thus  Mr  Russell  Johnston,  a  Member of the European  Parliament,  asked  in  a 
l'lritten Question on  6  November  19731 :  'Does  the  Commission  expect  the 
relative proportion of aid  from  the  ESF  to  each of the original Member States 
to  continue in the  future?'  The  Commission  answered,  on  7  January  1974: 
'There arc  no  quotas  reserved  for  individual  Member  States in respect of the 
aid granted under  the European Social Fund.  The  Commission  takes its decision 
in accordance with the Council decision of 1  February  1971  and its Supplementary 
Regulations,  taking into account  the  Community  interest of the  proposed 
projects,  their intrinsic value,  the  funds  available  and  the opinions 
2 
formulated  by  the Committee of the  European  Social  Fund 
The  fact  is that,  on  a  percentage basis,  the appropriations Britain has 
received  from  the Social  Fund  far exceed its contribution to  the Community 
budget. 
1  O.J.  No.  C  14,  15 February  1974 
2  Ibid. 
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PE  37.463/I/C/rev. From  the  legislative and  statutory points of view,  on  the other hand, 
it can be  seen  that,  if the  Commission's  proposals  for directives are  adopted 
by  the Council,  the  new  Member  States,  in particular the United  Kingdom  and 
Ireland,  would have  to  make  mnjor changes  in their social  legislation  (equal 
pay  for  men  and women,  mass  dismissal,  acquired  rights of workers  in the case 
of change of ownership of enterprises). 
Clearly the  economic  effects of implementing these directives and 
recommendations  cannot be  foreseen at present. 
One  assertion can,  however,  be  made  at the moment:  from  the  figures 
relating to  the  European Social Fund's budget,  Britain and  Ireland emerge 
as  the main beneficiaries of the  Community's  social policy in  1973. 
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New  Social  Fund  - Total  co~~itreents for  the  financial year  1973  Ah"'NEX  I 
(in million u.a.) 
Article 4  Article 5  Total per country 
and percentage of 
Country  Total  Regions  and  Handicapped  Total  1973  Fund 
Agriculture  Textiles  Technical  Article  4  progressl  persons  Article  5  Total  % 
Gem  any  9.56  - 9.56  3.96  6.42  10.,38  19.,94  10.7 
Belgium  0.,13  0.,59  0.72  5.00  1.47  6.47  7.19  3.9 
Den;uark  - - - 1..85  3.20  5.05  5.05  2.7 
France  13.,47  0.89  14.36  14.,35  7.41  21.76  36.12  19  .. 4 
Ireland  0.10  0.61  0.71  8.66  0.44  9.10  9.81  5.3 
Italy  - 0.04  0.04  41.99  1.70  43.69  43.73  23.5 
Luxe:nbourg  - - - - 0.04  0.04  o.o4  0.1 
Netherlands  o.81  - 0.,81  3.75  2.,21  5.96  6. 77  3.6 
United Kingdom  0.43  1.46  1.89  47.06  8.45  55.51  57.40  30.8 
--- -- --- --- ---
Total  24.50  3.59  28.09  126.62  31.34  157.96  186.05  100.0 
- -------'---- - --- ------ --'--- ---
l  The  appropriations  under  Article  5  relate to all aid to priority regions  and  'technical progress'  scherees;  these 
t\,·o  areas,  ~·rhich  are very often  li::1ked  together,  cannot be  shc·dn  separately in  a  sir.gle table.  In any  case,  the 
aid allocated  for  operations  8f  a  specifically regional nature  is  far  in excess  of  the  minimum  percentage  laid 
dc~n in Title I, Article  2  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  2396/71  of  8  November  1971. 
Pursuan~ to  the Financial Regulation of  25  April  1974,  conversion  into pounds  sterling is accomplished by  dividing 
L'1e  amount  expressed  in units of account by  2. 4,  which  corresponds  to  the unit of account/pound ratio on  the basis 
of  the official rate  for  the pmmd declared  to the International Honetary Fund • 
L~is applies  to all tables  concerning  the Social Fund.  The  above  figures  for  the United  Kingdom  and  the whole  of 
the  Co~unity are,  expressed  in millions of pounds,  as  follows: 
United  Kingdom  £ 
Total  £ 
0.18 
10.21 
0.61 
1. 50 
0.79 
11.70 
19.61 
52.76 
3.5 
13.06 
23.13 
65.82 
23.92 
77.52 
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ANNEX  II 
New  Social Fund  - Total  commitment  for  the  financial year  1974 
(in million u.a.) 
Article 4  Article  5  Total per country 
& % of  1974  Fund 
Regions  & 
Country  Agri- Higrant  Handi- Total  technical  Handi-_  Total 
culture  Textiles  workers  capped  Art.  4  progress  capped  Art.  5  Total 
O/  ;o 
Germany  6.6  2.6  0.1  - 9.3  6.5  12.2  18.7  . 28.0  11.0 
Belgium  0.3  0.6  - - 0.9  4.1  1.5  5.6  6.5  2.6 
Denmark  - - - - - 3.3  8.9  12.2  12.2  4.8 
France  14.9  0.7  0.4  0.2  16.3  27.9  5.2  33.2  49.5  19.4 
Ireland  6.0  1.2  - - 7.2  8.7  1.0  9.6  16.8  6.6 
Italy  2.2  0.5  1.2  0.3  4.3  65.3  3.2  68.5  72.8  28.6 
! 
Luxembourg  - - - - - - 0.01  0.01  0.01  -
I 
Netherlands  0.9  - - - 0.9  3.7  2.1  5.8  6.7  2.6 
United Kingdom  0.2  0.6  6.4  0.8  7.9  44.5  9.6  54.1  62.0  24.4  I 
-- -- -- -- -- --- --- ---
I 
Total  31.1  6.2  8.0  1.3  46.8  164.0  43.71  207.71  254.51  100.0% 
The  above  figures  for  the United  Kingdom  and  the whole  of the  Co~~unity are,  expressed  in million of pounds,  as  follows: 
United  Kingdom  £  0.08  0.25  2.67  0.33  3.29  18~54  4.00  22.54  25.83 
Total  £  12.96  2.79  3.33  0.54  19.50  68.33  18.21  86.54  106.09 N 
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Retraining of workers  - ·1973 
(in  u. a.) 
Coal-mines  Steel  Iron-ore 
.. 
Country  Appropri- Appropri- Appropri-
l'i'orkers  ations  (u. a.)  Workers  ations(u.a.)  Workers  ations(u.a)  Workers 
Germany  26,641  24,944,398.90  3,967  797,814.21  - - 30,608 
Belgium  5,542  2,760,000.00  - - - 5,542 
France  4,143  8,370,750.00  - - 260  408,700.47  4,403 
United  Kingdom  - - 816  534,393.60  232  120,000.00  1,048 
Community  36,326  36,075,148.90  4,783  1,332,207.81  492  528,700.47  41,601 
------ --------- -
The  above  figures  for  the United  Kingdom  and  the whole  of the  Co~munity are,  expressed  in 
United  Kingdom  £  - 222,664.00  50,000.00 
Co~.munity  £  15,031,311.00  555,086.58  220,291.86 
M'NEX  III 
Total  Total 
% 
Appropri-
ations(u.a) 
25,742,213.11  68.3 
2,760,000.00  7.0 
8,779,450.83  23.1 
654,393.60  1.6 
I 
! 
37,396,057.54  100% 
------
272,664.00 
15,581,690.00 1\J 
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ANNEX  IV 
Retraining of workers  - 1974 
(in  u. a.) 
Coal-mines  Iron/Steel  Total 
Country  Total 
1\Torkers  Appropriations  Workers  Appropriations  1\Torkers  Appropriations  % 
Germany  12 .13  5  8,739,882.85  483  142,245.74  12,618  8,882,128.59  22.3 
Belgium  1,062  945,389.37  2,607  291,837.58  3,669  1,237,226.95  3.1 
France  3,301  6,450,395.24  960  73,861.55  4,261  6,524,256.79  16.4 
United  Kingdom  11,921  19,445,  85.19  7,704  3,743,467.80  19,625  23,189,153.99  58.2 
Community  28,419  35,581,353.65  11,709  4,251,412.67  401 17 3  39,832,766.32  100 % 
L__  -- -- -- - -------- ---- --'--- ------------- --- - L__  ------ -·-· -- --- ------ - L_  __  -----
The  above  figures  for  the United  Kingdom and  the  whole  of the Community are,  expressed  in pounds,  as  follows: 
United  Kingdom  £  8,102,369.1  1,559,778.2  9,662,147.5 
Community  £  14,825,564.0  l,  771,421.9  16,596,985.0 
------ - ----------------- ----N 
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Country 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Total 
Proposed allocation of funds  available for  the 
Second  sta~e of the Seventh Subsidised Housjng  Programme  for 
workers in ECSC  industries 
7th  Progr~~e - stage  2  Housing  planned 
1.1.1973  - 31.12.1974 
New  housing 
in u. a. 
in national  --
in %  -currency  Number  Type  of  aid 
7,150,000  25,169,000  DM  35.75  1,600  Family houses 
1,000  Houses  for  single 
persons 
500,000  25,000,000 FB  2.50  200  Family houses 
4,650,000  25,826.100 FF  23.25  1,000  Family houses 
150  Houses  for  single 
persons 
700,000  437,500,000 Lire  5.50  200  Houses  for  single 
persons 
500,000  25,000,000 Flux.  2.50  200  Family houses 
1,000,000  3,620,000 Hfl.  5  400  Family houses 
4,000,000  1,666,680  £  20  - -
1,000,000  7,500,000 Dkr.  5  200  Family houses 
500,000  208,335  £  2.50  75  Family houses 
20,000,000  (£8, 333, 333)  100.00  3,675  Family houses 
1,350  Houses  for  single 
persons 
-------- -- -- ---- - --
A..~  .. ;'UEX  V 
(in million u.a.) 
Hodernisation of 
existing housing 
1,700 
-
1,700 
100 
-
250 
2,000  I 
I 
-
100 
5,850 
(£2,437.5) 
- - -- -SECTION  II - SECTORAL  POLICIES 
A.  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
The  problems  arising  from  the  need  to adapt British agriculture to 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  the  complexity  of  the provisions  of 
the Treaty  of Accession which  are designed  to achieve  this adaptation 
and  the  important  influence exerted by  the cost of  food  products  on 
public  opinion concerning British membership  of  the  Common  Market 
justify,  in our  view,  the  length of  the chapter devoted  to the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
THE  AIMS  OF  THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
Of  all the questions  concerning Britain's entry into the  European 
Economic  Community,  the  impact  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP) 
on  Britain is  the  topic  that has  caused  the most heated discussion 
(though  in  fact  in  the course  of  the  'renegotiation'  exchanges  the 
CAP  has  so far  presented  no substantial problems). 
'l'ho  critici!:ms  that  have  been  made  of  tho  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
refer to its cost,  either  in  increased  food  prices  or  financial 
contributions.  The  most  common  objection  to  the  CAP  is that it requires 
Britain to shift its agricultural  imports  from  low price world suppliers 
to high price Community  suppliers. 
Article  39  of  the  EEC  Treaty established the  objectives  of  the CAP  as 
the  increasing of agricultural productivity to ensure  a  fair standard 
of agricultural  income,  the stabilisation of markets  and  to ensure 
availability of produce  and  reasonable prices  for  consumers. 
To  achieve  these aims,  a  common  organisation of agricultural policy by 
sectors has  been  established,  which  may  include  regulation of prices, 
production  and  marketing,  storage and  carry-over arrangements,  common 
machinery  for  stabilising imports  and  exports,  vocational  training and 
joint measures  to promote  consumption  of certain products. 
PE  37.463/II/A/rev. The  similurity of Article  39  of  the  Treaty  to Section  l  of  the Agriculture 
Act,  l947,which  laid down  the basis  for  British agricultural policy,  is 
striking.  The  Act stutes  that:-
"the  following  provisions ...  shall have  effect for  the  purpose  of 
promoting  and maintaining,  by  the provision of  guaranteed prices 
and  assured markets  for  the  produce  mentioned  in  the First Schedule 
to this Act,  a  stable and  efficient agricultural  industry capable 
of producing  such part of  the nation's  food  and  other agricultural 
produce  as  in  the national  interest it is desirable  to produce  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  of producing it at minimum prices consistently 
with proper  remuneration  and  living conditions  for  farmers  and workers 
in agriculture and  an  adequate  return  on  capital  invested  in  the 
industry." 
From  the beginning  the part of  the nation's  food  that it was  desirable 
to produce  in  the  United  Kingdom  proved  a  bone  of contention between 
<JOVernments  bent  on  restricting the cost to the Exchequer  and  farmers 
hoping  to expand  production  to  a  maximum.  ny  adopting  the  system of 
deficiency payments  - the difference between  the  internal  'guaranteed' 
and  the  reigning world market price  - it was  thought  a  reasonable 
compromise had been  found.  Deficiency payments,  however,  merely represented 
the  means  by which  policy was  applied  and  not its basis  (there  is  no  mention 
of  the  technique  in  the Act). 
The  EEC  Treaty,  which  establishes  the basic  aims  of  the CAP,  has been called 
an  'outline treaty'.  It lays  down  basic  goals  and  provides  for certain 
arrangements  which  may  be  adopted  for  implementing  those  goals.  Thus  the 
CAP  is given  its shape by  the Regulations  and  Directives which  continuously 
amend  its working.  It is,  therefore,  in constant evolution.  Britain in 
the  Common  Market  is able  to add  its voice  powerfully  to direct the  CAP  in 
a  direction best suiting its interests. 
As  Commissioner  Lardinois,  responsible  for  European Agricultural  Policy, 
told  the  Farmers'  Club  in March  1974: 
"I wish  to  go  on  record  as  saying that the  common  agricultural policy 
is not  a  static policy.  It is  a  policy that must  adapt  to economic 
and  social realities as  they develop  in .the  Community.  I  am  also 
convinced  that we  must  take  into account real political difficulties 
in  some  of  our  member  countries.  We  must also listento suggestions  from 
Member  States with  a  view to  improving  the  common  agricultural policy. 
Not  only  do  we  welcome  such  suggestions,  we  take  them very seriously 
indeed." 
The  entry  of  the  United  Kingdom  into the  European  Community  has  coincided 
with  a  noticeable evolution  in  the CAP,  due  in part to  increases  in world 
- 28  - PE  37.463/II/A/rev. prices  of many  agricultural products,  and  in part to the determination  of 
the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  to base agricultural policy 
squarely  on  the modern  farm. 
The  Commission  has  acknowledged  that certain criticisms  of  the principles 
on  which market  and  price policy are well  founded,  and  it has  sought  to 
make  the necessary  improvements  to reduce  disequilibrium on  a  number  of 
agricultural  market~J,  to  take  into account  the  interests  of  the consumer, 
to reduce  expenditure  under  the  European Agricultural Guarantee  and  Guidance 
Fund  (EAGGF)  <1nd  to  improve  murket  organisations. 
This  involves  a  greater degree  of  financiul  responsibility  on  the part of 
the  farmer  for  agricultural  surpluses  and  the  establishment of a  better 
price relationship between agricultural products. 
Such  an  improvement  to the  CAP  will bring about  a  better equilibrium 
between  supply and  demand,  help the security of future  supplies at 
reasonable prices  and  contribute to reducing  the cost of the  EAGGF.  At  the 
present  time,  however,  the problem  facing  the  Community  is  one  of deficits 
in certain sectors  rather than surpluses. 
THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  ACTS  OF  ACCESSION 
1.  General 
The  signing by  the  United  Kingdom  of  the Acts  nf Accession  implies  acceptance, 
as  from  1  February  1973,  of all the mechanisms  and  r:egulations  of the  cormnon 
agricultural policy.  This  is particularly true with  regard  to interventions, 
import  levies  and  export refunds.  The  same  applies  to customs  duties,  charges 
having  equivalent effect,  quantitative restrictions  and measures  having 
equivalent effect on all products  covered  on  the date of accession by  a 
common  organisation of  the  market.  Exceptions  are  allowed  only where  there 
is no  common  organisation of the market  and  where  there is  a  national market 
organisation.  These  exceptions  are applicable  only until  a  common  organisation 
of  the market  for  these products  is  introduced.1 
The  common  organisation of markets  is  thus  the  key  element  in  the acceptance 
of the Community heritage,  with  the single exception  of  fishing products 
1  See Act  of Accession,  Art.  60(1)  and  (2).  It should be  noted  that at the 
beginning of  1973  the principal exceptions  to the  common  system  of markets 
~ore mutton  and  lamb,  ethyl  alcohol  and potatoes  (see J.P.  Puissochet 
'L'clargissoment des  communautes  europeennes',  Ed.  techniques et 
economiques,  Paris  1974,  p.72). 
- 29  - PE  37.463/II/A/rev. hut  even  this  refers  to fishing  regulations  rather than  markc·t  organisation 
. '  lf 1 
1_  L.~C  •  Acceptance  of  the  Community heritage  implies  adherence  to the 
following  three basic principles: 
- the existence of  a  single Community  market  and  the  free circulation of 
goods, 
- Conununi ty preference, 
financial  solidarity in  respect of  the marketing  and  sale of goods. 
However,  the practical  implications  of this acceptance  in principle are 
attenuated by  a  large number  of transitional provisions  applicable  up  to 
and  sometimes  even  beyond  1977.  The  Acts  of Accession are highly  flexible 
in  this  respect.  Flexibility was  necessary since the British negotiators 
were  compelled  to reconcile  acceptance of  these basic principles with  the 
requirements  of  a  country which: 
" •.•  needed  arrangements  which  would  permit  an  orderly adjustment by 
our  producers  to  the  Community's  system of support and  marketing; 
avoid  sharp  increases  in  food  prices;  and  prevent abrupt dislocation 
of  the exports  of our  Commonwealth  and  other  third country suppliers."2 
The  derogations  and  transitional provisions  in  the agricultural sector 
contained  in  the Acts  of Accession are  thus  the direct consequence  of  the 
progressive adjustment of  these  initial requirements  to the  three basic 
principles  of  the  common  agricultural policy.  The  aim of this analysis 
is  to point out  the essential transitional modifications  to the principle 
of Community  preference and  the  free circulation of  goods,  financial 
solidarity being  treated separately  in  the section  on  budgetary questions. 
2.  Protocol  No.  lG  on  markets  and  trade  in agricultural products 
This  protocol spells  out  the practical adjustments  made  to  the~ommunity's 
agricultural heritage to accommodate  the United  Kingdom  and  gives b  ~lear 
statement of  the philosophy behind  the transitional provisions  of  the Acts 
of Accesnion. 
'rhus  "the organisation  of  the. markets  has  as  its essential  feature  to 
enable  intra-Community  trade  to develop  in conditions  comparable with  those 
existing  on  an  internal market".  It follows  that  "changes  in the structure 
of  international  trade constitutes  a  national result of  the  enlargement of 
2 
Sec p.  31 
Scc'The  United  Kingdom  and  the  European Communities'  presented to 
Parliament;  London,  HMSO,  Cmnd  4715,  par.  77/p.20 
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!"or  <'C11'l.tin  lltird  ('tlllllll"it•n  and  in certain  11poclfic  c<won  clurinq  tho 
Lransitionul  period.  'l'hi11  covcrn  the  provinion11  t"elnting  to  CollUllOnwoalth 
sugar  and  New  Zealand butter  and  chccnc. 1 
3.  Transitional mechanisms 
(a)  1~e alignment of prices 
Since  the  levels  of  guaranteed prices  to producers  differed between 
the United  l~ingdom and  the Community,  the Act  of Accession  provided 
for  a  progressive  alignment  of  the  two  in six stages  to be completed 
by  1  January  1978.  Although  the  timetable  and  mechanism  arc binding, 
a  departure  of  up  to  10'/(.  in  either direction of  the  amount  of  the price 
move  to be  made  for  the  forthcoming  ye<~r  is permitted.  The  10·;~ margin 
has  been  applied  for both  the  l'J73-74  <tnd  the  1974-75  marketing years. 
As  far  as  production subsidies  (deficiency payments)  are concerned, 
the  United  Kingdom  has  been  authorised to maintain  them during  the 
entire period  of  ulignment.  They  must,  however,  be  abolished entirely 
by  31  December  1977,  even  though  there  is no set timetable  for  this 
purpose.  The  transitional measures  prevent  the  adoption  of the 
mechanisms  of  the  CAP  upsetting  the  internal stability of  the market 
and  modulate  the effect on  consumer prices. 
The  price mechanism  applicable during  the  transitional period still 
leaves  differences  in  the  level  of prices between  the  original  Six  <tnc1 
each  of  the  three  new  Member  States.  In order  to permit  the  free 
exchange  of products  it has  been  necessary  to set up  a  sluice gate 
system  aimed at correcting  the effects  of  these differences  in  level. 
This  is  a  system of compensatory amounts  equal  to the  difference 
between  the price resulting  from  the  immediate  application of  the  common 
prices  and  the price  fixed  in  the  United  Kingdom at each  of  the stages 
of the transitional period  (Article  55). 
It should be  noted  that the compensatory amount  to be collected or 
refunded constitutes  the  only measure  applicable  in  intra-Community 
2  trade.  In  trade with  third countries,  Community  levies  and  refunds 
are <tpplicable  red';lced  or  increased by  the  compensatory  amount.  '!'his 
system m<tkes  for  stable  trading relations  since  the compensatory  nmount 
1 
2 
See  Puissochet,  op.cit.  p.472 
See  'La  Communite  elargie:  bilan des  negociations  avec  les pays 
candidats  ~  l'adhesion';  The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
Brussels,  22  January  1972,  p.29 
- 31  - PE  37.463/II/A/rev. is  a  fixed  sum  and  is established for  the whole 
1  season.  It is 
therefore different  from  the  levy which  is variable,  depending  on 
fluctuations  in market prices. 
Compensatory  amounts  are  financed by the guarantee section of the  EAGGF 
(Artie lc  59) 2 • 
(b)  Tariff movements 
In  the case  of products  imported  from  third countries  and  subject in  the 
Six  to customs  duties,  duties between  the Nine will be progressively 
abolished.  At  tlc  same  time  the United  Kingdom  duties  on  imports  of 
these  products  from  third countries will be  progressively aligned with 
the  Common  Customs  Tariff.  The  timetable  for  these adjustments  varies 
from  product to product but they will all be completed by  1  January  1978. 
(c)  Possible extension  of transitional measures 
•ro  give  an  <Jdditional  Bafcgu<~rd that the  provisions  of the Act  of 
Accession would  operate with  the necessary  flexibility,  Articles  62  and 
63  envisage  'second degree'  transitional measures  to supplement  the 
derogations  already provided.  In  the case  of Article  62,  the procedure 
is  of  the classic Community  'legislative'  type  (Council  decision)  which 
can  cover  the whole  transitional period.  Under  Article 63,  on  the 
other hand,  any  necessary measures  are  taken  in accordance with  the 
'management committee'  procedure:  the mechanism  is thus  more  flexible, 
but it could operate  only until  31  January  1974  with  a  possibre  extension 
until  31  January  1975  (which  was  applied). 
4.  Fishery products3 
As  far  as  fishery  products  arc concerned,  the Act  of Accession  (Articles  98-
103)  has carried the principle of derogations  during  the transitional 
period to its extreme.  Here  the Community heritage has  been left out of 
account.  In  order to meet  the United  Kingdom's  demands,  the Community 
went beyond  the  limits it had set itself on  possible adjustment and  trans-
itional measures.  This  docs  not concern  the  common  organisation of markets 
1 
2 
3 
See  Puissochet,  op.cit.  p.78 
See  the section  on budgetary questions 
Among  the provisions  of  the Act  of Accession relating  to specific sectors 
of agricultural production  only  the special case of  fishery  products  would 
seem  to require special attention  in this  study.  For  other products  the 
Act  of Accession can be  referred to:  fruit and vegetables  (Art.65-68), 
wine  (Art.69),  oilseeds  (Art.70-72),  cereals  (Art.78  &  74),  pigmeat  (Art. 
75  & 76),  eggs  and  poultrymeat  (Art.77-79),  rice  (Art.80),  sugar  (Art.81-83), 
live trees  and  other plants,  bulbs,  roots  and  the  like,  cut  flowers  and 
ornamental  foliage  (Art.84),  milk and  milk products  (Art.85-89),  beef  and 
veal  (Art.90-93),  products  processed  from  fruit and vegetables  (Art.94), 
flax  (Art.95),  seeds  (Art.96),  other  products  (Art.97) 
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of  the  Act  of Accession.  It applies particularly to  fishing  rights 
(Articles  100-103). 
The  Regulation  of  the  Six  (of  20  October  1970,  see  OJ  of  27.10.70) 
established the  Community character of fishing  grounds  up  to  12  nautical 
miles.  Within  this  limit equal  access  and  exploitation were  guaranteed 
to nll Community vessels.  The  United  Kingdom ¢:lnd  Norway)  pointed out that 
this  Rcgulntion  hnd  bcnn  adopted after their acceptance  in principle of 
the  'Community heritage'.  Consequently,  Article  100  makes  it possible  for 
any  of the  Nine  to waive  the  Community  arrangement  lnid down  by  Regulation 
No.  2141/70 by authorising  them,  until  31  December,  to restrict fishing 
within  a  limit of six nauticnl miles  to vessels  operating  from ports  of 
their own  coastal area.  United  Kingdom  fishermen  have  thus  been  offered 
exceptional protection up  to 1983.  In certain areas  protection can 
extend to  12  nautical miles  (Article  101).  But this  is  a  'possible'  and 
not an  'imposed'  derogation,  subject to a  system of authorisation.  The 
fact  remains  that fishing  is  the only sector  in which  the  transitional 
measures  of accession have  affected and modified  the  system  followed within 
the original Community  of  the  Six. 
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The  experience of membership proves  that the  transitional measures  are  able 
to  function  normally.  The  flexibility of  the provisions  relating to 
agriculture in  the Acts  of Accession has  made  it possible to satisfy 
British demands  without any  major crisis during  a  period of great tension 
in international markets.  It must be  noted,  however,  that  from  the 
beginning  of  the  transitional phase  the  United  Kingdom  found it necessary 
to make  full  usc  of the derogatory provisions  which  the Act  of Accession 
contains. 
Over  the past two years  there have been considerable developments  in the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  in  the context of the regular price reviews  and 
by special  measures  which have had  to be  taken  for  particular sectors. 
Not  only did Britain participate in  the negotiations  that led  to these 
decisions but also  the  specific  problems  of  the  United  Kingdom  have  been 
at the centre of recent developments. 
During  the first year  of membership  an  orderly start was  made  to the 
transitional period at least as  far  as  the  fixing  of prices  is concerned. 
Monetary compensation  amounts  had  to be added  to tho  'accession compensatory 
amounts  because  the  initial conversion  rate representing  a  10%  devaluation 
of  the parity declared  to tho  International Monetary  Fund could not be held 
in the  face  of  the  downward  float  of the pound.1  Hence  the  need  for 
monetary compensation  amounts  in the  form  of  import subsidies  and  taxes 
on  exports.  M.C.A's  are also applied,  of course,  between  those  of  the 
original members  who  do not participate  in the monetary  'snake'  and  they 
are not an  inevitable part of  tho  transitional period.  They  were consider-
ably  reduced  by  the  new  representative  rate of the green  pound  in  September 
1974,  but  they  cannot be  abolished altogether until the  pound  returns  to  a 
stable  parity with  the other European  currencies. 
Events  of  the past two  years have  shown  that the Common  Agricultural  Policy 
can  no  longer be considered as  a  monolithic  edifice providing  a  blanket 
protection  for all products.  1\s  a  result of  the rapid deterioration in 
the  supply situation in certain sectors,  leading to  a  price explosion, 
and  surpluses  in others,  leading  to severe  losses  for  farmers,  a  number  of 
special measures  have been  taken which  supplement  or derogate  from  the 
relevant market organisation.  It is  therefore necessary to examine  the main 
developments  in the  CAP  produce by product. 
1 
2 
See  'Seventh General  Report  on  the Activities of  the  European Communities' 
(1973)  p.259 
See  OJ  L27,  L30  and  LSO  of  1  and  23  February  1973 
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the  sharp rise  in price on  the world market,  to prevent Community cereals 
being sold outside  the  EEC  at a  higher price than  that guaranteed to 
producers.  To  maintain  Community  supply  the  export of cereals  is  taxed by 
the difference between world prices  and  the guide price.  In  this  way  the 
deficit areas  are able  to acquire  their cereals at a  lower price than if 
they  imported  them  from  outside the  Community.  The  Commission has  stated 
that the price,  free  on board,at Rauen,  for  the export of French cereals  to 
the  United  Kingdom  (taking compensatory  amounts  into account)  varied 
between  £53.4  and  £56.1  per metric  tonne  in May  1974  as  against  £56.1  to 
£61.8  for  export  to third countries,  and  that by  October  1974  this had 
become  £65.3 .to  £66~6 a£  dgainst t79i9  ~o.£104.  ,,to average difference 
between  Community  and world prices  rose  therefore  from  £9.5 to £25.9  per 
tonne  over this  period. 
2.  Sugar 
Protocol  No.  17  of  the Act  of Accession  enabled  the  United  Kingdom  to 
continue  importing until February  1975  sugar  under  the  Commonwealth  Sugar 
Agreement.  Defore  that date  the Community  was  to adopt its new  sugar 
rnqulat ion  atHl  <ll  Llw  H<1me  t imo  decide what  offer coulcl bo  mado  to tho 
c;u1o  pr·odnclttlf  co\lnlrien  l·ot·  l:lto  forlhcominq  poriod.  'l'lw  Unitctl  l<ingdom 
decided  to maintain  the  system which  had  provided  a  cheap  source  of  oupply 
in  the past.  At  the March  1974  revicv.• special arrangements  were  made  for 
the selling price of sugar  imported  under  Protocol  No.  17.  The  Commission 
also authorised  the  United  Kingdom  to continue  until  30  June  1974  the 
option  of granting  an  aid  for  refining,and  a  higher margin  on  refining  than 
intended was  subsequently authorised.  The  1~/o alignment of  the British 
intervention price  for  white  sugar  was  postposed at the  1974  review to hold 
down  the  price paid  to domestic  producers. 
During  the  summer  of  1974  the  Commonwealth  sugar producers  decided not to 
fulfil  ~1eir quotas,  but  to sell on  the world market at much  more 
remunerative  rates.  An  acute  shortage  of  sugar  followed  on  the British 
market.  At  this  stage  the  Community  agreed  to step in since Article  39  of 
the  Treaty of Rome  states  that  one  of the  objectives of  the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy is  to ensure  availability of produce  and  reasonable prices  for 
consumers  - even  though  the British shortage  was  in  no  way  attributable to 
the  operation of  the  CAP.  In  October  the Council  decided to acquire 
200,000  metric  tono  of  sugar  on  the world market  and  to supply it to the 
'deficit'areas of the  Community  (90%  in fact went  to Britain)  at the 
1 
2 
Europe  Agency  of  27/28.1.1975 
At official rates  of  exchange  for  the  green  pound/unit of account 
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prices  is made  up by  a  subsidy  from  the  EAGGF. 1  Subsequently purchases 
of  a  further  200,000  metric  tons  were  decided  on,  supplemented  eventually 
by  100,000  tons  to ensure  Community  supplies until  10  March  1975.2  The 
benefit to the consumer  of  this  intervention is considerable.  Again  the 
export of  sugar produced  in  the Con®unity is subject to a  levy similar to 
that  imposed  on cereals  in  1974  in order to maintain  as  far  as  possible 
supply at a  reasonable price  to  the  consumer.  At  the  same  time  the price 
paid  to British beet producers has  been  aligned directly with  the Community's 
price,  starting with  the  1974 harvest.3 
In  adopting  the  new  sugar  regulation it was  necessary  to reconcile  the  need 
to  expand  the Community's  own  production  to alleviate the  immediate  shortage 
and  the  need  to guarantee  an  outlet  for  the African,  Caribean  and  Pacific 
countries  which  rely  on  exports  of  cane  sugar  to finance  their development. 
The  previous  requlation controlled  the quantity  of sugar  produced  by 
quotas  for  each  enterprise,  as  was  also the case  under  the British system. 
To  this basic  'A'  quota  is  added  a  second  'B'  quota  with  a  lower  guaranteed 
price  fixed  in  function  of  the market situation whilst quantities  produced 
outside  the agreed  limit must be  exported when  the Community  is  in  surplus. 
The  beet producers,  organised  in  powerful pressure  groups,  wanted  the 
Community  to become  entirely self-sufficient in  sugar production.  This 
eventuallywould have  to be  achieved at the  expense  of  the cane producers. 
Instead  the  new  sugar regulation provides  that  the  full  intervention price 
will be  payable  on both  'A'  and  'B'  for  the  1975-76  season,  but allows  for 
levies  on  'B'  output  in  future years.  The  maximum  quota  for  this year 
will be  145%  of  the basic quota.  Along  with  the  new  'A'  quotas  the 
Community has  decided  to offer the  ACP  countries  a  guaranteed outlet for 
1.4 million metric  tons  of  sugar  (compared  with  the Community's  'A'  quota 
of 9.1 million  tons  of which  1.0 million are allocated to the  United 
Kingdom).  This  offer would  enable  the  cane  producers  to maintain  their 
exports at a  comparable  level  to  that before  the adoption of the  new  sugar 
regulation.  Furthermore  the Community  proposes  that the Community's  own 
guaranteed price should act as  the basis of the  guarantee to  the ACP 
countries  (although buyers will be  free  to pay more).  Since  sugar prices 
are  fixed at each  annual  review  (under  the  CAP),  the  developing countries 
arc being  offered effective protection against  inflation for  the  first 
time.  The  improvement  on  the Commonwealth  Sugar Agreement where cane 
1 
2 
3 
OJ  No.  L311  of  22.11.1974 
OJ  No.  L20  of  25.1.1975 
OJ  No.  L341  of 20.12.1974 
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beet producers  and with  no built-in revision mechanism is clear.  At  the 
present time,  of  course,  world prices are well  above  the Community's,  and 
the  exporting countries will therefore have  to choose between  long  term 
guarantees  at a  more  modest  level and big short term gains  which  may 
change  into losses at a  later stage  as  world production expands.  For next 
season's  supply to the United  Kingdom  the British Government  is offering 
£260  per  ton c.i.f. which has  now been accepted by  the  Commonwealth  countries. 
The  exporters consider  that it is essential to settle the question  of the 
price  they will  receive  for  the next year's crop before entering into a 
long  term agreement with  the Community. 
3.  Dairy  Product~ 
The  principal development has  been  the  introduction of  a  consumer  subsidy 
on butter until  31  March.  The  maximum  amount  of subsidy payable  rose  from 
2p.  per  pound  in May  1973  to  6  p.  per pound  in April  1974  and  Sp.  per  pound 
from  1  February  1975.  However,  the financial participation of  the  Community 
continues  to be  limited to  lp.  per pound  or  50%  of  the  original  sum. 
722,220 metric  tons  had been sold under  the  scheme at 30  September  1974 
at a  total cost of £16.532  million to the community's  budget.
1 
4.  Beef 
At  the  end  of  1972  and  the  beginning of  1973  the  Community  adopted regulations 
to practise  permunent  intervention,  that is,  buying  in meat  when  prices 
fell  below the  intervention price  (this  is  in course  of revision)  and 
encouraging  farmers  to change  from  dairying to beef.  This  was  at  a  time 
when  an  acute  shortage  had  forced beef prices  up  to a  record  level  and 
long term projections  showed  that  demand,  notably in developing countries, 
would rise  faster  than  supply.  The  Government  of the  day  in Britain supported 
this policy and  from  1  February 1973  adopted the  intervention system. 
Deficiency payments  on  beef  would not  have  been  paid at that time  in any 
case,  because  market  rates exceeded the  guaranteed price,  and equally there 
was  no  need  for  intervention buying. 
According to the  timetable  given  in the Act  of Accession the  guide  price 
should have  been aligned by  5%  for  the  1974-1975  marketing year,  which 
together with  the  increase  agreed  for  the marketing  year would  have  given  a 
total  increase  of  17%;  the  increase  agreed was  in fact  only 6.3%.  In order 
to further hold  down  consumer  prices,  the  United  Kingdom  no  longer  practised 
permanent  intervention buying.  But  calf subsidies  were  introduced to 
compensate  farmers. 
1  Commission  reply to Written Question No.  487/74  by Lord  O'Hagan 
OJ  No.  Cl9,  27.1.75 
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cattle numbers  increased by around  25%  over  the last three  years)  with  the 
result that the  shortage  quickly turned into a  glut.  As  a  result of inter-
vention buying the available cold storage  filled up  and prices  could  no  longer 
be  held at the  intervention level,  falling to  10-15% below the official 
guarantee.  On  the  other  h<:md,  in Britain,  where  there  was  no  intervention 
buying to put  a  floor  under  the  market,  fat  cattle prices  plunged  from  £19  por 
cut  in May  1974 to under  [13  per  cut  in October.  This  fall  in prices  paid 
to producers  gave  little benefit to  the  consumer  since the retail price  for 
beef,  particularly for  the  best cuts  remained  remarkably stable  throughout 
the  period. 
To  remedy the situation special measures  were  decided at the  July session of 
the  Council.  A  variable  premium,  increasing  from  £9.2  in August  1974 
to £36.7  per head  in February 1975,  is payable  at  slaughter  under  a  scheme 
for  the  orderly marketing of cattle.  It is not  possible,  however,  to offer 
for  intervention meat  coming  from  cattle which  have  benefited  from  the  premium. 
At  the  same  time  a  regulation has  been  adopted  on  the  sale  of  beef at  a  reduced 
price to socially disfavoured persons.  Together  these  measures  represent  a 
considerable  departure  from  the established Community procedures  and  show  the 
flexibility with  which  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy is able to operate  in 
an emergency. 
Although the  premium and  social  beef regulation had  been  adopted largely as  a 
result  of British pressure1 ,  without  any  firm end price  support,  the  price 
paid to British  farmers  collapsed.  At  the  November  session the Council  authorised 
the  United  Kingdom  to begin  intervention buying  for  a  limited quantity of beef 
on  the basis  of  an  intervention price corresponding to  65%  of the  United  Kingdom 
guide  price,  the  intervention price  being  increased by stages to reach  85%  of 
the  guide  price  on  January  1975.  The  Council  also permitted  a  special variable 
premium to be  paid equivalent to the  difference  between  the  intervention price 
normally applicable  and that actually applied in the  United  Kingdom  until the 
end of the marketing year. 
The  Commission has  proposed  for  the  1975-76 season  to alter the  Community's 
support  system  in the light of the weaknesses  exposed  over  the  last year. 
Instead of  increasing the  intervention price  for  beef,  which might  have  the 
effect of  discouraging consumption  and  increasing the  amount  of meat  offered 
to the  intervention agencies,  farmers  would  receive  part of their  support 
through  a  grant  of £15  per adult male  animal  payable  at slaughter.  The 
proposal  represents  a  move  away  from  intervention prices  as  the  sole means  of 
guaranteeing  farmers'  incomes  and  towards  the  direct  payments  favoured  by 
Britain.  Under  the  Commission's  plan,  the  techniques  of  intervention would 
also  be  revised to introduce  more  flexibility and  encourage  producers  to market 
cattle when  there is  the  greatest seasonal  shortage. 
1  Mr  Peart stated in the  House  of Commons  on  17.7.74 that  "much  the  most 
important  of these measures  was  the  authorisation of the  system  I  myself 
proposed  for  direct  premiums  to  be  paid to beef  producers  for  finished cattle". 
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1.  Community  and world agricultural prices 
The  most  frequent  criticism of the  CAP  is that it has  forced  Britain to 
substitute its  imports  of  food  from  low price world suppliers to the  pro-
tected high price  Community  supplier. 
The  purpose  of the  CAP  is to provide  security and stability:  security of 
market  for  the  producer,  and  security of  supplies  and stability in prices 
for  the  consumer. 
There  cannot  be  one  without  the  other.  It is  only if the  producer is 
encouraged to continue to produce  that shortages  can  be  avoided and  prices 
maintained at reasonable  levels.  The  aim  of the  CAP  is to  prevent excessi1e 
variations  in prices.  This  can be  achieved,  according to the market 
situation,  by  intervention to buy  up  excess  supply,  by levies  on  imports 
from  third countries,  and  by export  taxes  on  products  in short supply,  by 
a  planned stocking policy and  by price  policies which  direct  production tc 
the  sectors where  increased  supply is required. 
Moreover,  it is  simply not  true that the  CAP  has  hindered international 
trade  in agricultural produce.  It would  be  more  true to say that it has 
generated  such trade. 
In the last decade,  trade  in agricultural  products,  especially transformed 
products,  has  shown  considerable and  substantial  growth.  The  increase  in 
trade  has  been mainly between  developed  countries,  and with  the  Community 
in particular,  which  is  an  important  client to the  rest  of the world. 
Imports  of the  Six of agricultural  and  food  products  from  the  rest of the 
world rose,  for  example,  by  7.·3% per  annum  between  1963  and  1973  (13%  1968 ·1.973). 
Prices  must  be  related to costs,  and  for  agricultureduring the last two 
years  costs  have  been  dominated  by  factors  which  make  it more  advantageous 
for  Britain to be  part  of  the  CAP. 
1973  and  1974  have  been  notable  for  unprecedented  increased  in the  costs 
of feedstuffs,  fertilizers  and  fuel  to farmers.  These  increases,  however, 
are  not related to Britain's entry into the  Common  Market. 
The  latter two  items  have  been  affected by decisions  outside  the  Community 
and principally by the  determination  of producers  in the  Middle  East,  Nort  t 
Africa  and south America  to obtain substantial  increases  in prices  for 
their main  source  of foreign  revenue. 
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more  important  is  the effect  on  fertilizer  output,  since most  nitrogen 
fertilizer is  produced  from  oil and  is extremely vulnerable to changes  in 
oil prices  or  supplies. 
Increases  in  feedstuff  prices have  been  due,  on  the  one  hand,  to greatly 
increased demand,  and  on the  other  to  reduced supply. 
It should be  noted that  a  number  of prime  feedstuffs  for  animals,  like 
soya  and  fishmeal,  are  not  even  covered  by  the  CAP. 
In  1970,  disease  cut  back the American maize  crop by  25%  and world prices 
rose  dramatically.  In  1973,  an  acute  shortage  developed  of soya,  a  major 
low cost  feedstuff,  due  to reduced American  production,  increasing demand 
and  a  certain dcqrec  of speculation. 
In  1973,  the  world  wheat  harvest  was  a  record  one,  and  yet  American  grain 
stores  arc  not sufficiently full  for  day to day market  management.  Even 
given reasonable harvests,  world prices  are  not likely to fall to any large 
degree  in 1975.  This  is  because  prices  have  been  pushed  up  by  increases  in 
demand  rather than any failure  of major  grain exporters to produce. 
One  important  factor  has  been  purchases  by the  Soviet  Union,  China  and,  to 
a  lesser extent,  developing nations  such as  India,  to make  up  shortfalls 
in their  own  harvest. 
Demand  created by  increasing population has  been matched  by  demand arising 
from higher  standards  of living.  This  has  made  itself felt  both  in  demand 
for  grain  for  direct  consumption  and to provide  the  feedstuffs  to produce 
livestock to satisfy stimulated consumption  of high  protein  foods  such  as 
pork  and beef. 
Since it takes  on the  average  seven  pounds  of  feed  grain to produce  one 
pound  of beef,  the  demand  for  grains has  expanded  enormously.  In the  past 
ten  years,  Japan has  increased its  imports  of  feed  grains  by  30~/a.  In  the 
United States,  where  per  capita  grain consumption has  reached  one  ton per 
year,  only  150  pounds  is  consumed  directly.  All  these  factors  have  produced 
a  world market  operating on  the  edge  of its capability.  Since then reserves 
have  dropped  so  low that the wealthy countries  have  engaged  in panic  buying 
to guard against shortages.  And  the  poorer  countries  have  run out of the 
good  land,  or water,  needed to produce  more. 
Grain  is the  most  important  single  staple  food  for  people  and  for  animal 
feedstuffs.  The  table  below  shows  the  astonishing rise  in wheat,  barley 
and  maize  prices  since  Russia  and  China,  after bad harvests,  decided  on 
massive  imports.  Britain's  intervention prices,  lower  since it has  only 
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in  1978,  huve  now  been left far  behind the  actuul  market  level  of prices. 
Britain's bread is costing more,  in short,  not  because  of the  CAP,  but 
because  American  grain stocks  are  now  abnormally  low.  Indeed,  the  incredible 
sib.lation at  present  is that France  is  now actuully paying export  levies 
on her cereals. 
Wheat  prices  in the  recent  pust  have  been  232%  above  the  level  requiring 
support  by  import  levies  or  Community  intervention in Britain.  Wheat  prices 
would  have  to drop  by  115%  before  Community  buying  in Europe  could  be 
accused  of keeping  them  too high.  Barley and maize  prices  similarly have 
been  above  intervention levels.  Because  of  the  rises,  the  premiums  paid 
to muke  more  wheat  Llvailuble  to unimo.l  feed  ho.ve  been  suppressed. 
It is possible thut  when  the  American  gro.no.ries  fill up  ugain  in  u  yeur  or 
two  the  Community  may  once  again  find itself supporting the market,  but  the 
Americans  now  believe that their grain prices will  never  again  drop  far 
below  EEC  levels.  The  CAP  system has  in fact  proved itself a  surprisingly 
good  way  of keeping Europe's  supply of grain steady when  the rest of the 
world  is suffering. 
The  consumer  has  benefited  from  the  restruining effect  of the  CAP  on  grain 
prices,  directly in the  price of bread,  and  indirectly as  imports  of cheupcr 
French  grain,  und  in porticular muize,  have  reduced the costs  of British 
livestock producers. 
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Not  all agricultural  produce  is  subject  to the variable  levy.  Potatoes, 
mutton,  wool  are  not  covered  by the  CAP.  Mutton  incurs  a  15%  tariff,  part 
of which  Britain has  only  just begun to apply;  but  Britain was  applying 
its own  4%  levy on  mutton  before entry into the  EEC.  Due  to British 
pressure,  no  duties  have  been  put  on  citrus fruit,  and  the  Community  system 
is more  open  to cheap apple  and  pear  imports  than was  the  British one. 
Moreover,  with the very substantial  increases  in world  prices,  traditional 
suppliers  of Britain and  the  Community have  turned elsewhere  to benefit 
from  those higher  prices. 
America  has  run short  of dairy products  and has  opened extra  import  quotas 
for  butter and  cheese,  so that  New  Zealand has  diverted its butter there. 
The  result has  been that New  Zealand has  fallen  short  by  33,000 tons  of 
its 167,000 tons  British butter quota,  and  by  22,000  tons  on  their  67,000 
tons  cheese  quota.  This  year it is planned  to send even  less  cheese. 
Por  a  whole  ri1l1CJ0  of products,  such  ar.  doiry produce,  meat  and wool,  New 
Zealand  and Australia lwvc  preferred to turn to the  more  lucrative Asian 
market  rather than to Britain. 
It has  been  said that Canada's  special cheddar  cheese has  been excluded 
from  Britain.  In  fact,  Canadian  chcddur has  still been  sold in British 
shops  because  stocks  were  high at  the end  of  1972.  Total  supply before 
that used to be  about  7,000  tons,  compared with total British consumption 
approaching 300,000 tons.  The  Community's  finance ministers have  therefore 
agreed that an  arrangement  should  be  negotiated directly with Canada  to 
open  Britain's  doors  again without \vuiting for  lengthy talks  in GATT. 
nutter  in the  last year actually went  down  in price and  it will rise by 
nothing  like  the  amounts  once  forecast.  At  the peak  in  1972  Britain 
was  having  to buy butter on  the world  market at £550  a  ton.  This  world 
price fell back  in  1973  und  steadied  up  at around  £440  a  ton,  but  subsequent-
ly rose  to a  new  peak  of £570  and  the situation remains  very uncertain. 
The  consumer is still paying  a  butter price far below the 'vorld level 
because  of the  UK  subsidy of  9p  per  lb and  the Community's  subsidy of 
approximately lp per lb.  However,  unless  the world price  goes  on  up  -
which it well  may  - the  United  Kingdom  intervention price,  less the subsidy, 
muy cutch  up  on  world price levels  when  Britain makes  its next  step over  to 
the  full  Community  intervention level  later this year.  This  increase  would 
huve  been  n  small  one if the  Commission had  got  its way  in suggesting that 
the  average  Community  intervention price  for  butter  be  cut  by  6%.  As  it is, 
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intervention price  for  butter.  The  reul rise \vill  come  when  the  remaining 
jumps  are  made  to a  full  EEC  intervention price. 
The  wholesale  price  of cheese  went  up  in Britain in January 1974  for  the 
first  time  in two  years  - a  delayed reaction,  since  stocks  were  oold off as 
the  first  step to Community  intervention  in May  1973.  nut  even at  £537  a 
ton it is  b<ucly above  world  levels  and actually substantially below the 
level at which 1\merica  h<~s  now  entered the  >vorld market.  Pull  EEC  inter-
vention prices  are  only about  £150  a  ton above  the  United  Kingdom's,  and 
the  next  step to  full  intervention plus  price  increaoe will  add  about  2p 
a  pound  to the  retail price  of  33p  a  pound. 
As  for  skimmed  milk  powder  (\-;hich  90es  into  ice-cremn,  soups  and the  like) 
Britain's price  was  already ncar  EEC  levels  when it joined.  It has  now 
gone  over to  the  Community  system  and still finds  its intervention level 
comfortably below  the world  price  of  f.335  a  ton.  Indeed,  the  EEC  has 
recently been  selling off  nome  of its Dutch  skimmed  milk  surplus at  a 
profit.  The  butter mountain  h<~s  disappeared. 
A  similar situation exists  in respect  of nugar.  Between  1970  and  1973  world 
production was  lower  than  consumption,  with  the result that  carry-forward 
stocks were  rapidly marketed.  By  September  1973  stocks  Here  at the 
absolute  minimum  required to ensure  supplies  for  the  beginning of the  new 
season. 
The  result has  been  thut world  sugar  prices have  practically trebled between 
1968  and  1973,  resulting in  a  dramatic reversal  in  the  relationship between 
the  Community  and  thr  world  prier:  lr>vr:lfl.  In  19GB  when  the  present 
orq<miflntion  Wufl  scL  up,  Lhr:  price  of sugar  on  the  intern<~tional market  was 
£23  per metric  tonne,  as  comp::~rcd  to  ,1  minimum  prime  for  sugar of 
£102  in the  Community.  In  197tJ,  however,  the situation hils  been 
completely reversed:  sugar  on  the  international market  reached  ~  peak of 
£650  per metric  ton  as  against f.l34  in  the Community.  'l'he  first batch of 
200,000  tons  decided  on  in November  to nlleviate Britain's  shortage cost 
the  Community  £31  million  in  nubsidy. 
The  European  Economic  Community has  for  a  number  of  years  developed  i1 
special position in regard to trade with  developing nations.  Even  before 
the  industrialised nations  had  agreed at the  second  UNCTAD  conference held 
in New  Delhi  to grant  non-reciprocal  and  non-discrimin<Jtory preferences  to 
developing  natiom;,  this matter had  been  under  discussion by the Community 
and  a  system  of generalised preferences  was  introduced;  it has  been  improved 
each year  and is the  most  extensive  system  introduced by  <1ny  major  client of 
these countries. 
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December  1974.  In the  course  of 1974,  two  additional  proposals  were  put 
forward  specifically to take  into account  the  interests of certain Asian 
countries with historic trading links  with  the  United Kingdom,  such  as 
India,  Sri Lanka,  Pakistan,  Bangladesh,  Malaysia  and Singapore.  These  have 
now  been  adopted. 
The  amount  of  trade  in processed agriculture  covered  by generalised 
preferences  amounts  to  £89  million and  covers  over  88  products. 
3.  The  Consumer  and the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
For  the  consumer  the principal  problem has  been  how to reconcile  the effect 
of adverse  developments  on  the  world market  with the  gradual  adoption of 
the  Common  /\qrlcultural  Policy. 
Food  prices  It ave  r  iF~ en  considerably dur iny  197  3  nncl  197 4  but  1 t  would  not  be 
correct to attribute these  rises to the  CAP.  According to Mrs  Shirley 
Williams,  the  British Minister  for  Consumer  Affairs,  "the  UK  Retail Price 
Index  for  Food  rose  by  20.1%  over  the  period  from  January 1973  to January 
1974.  The  increase attributable to our membership  of the  EEC  is currently 
1  estimated to be  between:!:!% and  1%."  In  answer  to  a  further  question she 
stated that,  "the  further  we  get  from  the  date  of entry into the  community, 
the harder  it is to calculate what  food  prices  would have  been if we  had 
stayed out.  'l'he  food  price  index  rose  by  29.2%  between  January  1973  and 
September  1974.  Official  estimates  now  show thnt  food  prices are,  on 
balance,  very slightly lower  than  they would  have  been  were  we  not  members 
of the  Community."2  Increases  in  input  costs  and world prices are  the  main 
culprits. 
Alignment  with  the Community's  prices has  brought  problems  of its  own  since 
movement  towards  the  guide  price has  not  been  fast  enough  in the  case  of 
cereals,  which  are  important  for  stock-feeding as  well  as  bread,  meaning 
that world market  rotes  are still effectively applied in the  United  rangdom 
instead of lower  Community  ones.  On  the  other hand,  progress  towards  aligning 
prices  for  higher  priced dairy products  has  been  regular. 
In  the  originol  Six  the stability of prices  for  fooastuffs  has  been  an 
appreciable  clement  in  the  fight  ugoinst  inflation.  Only  in Italy did the 
rate of  increase  of  foodstuffs  approach that  of  the  general  index  last  year 
1 
2 
Hansard,  22.3.1974 
Hansard,  11.11.1974 
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f>n/  f  }  .  .  f  .  t  .  ]  .v1-.  or  t  1e  remi1J.n1n'J  1vc  coun  r1es.  The  big  increase  in Italy is 
attribut<lblr.  to  Ll1r  nuccer~!dve (lcv;tl.ualions  of the  green  lira and to the 
importance  of  trade  wj tl1  non-member  countries  where  world prices  muot  be 
paid.  For  the  United  I~ingdom,  where  the  effect  of rises  in the world 
market  is so  strong,  the  rise  in the  foodstuffs  was  also almost  as  high 
as  that  of the  rise  in  the  general  index  (16.5% against  a  weighted  average 
of  12.3%  for  the  Six) 
To  protect  consumers,  the  Government  introduced subsidies which  represent 
3p  on  a  large loaf,  9p  per  lb on  butter,  12p  a  lb  on  cheese,  2~p a  pint  on 
milk  and  8p  a  lb  on  tea  in  January 1975.  1\t  those  rates  the  cost  in a 
full  year  is  estimated at  £571  million.  The  subsidies  have  had  the effect 
of holding  down  retail pc-ices,  but  since  they must  be  puid  for  through  taxes 
they have  acted  up until  now  mainly as  a  meuns  of muintaining  demand  for 
the  products  involved.  The  danger  is that  lower  prices will  leud to 
ever-increasing Exchequer  expenditure  as  consumers  switch resources  to 
buying more  food.  Furthermore  the  producers  do  not benefit at all,  whilst 
being asked  to  produce  more  to supply an  expanding mnrket. 
It could  be  argued thut  under  these  circumstances  it woUld  be  better to 
adopt  full  Community  prices  rapidly in the  knowledge  that  they will  remain 
fairly stable  thereafter whilst  taking the  necessary transitional measures 
to case  the  burden  of  the  less well  off. 
Thus,  Sir Henry Plumb,  President  of  the  National  Farmers'  Union,  recently 
described  food  subsidies  as  a  'delusion',  although he  recognised their usc 
as  a  political expedient.  nut  \<Jhen  they arc  accompanied  by  "rising 
production costs  without  compensation  for  the  producers,  they threaten to 
become  a  disaster ..•  !£ consumers  prefer to pay the true cost  of eating 
through higher  tnxes  - and  I  doubt  it - they will continue to support 
Government  policies  which  contain  the  price  of  food  by urtificial means. 
But  in that  case  the  Government  itself must  meet  the  rising costs  of 
production,  or  there  simply won't  be  any  food  to subsidise." 
4.  The  British  farmer  and  the  Common  Agricultural  Polic~ 
1974 was  in many  ways  a  difficult year  for  the British farmer.  This,  however, 
cannot  be  blamed  on  the  CAP,  but  rather  on  the  sudden  increase  in the  prices 
of  feedstuffs,  fertilizers  and  fuel. 
1  The  Agricultural Situation in  the  Community,  1974  Report,  Part I,  p.l7 
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from  the  previous  British system  of  deficiency payments  without  entering 
fully,  in the transitional  period,  into the Community's  agricultural  system, 
in  a  period of continuously rising costs.  At  the  same  time  the 'rreasury 
has  reduced direct  grants,  a  move  which has hit the  young  farmer  especially. 
Sir Henry  Plumb  has  warned that  farmers  now  face  extra costs  running at 
an  annual  rate of  $400 million. 
While  1973  was  a  reasonably profitable year  for  farmers,  1974 has  been 
described an  a  financial  disaster.  The  Commission states  in its report  on 
the agricultural situation in the Community that  for  1973, 
"Generally speaking  farms  devoted to arable  crop production,  with  the 
exception of those  concentrating on  growing  potatoes,  succeeded  in 
maintaining,  or  even  improving their position.  On  the  other hand, 
farms  devoted to livestock  farming  suffered considerable  falls  in 
their  income  arising  from  the standstill,  or  even  fall  in prices  of 
livestock products  combined with the  initial increases  in the  prices 
of  annimal  feedingstuffs."1 
And  that, 
"To  judge  from  the  first  information available  for  the  current  year, 
it appears  that the  agricultural  income  situZltion has  deteriorated 
sharply in 1974."1 
Again  the  worst hit have  been  livestock enterprises,  and since British 
agriculture  is basically a  livestock industry it follows  that  farmers 
have  been  going through  a  crisis period. 
The  situation is most  critical  in the  pork,  beef  and  poultry sectors. 
All  of these  arc  extremely susceptible to grain prices.  In terms  of 
efficiency of energy conversion,  poultry is  the  most  rewarding enterprise 
because it takes  about  3lbs  of grain to produce  a  pound  of poultry meat, 
Slbs  for  a  pound  of  pork  and  between  lOlbs  and  l5lbs  for  a  pound  of beef. 
However,  beef  producers  have  the  choice  between  fattening  their stock on 
cereals  or  on  grass,  which  poultry producers  do  not.  When  feed  accountn 
for  over  70%  of the total  cost of broiler production  and  feed  prices 
double,  producers  arc hard hit.  In addition,  beef  and poultry arc mutually 
competitive,  because  consumers  tend to  switch  from  beef to poultry when 
beef prices arc high but  from  poultry to beef when  the  gap  between  them 
narrows.  Hith the  slump  in the  beef market,  demand  for  poultry meat  has 
been  slackening so that at the  same  time  as  margins  per head arc  squeezed 
by rising costs total production is  falling. 
1  The  Agricultural  Situ<Jtion  in the  Community,  1974  Report,  Part I,  pp.28-29 
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feed price  formulu.  and  the  bacon  stabiliser has  been  dismantled to be 
replaced by a  guaranteed price that  is  too  low to protect the  farmer 
against  present costs,  in an  intervention system that in the  past has  proved 
more  theoretical than practical.  Past stability,  on  which  slaughterhouses 
could  offer  fixed  price contracts,  has  now  disappeared,  as  the  farmer  has 
been  caught  between the world price  of  gru.in  and  UK/EEC  demand. 
The  position is very similar  in the  beef and  veal  sector,  with  the result 
that  farmers  have  been  complaining that beef costing £20  a  hundredweight  to 
feed  was  only fetching  £18  (or  less) .  As  stated above1  the  losses  suffered 
by beef producers  arc  in large  part  t11e  result  of  the  decision to abandon 
intervention buying  and  the  lack of  any effective floor  in  the market. 
Since  the  autumn,  which  represents  the  seasonal  low  point  wlwn  cattle nrc 
brought  in  from  the  summer  par;ture,  prices  have  recovered although  not  to 
lho  point  n•;wlwcl  dur·inq  t.lH~  l'l72  i\rHl  oarly  1')73  pcnk.  l\fJ  yet,  ·tlwroforc, 
it has  nol  beer\  necessary  lo usc  lhe  combination of  limited intervention 
buying and  the  variable  premium  agreed  in November. 
A  further  point  which has  affected all livestock producers  is the exceptionally 
poor harvest  of  fodder  crops  this  year,  particularly hay and  grass  silage, 
combined with  a  shorter period of pasture  thu.n  usual, which  is making winter 
feeding particularly difficult.  Similar situations arise  from  time to 
time,of course,  and  no  agricultural  policy can  regulate the weather,  but it 
has  come  at  a  particularly bad  time  this  year with alternu.tive  feeds  so 
expensive. 
The  Commission  and  the  Council  of the  European  Community have  udopted  a  very 
flexible  approach,  introducing  a  number  of special  measures  to help the 
British  farmer, including: 
- an  increased calf subsidy,  by  £10  per calf, 
- a  special variable  levy  on  beef to be  paid at  slu.ughter  which  makes  up 
the difference  between  the  British guide  price  and that of the  Community, 
- direct Government  aid  for  British pig producers to prevent  a  decline  in 
the  pig herd, 
a  10%  increase  in British sugar  beet  qnotu.  u.creage  which will  bo  greatly 
expanded  by the  new  regulation  coming  into operation during 1975, 
- a  temporary  flat rate subsidy of  6p  a  gallon  for  all types  of heating oils 
to the agricultural  industry to overcome  the  increase  in  fuel  costs. 
1  pp.  34-35 
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Within  the  boundaries  of  the  Conununity  there cxints  a  wide  range  of 
farming  systems,  of size of  farms  and  of standards  of husbandry  - wider 
perhaps  than  can  be  found  anj'\·lhere  in the world  over  a  comparable area. 
Price  policy alone,  which  provides  generally the  same  level and type  of 
support,  from  the Shetland Isles to Sicily,  cannot  be  expected to remedy 
all the  problems  of Europe's  farmers  or  to be  appropriate  as  a  means  of 
support  in all cases.  The  Community  h~s recently adopted  or  is  in the 
process  of adopting  two major  series  of measures  to deal  with  the  diversity 
of the agricultural situation. 
Under  the  original regulation,  individual  projects to improve  marketing or 
production  structures were  forwarded via  national administrations to the 
Commission  and  the  Guidance  Section of the  EAGGF  reimbursed  a  proportion of 
the cost  (between  20%  and  45%)  •  The  projects are intended to  improve 
agricultural  intrastructure;  land consolidation,  drainage,  irrigation, 
construction of  slaughter houses,  deep  sea  fishing  boats  and  similar 
projects all quolify.  Commissioner  Man.sholt,  hmvever,  believed that this 
initial regulation did  not  go  far  enough,  and  in  a  memorandum  addressed to 
the  Council  in  December  1C)6fl  he  arqued that  the  Community  should  ndopt  a 
series  of  common  measures  in which  Community criterio  <.<ro  employed to 
accelerate  and  direct  its  pace  of agricultural  change.  After  a  great  deal 
of  discussion,  the  Council  adopted  a  resolution  in  May,  1971  followed  by 
a  series  of dirbctivcs  in  March  1972. 
1.  Structural  reform 
Not  all of the  Community  ha~;  the  advantage  of Britain's  large holdings  and 
centuries  of agricultural  progress.  This  enviable  position,  however,  was 
achieved at  great  social  expense.  It is the  object  of the  directives  on 
structural  reform to achieve  the  objective  of modern  farms,  rationally 
organised and  run,  without  passing through  a  traumatic  phase  of adaptation. 
There  is  no  point  in encouraging  farmers  and  workers  to leave the  land if 
their  lack  of training for  another  occupation  menns  that the  only result is 
to swell  the  number  of  unemployed,  or  in aiding others  to modernise  and 
invest if badly chased methods  mean  eventual  bankruptcy.  The  legislation is 
in the  form  of Directives  to Member  States  who  apply it in their  own  way 
and adapt  the  provisions  to their needs.  In  an  area  in  \~ich human  factors 
play such  a  large  part,  decentralisation is  a  prerequisite  of  success  and 
represents  a  further  example  of the  flexibility in \fuich  seemingly cut  and 
dried Community  policy is  able  to act  in practice. 
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achieve  a  reasonable  income  after modernisation  but  do  not  yet  attain it. 
They  receive  priority for  land released under  the  outgoers  scheme.  A 
development  plan  showing  the  starting point,  the  objective to be  achieved 
and the  means  to attain it ensures  that  the  financial  assistance  granted is 
well  spent  and that  the  farm  will  remain viable  in the  future.  The  scheme 
is already in operation  in  the  United Kingdom  where  it develops  and  expands 
the  previous  Small  Farm  Development  Schemes. 
Directive  160/1972  provides  financial  incentives  for  farmers  and workers 
on  uncommercial  holdings  to give  up  farming  and to train for  other employ-
ment.  In the  United  Kingdom  the  scheme  has  replaced the  outgoers  grants 
provided  for  in the structural section of the  1967  Agriculture Act. 
Directive  161/1972  will  perhaps  prove  to be  the  most  important  for  the 
future  of European agriculture  in the  long term  because  it provides  for  the 
creation and  training of  socio-economic  advisers to orientate  farmers  and 
workers  either to develop  or  to abandon their  farms;  it is  the  means  of 
changing attitudes  on  which  all else  depends.  Even  though  the  British 
advisory services  had  no  previous  experience  in this kind of work,  the 
United  Kingdom has  taken  the  lead  in the application of this  directive  by 
creating regional  socio-economic  advisers  and special  interest advisers  in 
socio-economics  located  on  a  divisional  level  attached to the existing 
extension network,  and training the  local  advisory officers  in this  type 
of work.  It is to be  hoped that  other  countries  of ·the Community,  which 
perhaps  have  a  more  pressing need  for  these  advisers,  will  follow this  lead 
and  soon  by applying the  directives  as  well. 
2.  Hill  farming 
Not  all the  present  imbalances  in European  agriculture  may  be  solved by the 
progressive  extension of the  number  of modern  farms.  Some  of them are  the 
result of geographical  or  physical  limitations  of  a  permanent  character, 
and this  is particularly true  of the hill and mountainous  regions  of the 
Community.  There,  the  short  growing  season,  difficulties of mechanisation, 
distance  from  market  and  poor  communications  mean  that without  special help 
agriculture  cannot  survive,  with  the  result  of depopulation  of  a  vast area 
of the  Community. 
The  importance  of hill  farming to Britain is  such that it was  raised as  a 
specific  point  during the  negotiations  and declarations  by the United 
Kingdom  and  the  President  of the  Council  of Ministers  attached to the Treaty 
of Accession.  A  directive  on hill .farming and agriculture  in less  favoured 
areas,  adopted  in January  1974,  follows  the  British experience  in basing 
aid  on the  number  of head  of cattle and  sheep  because  these  are  the 
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delayed because  of disagreement  overilie areas which  should benefit  from 
aid,  but the Commission  has  now  published  tlnnecessary map  and it is 
expected  that it will be  accepted at the  same  time  as  the prices  for  the 
1975-76 marketing  year. 
In  financial  terms,  EAGGF  aid will represent  a  considerable saving  to 
Britain. 
The  adoption by  the  Community  of measures  to speed  up  the pace  of 
modernisation  and  to shift the burden  of protecting special cases  from 
price policy to direct aids means  that it will become  progressively 
easier  for  the  CAP  to reconcile the divergent  aims  of all agricultural 
policies which  are to provide reasonable prices to the consumer with 
effective security of  supply at the  same  time  as protecting the producer's 
income.  This  can  only be  done  through  the creation of an  efficient 
agricultural  industry  in which  farmers  are able  to make  a  reasonable living 
at the  same  time  as  providing  food  at competitive prices.  Investment now 
is  repaid  tenfold later. 
'L'hot:n  r·nmnlnn,  1\nwovPr,  ;111  lmporliu1t  point  to h<'  not.tlod 1leforo  tho  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  tlevelnpn  into  ;1  fully  fleclued  instrument compnrnblo 
to its national predecessors.  Direct aids  granted by  individual stntes have 
not ceased;  on  the contrary,  they have  developed considerably over  the last 
ten years  and  there is a  need  for  a  division of competence between  the 
different levels.  Community  legislation through  the  use  of directives may 
act flexibly and  if criteria are adopted for  aid  on  a  Community  level  there 
is  no possibility of  a  distortion of competition and certain members 
granting sUbsidies  to outsell their competitors rather  than  to rectify a 
problem.  A  compromise  might be  'optional'  legislation where certain members 
do  not apply  Community  decisions  because  they are of little importance  to 
them.  These  questions  are dealt with  in the  section  on  legislation problems. 
Structural policy will become  increasingly  important and  the Commission  in 
its memorandum  on  the  improvement  of  the Common  Agricultural  Policy states 
that the next measures  should be  in  the  fields  of  forestry  and marketing 
s true tures. 
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~rhe  Conununity  did not wait until enlargement before  taking  up  the subject 
of reform  of the  CAP.  Conunissioner  Mansholt's  memorandum mentioned  in  the 
previous  section represented  a  first attempt to assess  the  successes  and 
failures  of  the policy and  to suggest  a  new orientation based  on  the 
ntructural policy.  After  ten years'  experience  in operation it is natural 
that a  new  look is being  taken at the Common  Agricultural  Policy.  This  is 
particularly important because completion of the first decade has  coincided 
\vith  the  entry into force  of  the Treaty of Accession  with its attendant 
complications  of transitional arrangements  and  the need  to integrate the 
differing agricultural  experiences  of the  new  members  into the  CAP. 
commissioner  Lardinois became  the  first to formulate  concrete proposals 
\Jhen  he  presented his  memorandum  on  the  improvement  of  the Common  Agricultural 
Policy  to the Council  in  November  1973.  He  w<:~s  followed  by  Mr  Peart who 
presented  'The  United  Kingdom's  ideas  and  proposals  for  the  improvement of 
the  CAP  and certain related matters'  to the Council  on  18  June  1974.1 
After  the crisis over  the special  autumn  price review to compensate  farmers 
for  the  sudden  rise in costs  over  the previous  six months,  the Council at 
the  German  government's request asked  the  Commission  to prepare  an  inventory 
of  the agricultural policy  to be completed by  Spring  1975.  Recently  the 
German  and  Danish  governments  and  the  French  Chamber  of Agriculture  gave 
i:heir positions  on  the  inventory2 ,  and  related subjects are already under 
negotiation  in  the Council  over  the  1975-76  price proposals.  The  main 
points at issue are therefore fairly  cle<:~r,  although,  of course,  it is not 
possible at this  stage  to say what conclusions will be  reached after the 
!: tocktaking. 
It must be  emphasised,  however,  that a  great deal  of  improvement  in. the 
policy takes  place as  a  result of  the  normal process  of  development of  the 
CAP.  The  Conunission,  for  instance,  regularly uses  the annual  price review 
to propose  improvements  to the mechanisism of  the  guarantee section of the 
r;AGGF  and  to  take  into account  the weaknesses  revealed  in  a  particular 
sector. 
l. 
3  The  Lardinois  Memorandum  on  the  Improvement of the CAP 
~~his  memorandum  emphasised the  interdependence  of the  CAP  with other 
Community policies;  not<:~bly  economic  and monetary  and  regional policies. 
"It has  never been  claimed  that the agricultural policy could settle all the 
1 
3 
The  text of  Mr  Peart's statement  is publiohed  in  the July  European  Community 
commentary  in  'Trade  & Industry',  11.7.74,  pp.4-6 
See  Europe  Agency  of  23,  24,  25.1.75 
Bulletin of  the  European  Communities,  Supplement  17/73 
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the agricultural policy itself is concerned there should be  three objectives 
for  the price and  market policy:  a  reduction of  the disequilibrium prevailing 
on  a  number  of  agricultural markets;  a  reduction of expenditure  under  the 
Guarantee  section  of  the  EAGGF;  and  a  simplification of certain mechanisms 
in  the  common  organisation  of markets.  It is  imperative to press  forward 
vigorously with  the socio-structural policy in order  to  remedy  the  remaining 
deficiencies. 
Prices  for  the period  1973-78  should be  based  on  objective criteria:  on  ·the 
one hand,  the situation  in  modern  farms  and,  on  the  other,  conditions  of 
supply  and  demand.  The  Commission  has  based its proposals  for  the  1975-76 
marketing year  on  the rise in costs  over  the previous  two  years,  less  the 
rise  in prices  over  the  same  period and  has  attempted  to agree  these  figures 
with  the  farm  organisations  to give  them  the  maximum weight  (this was  the 
procedure  followed  by  the  former  British annual  review).  Vegetable products, 
which  are  in short supply,  would  be  encouraged at the  expense  of animal 
products  under  the Commission's  proposals.  Basing prices  on  objective 
criteria means,  of course,  choosing  as  a  matter  of principle in  favour  of 
national  modern  agriculture having  a  small  working  population;  in  short, 
efficient agriculture with  low production costs.  This  should be  ideally 
suited to British agriculture provided that socio-structural policies arc 
able  to create appropriate  solutions  for marginal  area  farms  and  for  less 
favoured  regions  and categories of which  there  is certainly no  shortage  in 
the  British rural  world. 
The  other guiding principle of  the  transitional period would be  to refrain 
from  generalisation of the various  forms  of direct aid  to  farm  incomes, 
because  this would risk  impeding  structural changes  and causing wastages  of 
public  money  and  administrative difficulties.1  This  is  largely a  theoretical 
option,  because  in practice aid is still widespread but it can  lead the 
United  Kingdom  during  the  transitional period to an  agricultural  economy 
which  would  no  longer be  that set out in the Agricultural Acts  of  19~7 and 
1957. 
2.  The  British  'plan'  of  18  June  1974 
The  'plan• 2  presented by  the Minister,  Mr  Peart,  to  the Council meeting  on 
18  June  1974  avoided explicit discussion  of previous  Community  legislation. 
Normal  developments  in  the  Common  1\gricultural  Policy and  tho  combined 
effect of  the  transitional  measures  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Britioh 
1 
2 
Doc.  COM{73)  1850  (Doc.  251/73)  p.4 
For  a  good  summary,  see  Europe  Agency  of 19-20  June  1974; 
same  dates;  'Financial Times'  of  19  June 
'Le  Mondo'  of 
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quite different  from  an  overall  demand  for  'renegotiation', be considered 
compatible with  the basic principles of unity  of  the market,  Community 
preference and  financial  solidarity?  Everything hinges  on  these principles 
because the  trv.nsitional measures  were created with  a  view to their acceptance 
in due course. 
Mr  Peart put  forward  the  following  suggestions: 
(i)  Prices policy- He  asked,  as  had  Commissioner Lardinois,  that prices 
take account  ' •..  of the  needs  of the  modern  and efficient farms  and 
secondly,  of  the  supply/demand  situation for particular commodities. 
The  problems  of  those  in  less  favourable  circumstances  must  be. handled 
outside  the price policy by  choosing  ' ••. other ways.'  For  the  moment 
no details have been  given. 
The  Minister also suggested  the Council  accept as  a  possibility the 
fixing  of prices  for  p<J.rticular parts of the  Community at levels below 
those  for  the Community  as  a  whole.  This  is probably the most difficult 
of all the  suggestions  made  to square with  the Common  Agriculturv.l 
Policy.  How  could differing price levels between  members  be prevented 
from distorting competition  v.nd  leading back to  national  sup)lort  sy!ltem!l? 
(ii)  Absorbing  surpluses  - The  technique  envisaged  is of  a  steady fall  in 
producer prices  once  stocks  build  up  to  a  certain level.  A  similar 
system operv.ted  in Britv.in  for  milk where  the  guaranteed price was 
fixed  for  a  stv.ndard quantity equivalent to  the country's  needs  in 
milk  for  liquid consumption. 
(iii)  Beef  - The  Community  should  return  to the pre-1972  situation when 
intervention buying  w<w  no  longer automatic.  Subsidies  and  a  variable 
premium  on  reetring  and  :>laughtering are proposed to supplement  the 
guide  price. 
The  Commission  stated in the  1975-1976  proposals  that  a  new beef  regime, 
with  changes  in the  intervention system  similar to  those  outlined by 
Mr  Peart, will be  presented to the Council during  1975.  In  the  same 
proposal,  the  intervention price  for beef would  not be  increased,  but 
instead  a  slaughter  premium  would  compensate  for  the  rise in costs  over 
the  last year.  However,  this  premium  would  be  for  a  fixed  amount  and 
not  a  variable  one  as  in the  British suggestion. 
(iv)  Commonwealth  imports  - It has  been  requested  that the special  tJystem 
applied  to  New  Zealand  butter should  be  extended  to  1982  and  even beyond. 
The  Commonwealth  should  be  guaranteed  an outlet for  1.4 million tons  for 
sugar,  but incentives  for beet sugar  production in the  Community  are also 
I 
requested. 
- 53  - PE  37.463/II/A/rev. The  Community  is offering  1.4 million  tons  in the  negotiations  and  the 
1 
incentives will  come  into  forcP- with  the  new  sugar  regulation. 
(v)  Relations with  third  countri~~- Protection  for  certain commodities, 
such as  hard and  semi-hard American  wheat,  preserved  fruits  and 
preserved  fish,  of which  Community  production is  low,  is thought to 
be  unnecessarily high.  At present there arc no  levies  for  wheat 
since the price is above  the  Conmlllnity  guide price,  while  on  many 
products  which  cannot be  produced within  the Community  there are 
import quotas  with  zero-rated tariffs. 
3.  The  Inventory  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
The  Commission  has  not yet published its report based  on  the stocktaking, 
but recent statements by certain member  states arc clarifying the  issues 
at stake.  The  German  government,  which  was  behind  the decision to take 
the  inventory,  considers  that competition is affected by  the multiplicity 
of national aids  which should  in  future be  more  strictly controlled.  This 
is the exact opposite of  the British attitude which  seeks  to shift much 
of the burden  from  the price policy by  the extension of  these aids.  The 
German  position comes  close  to  that of  the United  Kingdom  on  the absorption 
of  surpluses  through  the  financinl  responsibility of producers,  greater 
flexibility  in  the  intervention system  for beef,  stricter control of  EAGGF 
expenditure  nml  qrciltf'r  accP-r.r.  for  lhirc1  countries. 
The  French  Chilmber  of Agriculture points  out  in  their balance sheet that 
intervention buying  represents  a  very  small proportion of total production 
and  that under  present conditions it is possible to export nearly all the 
products  for  which  surpluses might ilrise.  At  the  same  time  the  Community 
imported  $18,000 million of agriculturill produce  in  1973  whilst exports 
were  only  a  third of  that sum. 
Denmark maintains  that  the principles  of the  CAP  do  not need  to be altered 
although  there arc  a  number  of details which  could be  improved.  The  pig-meat 
and  egg  and  poultry markets  do  not  function  satisfilctorily and  generally 
speakinq  there  should be  r.tricter quality ntanclards  for  goods  offered  for 
intervention.  '!'here  should  al~~o be  further  rJtudy  of  the possibility of 
putting intervention butter at the disposal  of  consumers.  In  trade with 
third countries,  tho  Danes  consider  that greater flexibility would be 
desirable.  Above  all,  tho structural policy should be  developed  and greater 
emphasis  laid on  social and  regional policies which arc  a  prerequisite for 
its success. 
1 
See  pages  35  - 37. 
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with  third countries  o.re  beinq  placed ut  the  centre  of  tho discussions  on 
reform of  the  Common  1\griculturul Policy beco.use  they  iJ.rc  the  three 
fundamental  issues which  face  developed countries  when  clecicling  on  a  system 
of support  for  ugriculture.  'rhe  level  of prices  determines  whether  the 
consumer  or  the  producer will benefit more  from  the policy.  Surpluses 
arise when  the  Ci1pi1ci t·y  to become  self-sufficient is  o.ccompanicd  by  the 
incentive  to produce  and  ~1en no quantitative restraints arc plu.cod  on 
production.  Deficits,  however,  will arise if the  incentives  u.re  not 
strong enough  and  it may  not always  be possible  to compensate  by  imports. 
Developed  countries  depend  on  trade with  other countries  for  their 
prosperity and  trading purtners  may  have  <~griculturo.l as  v1r~ll  <IS  industriul 
products  to export.  In  order  to keep  frontiers  open  for  domestic  exports, 
the position of foreign  suppliers has  to be  to.ken  into  <~Ccount. 
In  the Community  today there  is  u  bulilnce between  the countries which  are 
likely to treat protection of  the consumer  <IS  their main  objective and 
those  which  would  tend rather  towards  that of  the producer.  It should,' 
therefore,  be possible  to  reach  agreement  on  improvemcnto  of  the  CI\P  which 
will be  fair  to both sides.  The contradiction between  these  two  interests 
can be  resolved  in  the  long  term by  the creation of  un  efficient,  low cost 
ugriculturo.l  sector,  for  which  the structural policy is  an  e£;sential  tool. 
Thus  it is  the short  term  that the  debutc  mainly concerns. 
When  the first regulations  establishing  a  common  organisiltion of markets 
were  issued  the  level of prices  was  fixed  at  a  fairly high  level.  The 
large numbers  of  small  scale producers  needed  a  protection  that could not 
be provided  in  any  other  way  at the  time.  'l'he  existing level of prices 
also had  to be  taken  into account  and  a  median  price adopted.  In  the 
case  of cereals,  Germany  insisted that a  high  gnarant:crc1  price be  fixed 
because  of  the difficult conditions  for  production  in  Ulilt country.  The 
prices of livestock products  were  then  aligned with  U1osb  of cereals. 
Since  then  the situation has  changed  completely with  the  level  of prices 
in  the  Community relatively  lovl  compared with  that  in tlw vorld market. 
Developments  have  vindicutcd  those  who  argued  thett security of supply and 
st<lbilising of prices  must  bo  the prime  olJjcct:ivcr:  of agricultural policy. 
There  is  a  d<:~nger,  however,  that  fixing  prices  uniquely  to tab:  <.tccount  of 
costs of production \vill  deter conr:umers  from buying  rclntivcly expcnr,ivc 
products  such  as  butter or beef.  By  shifting  some  of  U1c  Lurden  fo~ 
producer  support  from  end  price guarantees  to direct subsidies,  it:  is 
possible to maintL!in  lower prices  for  the consumer  without penctlis ing  the 
producer.  Dut  this would  mean  departing  from  one  of  the principles  of 
the  CAP  that  the consumer  should  pay  the  full cost of  food. 
- 55  - PE  37.463/II/A/rev. A  further  problem  is whether subsidies  should be  in  the  form  of  a  variable 
premium according  to the market  situation or  should be  p<:tyable  on  a  flat 
rate basis.  Tho  advantage  of the  flat rate lies not only  in  the  fact that 
tho cost over  the  following  year  can be  estimated with  accuracy but also 
that it can  be  combined with  the Community's  price  system without difficulty. 
The  variilblc premium  on  the  other  hand  requires  an  immense  amount  of admini-
stration which,  although  practicable  for  <1  country  like the United  Kingdom 
with  a  small  farming  population  and  long  experience  of  government regulation, 
would cause  great problems  on  a  Community  level.  The  cost,  too,  tends  to 
got  out  of hand.  In  1970-71  (the last year  under  'normal'  conditions  \vhen 
deficiency payments  operated  in  the  United  Kingdom price guarantees  for  beef 
<tlono  totalled £31  million.  Even  before negotiations  to enter the Community 
h<:td  begun,  successive British governments  had  moved  towards  import controls 
and  guantitativo restrictions  on  guarantees  to limit the cost to the 
Exchequer  and  to shift the burden  to  the  consumer. 
During  the  post-war  period both Britain  and  the  Community  have had  to dispose 
of occasional  surpluses  in  one  sector or  another.  It is extremely difficult 
to strike a  balance between  <1  liberal  economic  policy, which  in  the past has 
led  to big  fluctuations  in  the market,  and  tho  rigidity of  <tn  interventionist 
policy.  The  surpluses  which have been  run  up  \.mder  the Common  Agricultural 
Policy  for beef and butter  may  <:tppear  impressive when  expressed  in  terms 
of  tonnage,  but  they represent only  a  few  weeks'  supply  for  the consumer. 
Certain  techniques  - limiting  tho  amount  guaranteed to a  standard quantity 
of produce  or  diminishing  the  price paid to producers  - exist to dispose 
of surpluses,  but the danger  is that farmers  will overreact and  not produce 
enough. 
The  move  to  t<tke  greater account of  tho  consumer'~; position  in  the  formulation 
of agricultural policy has  como  at  <1  time at which,  ironicu.lly,  the balance 
of the  CAP  as  it is constituted at present 11ils  <:tlready  moved  in  the 
consumer's  favour.  Tho  high  initial level  of  guaranteed prices has  been 
eroded  by  inflation and  security of supplies  is at the centro of consumer 
preoccupation:  British consumers  found  during  the  summer  of  19711  that 
offering  low prices  to  sugar  producers  did not keep  down  the cost in  the 
shops.  The  same  is  true of domestic  producers  and  the  opinion  is  expressed 
that current Community  prices arc  too  low to maintain  supply at present 
levels.  Deficits ruther  than  surpluses have  become  tho  mujor  problem at 
U1o  present  time. 
'l'he  European  Common  .1\qricultur<tl  Policy  follows  tho  sumo  pattern  and  is 
subject  to  the  same  criticisms as  agricultural policy  in  any  developed 
country.  Obviously  the  policy  is not perfect and  improvements  may  be  made 
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and  stability of prices  and  in  improving productivity are also considerable. 
They  have  been  realised by  the will  to construct a  policy  on  the  European 
level  to serve  a  European  interest.  Reform  of the  CAP  can  only success  if 
it follows  this path.  If the  object is  only  to obtain concessions -which 
derogate  from  the Community's  policy,  then there will  follow  a  return  to 
purely national policies - but without any  assurance that the advantages 
offered by  the  CAP  can be  obtained at that level. 
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1.  The  harmonisation  of structural,  social  and  fiscal policies 
The  United  I<ingdom has  already  taken  measures  to  improve  the structure of 
agriculture,  ranging  from central grants,  encouragement  to leave  farming 
und  measures  to  improve  certain problem sectors. 
In  respect of the  improvement  of the  structure of British agriculture, 
the  effects  of accession  to  the  EEC  arc confined  to  a  small  nwnber  of 
minor,  formal  adjustments1  to existing structural measures.  Even before 
accession  the  trends  in Britain  nway  from  employment  in agriculture and 
towards  the  enlargement of holdings  were  already  running  parallel with 
trends  in  the  original Community  of  the  Six and  there has  been  no  chnnge 
in this  since accession  (decrease  in  full-time  farming  in  the period 
1968-1973:  8%). 
There  nrc  n  number  of  ngricultural  improvement  schemes  in  the  framework 
of the  Guidnncc  Section  of  the  El\GGF  from  which  British hill lnnd  farming 
and  fishing  sectors arc  expected  to benefit. 
The  schemes  in force,  or  envisaged,  range  frrnn  individual projects  under 
Regulation  No.  17/67  to  improve  instullationr;  in  furms  and marketing 
organisations  to  joint schemes  following  the  Council  Resolution of  25  Huy, 
1971  for  the modernisation  of  farms,  the  encourugcmcnt of guidance  and 
training,  the  improvement  of mnrkcting  facilities,  the  encouragement  of 
renfforcstntion,  the  reorganisation of the  fishing  sector,  and  for  premiums 
to encourage beef production.  There  arc also special  schemes  for  the 
reduction  of  the cultivated areas  producing  surpluses difficult to market, 
such  as  fruit,and  to establish producers'  organisations.  The  Council  is 
also in agreement  in principle with  the  use  of  the  El\GGF  for  regional 
development. 
1\ids  to be  provided  from  the  El\GGF  for  schemes  within  Member  States vary 
from  a  normal  figure  of  25%  to 45%,  or  exceptionally  65%  of  the costs. 
2.  The  future  of  EEC  competition  poli.£y____i_n  oqri_<;..!:llt~re  ond  the 
nrit.ish  farmer 
The  elimination of unfair competition and  distortion  of competition  due  to 
differences  in  tux  systems  and national  aids  to producers has  been  a  major 
area  of activity of  the  European  Economic  Community. 
1 
The  lime  and  fertilizer subsidies  may  be  abolished  this year 
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Articles  92-94  regulate oids  to be  granted  by  Hcmber  States.  By Article  93, 
the Cormnission  shall decide which aids  are compatible with  the meaning  of 
Article  92.  A  fairly extensive  range  of aids arc  in  force  in all Hember 
States  and  include,  for  example,  interest subsidies,  aids  to poorer 
farming  regions,  VAT  rebates,  market  support measures,  financial  contributions 
for markctiny  and  compensation  for  increases  in energy ·Costs. 
In  the  early years  of  the  Cormnunity  the  emphasis  of agricultural policy was 
directed  towards  the  establishment of cormnon  prices  for  the principal 
farm  products  and  the  formulation  of regulations  concerned with  foreign 
trade  and  domestic  markets,  including intervention buying,  quality standards, 
etc.  Durin~J  the  past:  six years1  attention h<w  been  increasingly turned 
towetrds  c~ic1s  to the  <~gricultural sector which  might  tend  to distort the 
fair competition between  member  countries  which  is  a  principal of  the 
Treaty of Rome.  During this period the  numerous  aids  given by  member 
countries have  been  studied by  the  Cormnission,  consultations have  taken 
place with  government  and professional organisations,  and  a  timetable has 
been agreed  for  dealing with  these aids  and  their harmonisation  on  a  product 
by product basis.  The  Cormnission  has  recently moved  from  an  essentially 
negative viewpoint  towards  aids  (e.g.  banning certain aids  reported either 
by  the country offering  the aid or by  other  member  countries which  feared 
adverse effects  from  them),  to  a  more  positive attitude involving active 
implementation  of  a  harmonised  policy  in this sector.  The  Cormnission's 
energies will  increasingly be directed  towards  this  end,  and  a  more  flexible 
appro<:~ch has  <tlready  become  evident  followin<J  the present difficult:ics 
of  the agricultural  sector  in  the  face  of  increased  feed,  fertilizer  and 
energy costs. 
It is  expected  that the  Cormnunity will  make  more  rapid progress  in ubolishing 
or harmonising  uids  during  the  next  few  years  and  that by  the  end  of  the 
transition period at the  latest the  only  ones  remaining which could 
potentially distort competition will be  in the  fields  of direct taxation 
and  social  security. 
During  the  transition period,  Britain and  the  other  new  Hember  States would 
be  required  to declare  their aids  to  the agricultural sector  and  justify 
them,  part of  the process  of creating  'transparency of aids'.  It would 
be  likely to be  some  time before acceptance  or  abolition of existing 
British aids  was  completed.  Meanwhile,  some  of the Community  ones,  for 
instance  for  produ·::er  groups,  might be  adopted by  the British Government. 
1  The  Cormnission's  proposals  for  the establishment of criteria for  a 
cormnon  policy for  agricultural subsidies,  published in  H<:~rch  1966, 
have  never been  formally  adopted 
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mcm1Jnr  counlrien  (or  likoly  I:CI  rnrn;Ji.ll  i1Vilililhlo  in  futuro)  the  qencral 
conclusion  in  thaL  them~ urn  nul  I il'.nly  to 1H"!  "  t!OUrcc  of mnjor  cliotortion 
to competition  for  Brit<~in  in  the  enlarged Community  either during  the 
transitional period or  thereafter. 
3.  The  position  of  farmers  in  problem areas 
Within  the  framework  of creating  a  harmonised  Community  policy  on  aids  to 
agriculture,  un  agreed definition will have  to be  reached between  the 
Commission  and  the council  of  those areas  to which  member  countries  shall 
be entitled to grant special aids.  The  definition given  in Article  92(3) (a) 
of  tho  Treaty of Rome  - "regions  where  the  standard of  living is  abnormally 
lmv  or where  there exists serious  underemployment"  - provides  no  ~rmrking 
criteria.  The  question  of poorer agricultural  regions has  moved,  however, 
from  this negative aspect to  a  positive policy of Community  aid under 
the Directives  on  mountain  and hill farming  in certain less  favoured 
areas  and  the draft Regulation  on  priority agricultural regions  which  have 
been  under consideration  or  adopted since Britain's accession  to tho  EEC. 
'rho  Britinh <:ovornmcnt  has been,  therefore,  not only  fully  involved  and 
al>l•·  lo  put:  itn  own  p<>int  <>f  vl.ow,  hut  h;u;  mot- with  a  wl.tle  me<wuro  of 
nympu thy  [rom  otllel·  mt"!ltllJcr  qovcrnmcn l:n,  including  those  of  l:he  now 
Hember  States.  'rhere  is  a  consensus  on  both  the social and practical 
necessity of  avoiding  dc-populution.  Access  to many  problem areas  must 
be  preserved  for  an  increasingly mobile  urban  population. 
Since  tho  solution to these  problems  is busically a  question  of maintaining 
farm  incomes,  any  divergence  of  opinion  is likely to arise over  how  to 
do  so.  To  some  extent this may  be brought about by  a  general  system of 
income  supplement,  though  low  farm  incomes  are not necessarily confined 
to problem areas.  The  obvious  British interest is  in  u  form  of aid  that, 
even  if not directly product-linked,  is closely related  to certain types  of 
livestock husbandry.  'rho  likelihood of  such measures  being  introduced has 
boon  increased by  tho present difficulties  faced  by  European  agricul.-l:ure. 
'rhe  Commission,  in its price proposals  for  tho  1975-76  mi1rk<Jt.ing  year,  has 
a  proposed  a  limited step  in  this  direction in the beef sector. 
4.  Food  legislation 
Before  1  January  1973  a  number  of directives relating to  food  legislation 
were  adopted  by  the  Community  in order  to facilitate trade within the 
Community  where various national provisions  hu.d  constituted obstacle!::  to 
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programme  to eliminate  technical  trade  barriers.  This  programme,  which  also 
covered  food  legislation,  was  later subject to amendments  and  postponement 
of deadlines. 
The  directives  adopted  by the Community prior to the  accession  of the 
United  Kingdom  deal  with  food  additives  such  as  colouring matters  preservatives, 
and antioxydising agents.  ~s in the  United  Kingdom,  these  directives are 
based  on  the  'positive list'  principle,  i.e.  only matters  listed in the 
provision can  be  used  as  additives  in foodstuffs. 
~s  a  result  of the entry negotiations certain amendments  were  made  to the 
directive  on  preservatives  to meet  British wishes.  New  matters  were  added 
to the  EEC  list which  would  make  it easier than  before  for  British industry 
to market  certain products  in the  original six Member  States. 
Further,the United  Kingdom  was  granted  a  period of transition in applying 
the  three  directives  mentioned.  This  period expires  on  31  December  1977. 
The  transition period allows  the  United  Kingdom  to keep its national lists 
in the three  fields  of additives.  Only if proved harmless  to human  health 
before the  date  of expiry of  the transition period can these matters  be 
included  in the  EEC  lists. 
~s regards  colourinq m<1t!:ers,  tlH're  is a  special  arrangement  which  allows 
the  United  J<inqdnm  to  m;lint:<~in  its  prohibition  of the  use  of certnin colours 
until  31  December  1975,  nfter which  date  the  usc  of  these  colours  in the 
United  Kingdom will  be  permitted unless  the  EEC  has  decided  beforehand to 
exclude  these  additives  from  the  EEC  list. 
Generally speaking,  the  EEC  lists are  more  restrictive as  to the type  and 
number  of  food  additives  that  can  be  used  in  food  for  human  consumption 
then  the  United  Kingdom  lists.  In  1972,  for  instances,  with respect to 
'coal tar'  food  colours,  24  colouring matters  were  permitted in the  United 
Kingdom  according to the  regulations  under  the  Food  and  Drugs  Act  1955, 
whereas  only  19 matters  were  permitted within the  EEC;  only 10 matters  were 
on  both  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Community  lists1  Taking  into consideration 
the  addition  of  further  preserving matters  to  the  EEC  list as  a  result  of 
the entry negotL1tions  and  the  relatively long  periods  of adaptation  or 
transition,  there  have  not  been  any significant difficulties  for  United 
Kingdom  industries  as  a  consequence  of the  accession to the  EEC.  It is  in 
1  For  example,  a  major  problem could arise  over  the  lack of suitable  brown 
colourings  in  the  EEC  list for  making kippers.  The  EEC  list also lacks 
heat-stable  orange  and  red  dyes  for  sausages  and  preserved meats. 
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this  field during the entry negotiations  have  improved  the  competitiveness 
of United  Kingdom  industry on  the  EEC  market. 
During the  transition period expiring on  31  December  1977  and thereafter, 
the  United  Kingdom will have  a  full  say in any negotiations  taking place 
prior to the  issue  of directives  concerning other additives,  the  compositioni 
etc.  of commodities,  or  the  amendment  of existing EEC  directives.  It is 
likely that the  directive relating to colouring matters  in particular will 
need  amendment  because  both  production methods  and  consumer  habits  have 
changed considerably since the adoption  of the  original  EEC  directive~ 
It will  be  possible  for  the  United  Kingdom  to ensure  that  any  new  agreements 
will  take  into consideration the  considerable  differences  between  provisions 
in the  EEC  and those  in the  United  Kingdom.  This  is particularly important 
in the  field  of commodities  w1JCre  differences  are numerous.  In the course 
of  1973,  two  commodity directives  were  adopted by the  EEC,  concerning  sugar 
and cocoa.  In these  cases  the  United  Kingdom  had the  opportunity of taking 
pilrt  in  <Jgrecmcnts  on  <tn  equal  footing with  the  original  Member  States. 
'!'hen'  wcrP  conr;idcrill>lc  difficulties  in  reaching agreement,  but  compromises 
were  m<Jde.  It  is  cxpcctccl  th<lt  serious  problems  may  arise  when  proposals 
for  directives  concerning  such  products  as  margarine,  jams,  beer,  etc.  arc 
dis~usscd.  At  present  about  40  proposals  are  planned  by the  EEC  Commission. 
Harmonisation  of provisions  concerning  commodities  may  lead to  fewer 
difficulties  in  future,  however,  as  the  EEC  Commission  intend to propose 
optional harmonisation.  This will  permit  the  United  Kingdom  to retain 
national  provisions  governing,  for  instance,  the  importing and marketing of 
such types  of bread,  beer,  etc.  that  complied wLth  the  specifications 
outlined in commodity directives. 
Thus,  it would  be  possible  for  the  United  Kingdom  consumers  to retain the 
choice  of  buying  commodities  of  a  kind that they are  in  the habit  of buying, 
and to avoid  sudden  and costly changes  in manufacturing techniques.  United 
Kingdom  industry may,  of course,  have  to change  techniques  used  in manu-
facturing  products  intended  for  export to other  Community  Hember  States to 
comply with any  EEC  standards  which  may  be  laid down  in  future  directives 
concerning commodities. 
5.  Health aspects  of the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
The  harmonisation of the  veterinary provisions represents  an essential 
complement  to the market  organisation regulations.  In the  absence  of such 
harmonisation,  any efforts made  to ensure,  at a  commercial  level,  the  free 
movement  of  goods  - and  in this case  of animals  as  well  - would  remain 
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of their  public health provisions. 
The  ultimate  objective  is  as  follows:  as  soon  as  each  of the  Member  States 
observes  the  same  public health and veterinary provisions,  checks  on  products 
or  animals  can  be  made  in the  country of origin to ensure  that  they meet 
the  prescribed public health and  veterinary standards.  At  the  same  time, 
it should no  longer  be  necessary,  save  in exceptional  cases,  to provide  for 
checks  in the  receiving countries,  since these will  have  been  seen to as  a 
matter  of course at the  outset.  Where  the  free  movement  of  goods  and 
animals  is concerned,  the  advantages  of  the  above  immediately become  clear. 
consequently,  the  Community  lws  over  the  years  adopted  a  certain number  of 
directives,  thou<Jh  it ll<ls  not  yet  covprecl all  fields.  In areas  not  covered 
by Community  rules,  the  national  provisions  remain  in force. 
The  differences  between  the  Community rules  at the  moment  of accession and 
the  regulations  in  force  in countries  wishing to  join the Community  gave 
rise to lengthy discussions  at the  accession negotiations. 
It would  take too long to  go  into all the  details  of the  veterinary 
regulations.  Measures  to control  foot-and-mouth  disease  can,  however,  be 
given  as  an  example.  Although  a  system of compulsory vaccination was 
introduced into the  Community  by directives  drawn  up  at  Community  level, 
the three  acceding nations  benefited  fromtheir  status  as  countries  free 
from  foot-and-mouth  disease  and  were  consequently exempted  from the 
obligation to vaccinate  their animals. 
Under  the  principle whereby the  acceding States  accepted the  body  of 
legislation already enacted by the  Community,  the Community regulations 
should have  been  introduced into the  new  Member  States.  Ilowever,  at the 
time  of the  accession negotiations,  it was  agreed that the  three  new 
Member  States could maintain their national  legislation up to the  end  of 
1977,  that is to say,  up  to that date  the  animals  would  not  be  subject to 
compulsory vaccination. 
The  disadvantage  of compulsory vaccination  for  the  new  Member  States  is 
twofold: 
(a)  at the  public health level:  any vaccination whose  sole principle is 
the  injection of  low  doses  of disease  germs  in order  to encourage 
antibodies  means  in  fact  the  introduction into a  given country of the 
germs  in question; 
(b)  at the  financial  level:  compulsory vaccination obviously entails 
additional  expenditure. 
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reality,  no  country cun truly be  considered safe  from  foot-and-mouth 
disease.  In  1968,  the United  I<ingdom  had  an  epidemic  which  was  nothing 
less  than  C\  disuster  for  the agriculturul  sector  since  animals  had to be 
slaughtered immediutely und  the meat  incinerated.  Systemutic vaccination 
makes  it possible to uvoid catastrophies  of this kind. 
For,  even  if the  insurance  puyments  and the state compensation  paid out at 
the  time  of the epidemic  in 1968  provided compensation  for  the  gross  loss  o: 
the cattle,  milk  producers  suffered a  considerublc  loss  of  earnings  during 
the  period necessary for  reconstituting their  stock  und  bringing it to 
muturity. 
However  that  may  be,  the  i"lccession  agreements  provide  thut the  Commission 
shall  submit  a  report  on  this  problem to  the  Council  in July  1976.  It will 
be  then that  u  final  decision  is  tnken  on whether  or  not  the  Community 
requirement  of compulsory vaccination is to be  introduced  in the  new  Member 
States  as  from  1978. 
These  temporary measures  have  created a  sort of status  quo  in relation to 
the previous  situation and,  for  that  reason,  the  new  legal situation has 
hud  no  repercussions  on trade. 
There  is another  problem:  that of the  protection of animals.  The  Communit: 
leqinlutors  ilre  at  pn'f;ent  Btudyinq  the  ruleB  \vhich  might  be  introduced 
into  the  Community  wher·eby  i L  wou] d  become  compul r;ory  to  11tun  nnimals  be fort 
:;luughtering  them, as  is  the case  in  the  United  Kingdom.  'l'his  is  <:1.  problem 
which  clearly hus  its  'humanitarian'  side,  but  its solution would  involved 
considerable  sums  of money,  given the  need  to modify  a  large  number  of 
t-}:isting slaughter houses. 
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During  the period  1968  to 1972,  the  final production  of  the original 
Community  increased  in volume by  1.9% per  annum1 •  The  Common  Agricultural 
Policy has  therefore had  the desired effect of stimulating domestic 
production.  Over  the  same  period,  however,  the rate  for  the  United 
Kingdom  was  even higher  - 2.6%- although  this  was  during  a  period when 
government policy attempted  to boost production  in order  to save  imports. 
Trade  in agricultural produce between  member  states is  the  area where  the 
impact  of  tho  European  Economic  Community  has  boon  most  strongly felt. 
In  I'JS!l  moml>nr  ntatoll  worn  import:inq  ~~909  mj llion worth  of  food,  drink 
nne!  tolm''''<l  I '"'>Ill  •·acl\  olllor.  lly  I 'J'/0  lllis  h<Hl  .i.ncrean(J(l  sixfold to  $ S, 446  m. 
A  similar expansion  of  trade between  the United  Kingdom  and  the original 
Community  can been  seen by comparing  the  trade  figures  for  1972  and  1973 
(Table I).  British imports  of agricultural and  food  produce  from  the 
Community  of the  Six  in  1973  were  17%  of the total  figure  and  19%  for  the 
first nine months  of  1974,  as  against  13%  in  1972.  Exports  declined  to 
9%  of  tho  tot~l  in  1974  from  34%  in  1973  and  33%  in  1972.  This  was  due  to 
the high prices  for  exports  of  fresh,  chilled and  fr~ecn meat  during  the 
boom  of  1972-73  falling off during  the  slump  of  1974. 
The  trend  shown  by nine selected products  in  volume  is as  follows: 
1972/73  Exports:  +  234  Imports:  +  51 
The  percentages  shown here refer of course  tot total volumes  which  are of 
very  unequal  importance,  being  in a  ratio of  1:7  for  exports  and  imports. 
This  trend could also reflect the  fact  that certain products  \vere  placed 
in  stock  in Britain in  order to benefit  from  the  enlargement. 
In  any case  tho efficient British  farmer  can  expect  to reap rich benefits 
from  the  Common  agricultural market.  Freeing  of trade  in  this sector 
within  the  community will  lead to  a  more  efficient production as  special-
isation leads  to decreasing costs.  Thus  it can  be  expected  to see British 
production concentrate now  on  livestock prcn uction  and  certain arable 
crops,  sugar beet,  for  example,  while  importing  feedstuffs,  such  as  maize. 
It is too early to reach  any definite conclusions  on  tho effect of the  CAP 
on  farming  patterns  in Britain.  At  the  same  time,  as  British agriculture 
must adjust  to  the  CAP  a  further  adjustment  is  required  to cost increases 
and  the pattern which had  been  expected to  emerge,  as  a  major  livestock 
supplier to the Community,  has  been  distorted by  a  new pattern of relative 
sector costs. 
1  The Agricultural Situation  in the Community,  1974  Report,  Part I,  p.lO 
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expense  of trade with  the rest of the world.  In value  imports  £rom both 
the  Six  and  the world  (Table  III)  have  shown  large  increases.  If imports 
have  increased more  rapidly  from  the  Six,  it is because purchasers have 
been  switching to  lower  priced Community  supplies  rath~r than  any constraint 
imposed by  the CAP  on  purchases  from  outside  the  Community.  Indeed  imports 
from  the  Six were  already  increasing faster  than  imports  from  the rest of 
the world before entry into the  EEC. 
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TABLE  I 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
% of  Imports  of Agricultural  Produceland Foodstuffs  from  the  E.E.C.  (6) 
in terms  of Total  Imports 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
19742 
11 
12 
13 
17 
19 
% of Exports  of Agricultural  Produce  and Foodstuffs  to the  EEC  (6) 
in terms  of Total  Exports 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
19742 
24 
24 
33 
34 
9 
UNITED  KINGDOMiE.E.C.  ~9) 
- Imports 
- Exports 
of Nine  Selected 
1972 
1973 
Trend % 
of Nine  Selected 
1972 
1973 
Trend  <;(, 
Agricultural 
in value 
(£  ooo) 
2711637 
391,029 
+44 
Agricultural 
in  value 
(£  ooo) 
45,622 
108,111 
+137 
Source:  Overseas  Trade  nnd  Industry 
S.I.T.C.  classification 
First nine  months 
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and Food 
and Food 
Products 
in volume 
(tons) 
2,312,869 
3,497,027 
+51 
Products 
in volume 
(tons) 
160,692 
536,460 
+234 
PE  37 .463/II/A/rev. The  following  tables  show agricul  t~ural  trade  in detail:  TABLE  II 
UNITI':D  KINGDOM 
- Trend 
World 
EEC  (6) 
USA 
- Trend 
World 
EEC  (6) 
USA 
in 
in 
Im12orts 
Ex1:2orts 
of Agricultural 
1970-1971 
+  3 
+  16 
+  14 
of Agricul  tura  1 
+  12 
+  11 
+  11 
Source:  Overseas  Trade  and  Industry 
Prcxluce  and 
1971-1972 
+  9 
+  18 
Produce 
+  0.12 
+  36 
2 
and 
Foodstuffs  (as 
1972-1973 
+  39 
+  78 
+  32 
Foodstuffs 
+  53 
+  61 
+  14 
(as 
'({,) 
%) 
1973-19741 
+  29 
+  60 
+  28 
+  33 
+  23 
+  41 
- Im1:2orts  of Agricultural  Produce  and  Foodstuffs  (in  £  millions) 
1970  1971  1 ')7 2  19"/3  ]9741 
World  2781.9  2878.4  3131.9  4340.5  3915.8 
EEC  (6)  308.5  358.0  422.7  754.4  866.8 
USA  212.7  242.1  242.6  320.2  250.2 
(%  of  imports  of 
agricultural produce 
c:md  foodstuffs  in 
terms  of total 
imports  30  29  28  27  23 
- Exports  of Agricultural  Produce  and  Foodstuffs  (in  £  millions) 
World 
EEC  (6) 
636.7 
153.9 
USA  141.9 
% of exports  of 
agricultural produce 
and  foodstuffs  in 
terms  of  total 
exports  8 
712.9 
171.2 
157.8 
8 
Source:  Department  of Trade  and  Industry 
l  First nine  months  of  1974 
-68 
713.8 
233.5 
154.4 
7 
1089.1 
374.9 
175.3 
9 
963.2 
263.2 
165.7 
8 
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TABLE  III - IMPORTS  FROM  THE  ENLARGED  COMMUNITY  ( 9) 
Meat, 
fresh,  Hilk  Cheese 
C.T.C.I.  chilled  and  Butter  and  Eggs 
or  Cream  curd  in 
frozen  shell 
+ 
Hetric 
Ton  149  761  50  184  137  188  65  671  1  322 
£  000  58  209  12  206  66  868  27  827  516 
+ 
Hetric 
Ton  105  988  54  432  185  670  83  287  15  340 
£  000  57  949  14  815  81  614  41  920  5  603 
Metric +  213  678  45  116  325  657  101  573  19  004 
Ton 
£  000  122  661  14  637  186  707  68  631 
Source:  Overseas  Trade Statistics of the  U.K. 
(Department of Trade  and  Industry) 
7  278 
Wheat 
(including  Maize 
spelt)  Barley,  (corn) 
and meslin,  unmilled  unmilled 
unmilled 
1  106  280  39  530  703  923 
30  578  904  18  432 
1  474  832  158  679  1  332  186 
65  448  6  038  61  014 
1  379  974  683  028  1 751  953 
110  587  39  474  112  360 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
Cereals, 
unmilled,  Bovine 
other than  cattle 
wheat,  rice,  (including 
barley and  buffaloes) 
maize 
Number 
59  010  492  829 
of which 
Ireland 
491  938 
1  456  54  641 
Number 
86  613  342  318 
of which 
Ireland 
341  118 
4  219  52  409 
Number 
350  374  383  021 
of which 
Ireland 
381  246 
20  155  57  266 
+Metric  tons  have been obtained by multiplying  Imperial  tons by  a  coefficient of 1.016 -..! 
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UNITED  KINGDOM 
TABLE  IV  - EXPORTS  TO  THE  COHMUNITY  (9) 
Heat, 
fresh,  Hilk  Cheese 
C.T.C.I.  chilled  and  Butter  and 
or  Cream  curd 
frozen 
+ 
Hetric 
1  Ton  78  061  15  417  1  659  746 
9 
7 
2 
£  000  39  234  2  616  755  386 
+ 
Hetric 
1  Ton  106  793  111  692  5  309  3  204 
9 
7 
3 
£  ooo.  67  379  21  163  2  290  1  413 
'  + 
1  Hetric 
9  Ton  111  475  73  505  1  645  3  297 
7 
4 
£  000  65  895  14  497  935  1  793 
Source:  OVerseas  Trade Statistics of the  U.K. 
(Department of Trade  and  Industry) 
Eggs 
in 
shell 
962 
607 
3  081 
2  026 
6  495 
3  365 
Wheat  Cereals, 
(including  Haize  urunilled,  Bovine 
spelt)  Barley,  (corn)  other than  cattle 
and meslin,  urunilled  unrnilled  wheat,  rice,  (including 
urunilled  barley and  buffaloes) 
maize 
Number 
6  326  49  813  4  044  3  664  185  781 
of which 
Ireland 
99  781 
243  1  554  138  89  18  878 
Number 
9  895  247  146  14  318  35  022  156  176 
of which 
Ireland 
79  903 
592  11  102  671  1  475  20  382 
Number 
2  049  148  357  19  453  12  752  80  255 
of which 
Ireland 
76  946 
181  8  955  1  325  830  8  625 
+Metric  tons  have  been obtained by multiplying  Imperial  tons 
by a  coefficient of 1.016 ANNEX  I 
BRITISH  AGRICULTURE  AND  THE  FINANCING  OF  THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY! 
1.  Pavmcnts  from  the  Guarantee  Section of the  EAGGF  to the  United  Kingdom 
in  l 97 3 
The  following  table gives  the whole  of  the expenditure  for  each sector in 
which  the  Guarantee  Section intervenes.  This  table  shows  that in  1973 
the United  Kingdom  received 151.8 m.u.a.from the Guarantee  Section.  This 
is  about  4.5% of the total expenditure by this section.  This  modest  figure 
is  explained by  the  length  of  time  needed  by  the United  Kingdom authorities 
to set up  the machinery to enable it to benefit  from  the Guarantee  Section. 
Although  in principle  the  common  regulations  on  agriculture were  applied 
to  the  new  Member  States as  from  1  February  1973,  there were  almost  no 
requests  for  intervention until  the  end  of March  1973.  To  obtain  a  more 
accurate  idea  of the  'annual'  amount  which  the  United  Kingdom  could receive 
the  results  for the first three months  of 1974  should be added  to  the 
151.8 million u.a.  These  amounted  to 53.5 million  u.a.  so that the  figure 
for  the whole  year  is  205.3  million u.a.  or  about  £85.5  million.  This  is close to 
close  to the  estimate made  by the  'Annual  Review  of Agriculture 1974'  which 
predicted  £82.5 million  for  the period April  1973  to March  1974. 
This  estimate alone,  however,  is not  enough  to assess  the total benefit 
received by  the  United  Kingdom  from  the budget of the Communities.  The 
attached table  shows  that the  'accession'  compensatory amounts  were  264.3 
million u.a.  (£110  million)  for  the  financial year.  Compensatory  amounts 
were  paid by  the  Member  States  and  borne by  the  EAGGF  to allow the  new 
Member  States,  principally the  United  Kingdom,  to  import  Community  agricultural 
products at a  lower  price than  that applied  in  the  old Six.  It can  therefore 
be  said that this  sum,  which helps  sales of products  from  the Continent, 
also benefited the British consumer.  In  a  period of overheating  on  the 
world market,  the effect of  the compensatory  amounts  in  the  United  Kingdom 
was  a  not  inconsiderable  factor  in stabilising internal prices.  This  direct 
effect of  the  financial  system of  the  common  agricultural policy and  the 
machinery set up by the  Treaty of Accession  should not be  overlooked. 
These compensatory  amounts  admittedly prevented  these  goods  being sold  on 
the world market,  which  would have  meant  payment of refunds by  the  EAGGF, 
at least for certain products  and  depending  on  the price situation on  the 
world market.  Nevertheless,  the United  Kingdom  derived major benefit from 
the compens?tory  amounts  system,  although it is unfortunately not possible 
to  give  exact figures. 
1  See  also  the  section  on  budgetary matters. 
is  £1  =  2.4  u.a. 
-71 
The  rate of exchange  used 
PE  37.463/II/A/Ann./rev. It is still difficult to predict the  future  expenditure  from  which  a  Member 
State might benefit.  Assuming,  however,  that production  in the United 
Kingdom  remains  approximately  the same,  the gradual  alignment of prices 
would  normally mean  a  higher  level of  intervention.  On  the other hand, 
refunds  would  remain  small since  the  United  Kingdom  is  a  net importer  of 
agricultural products.  Finally,  the compensatory  amounts  would  normally 
diminish,  again because  of  the alignment of prices. 
2.  The  Guidance  Section  of the  EAGGF 
Under  the  common  measures  Britain is already benefiting  from  the Guidance 
Section because  of  the  early application of the directives  on  structural 
reform. 
To  qualify  for  reimbursement  from  the Guidance  Section,  common  measures  and 
individual projects must  be  submitted by  the national administrations  for 
approval by  the Commission.  This  involves  a  certain amount  of delay and 
appropriations  for  individual projects submitted in  1973  are decided  the 
following  year.  In  1973  aid to the United  Kingdom  totalled £8.443,997. 
Drainage and  flood prevention works,  the construction of  fishing boats  and 
cheese  factories  figure prominently  on  the list of projects accepted. 
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Sectors 
C~reals 
Rice 
Milk  and miL'lc  products 
Fats 
Sugar 
Beef and  veal 
Pigmeat 
Eggs  and poultry meat 
Fruit and vegetables 
Wines 
Tobacco 
Fishing 
Flax and hemp 
Seed 
Hops 
Processed agricultural products 
Compensatory amounts  accession 
monetary 
Total 
in £M 
Expenditure by the Guarantee Section of the  EAGGF 
(millions of u.a.) 
1.2.1973 to  31.12.1973 
U.K.  E.E.C. 
55.8  952.9 
- 11.2 
32.5  1,458.5 
0.6  362.9 
4.5  127.0 
- 16.0 
0.06  90.6 
0.1  21.5 
0.04  34.5 
- 11.7 
- 118.2 
0.1  1.2 
- 5.5 
2.5  14.3 
- 4.7 
0.7  23.7 
- 264.3 
49.5  140.3 
151.8  3,659.6 
63.25  1,524.83 
1.1.1974  to  31 March  1974 
U.K.  E.E.C. 
14.9  96.5 
- 0.  7 
14.7  342.9 
0.4  20.6 
1.2  28.5 
0.01  3.9 
0.03  19.4 
0.03  3.5 
0.007  1:2.8 
- 0.23 
- 84.8 
0.06  0.45 
- 5.4 
0.9  5.3 
0.5  5.2 
0.18  70.8 
20.7  48.8 
53.5  752.6 
22.29  313.58 B  - TECHNOLOGICAL  AND  INDUSTRIAL  POLICY 
l.  Definition of the  term  'industrial policy 
(a)  The  European  Treaties  do  not expressly provide  fOr  the introduction 
of  a  common  industrial policy.  Community  efforts  towards  the 
development  of  a  common  technological  and  industrial policy should 
therefore rather be  seen  as  an  attempt  to reach  a  higher  standard 
of efficiency by  combining  into a  single consistent policy various 
individual measures  which  the building  up  of  the Common  Market  or 
of  the  Economic  and Monetary  Union,  or  the  general  development of 
the  industrial  economy  of  the European countries,  has  made  necessary. 
In  fact,  the  term  'industrial policy'  has  not yet been  very precisely 
defined;  at least there exists  no  generally accepted  definit~on. 
Thus  in his  speech  tothe Council  of Ministers  of  the European 
Community  on  4  June  1974,  in which he constantly spoke  of  'regional 
and  industrial policy',  Mr  Callaghan  seems  to have  had chiefly in mind 
the question  of aid to particular enterprises.  The  purpose  of  the 
'renegotiations'  would  therefore  seem to be  not so  much  to obtain aid 
from  the Community  as  to ensure  that Community harmonisation measures 
and  measures  to  remove  discrimination will not rule out  intervention by 
the British government  in specific cases  involving  regional policy or 
individuQl  industries  or enterprises. 
It must  be  pointed out  in  this connection  that Article  92(3)  of  the 
EEC  Treaty expressly states that the  following  may  be considered 
compatible with  the  Common  Market: 
"(a)  Aid  to promote  the  economic  development  of areas where  the 
standard  of  living is abnormally  low or where  there is serious 
under-employment; 
(b)  Aid  to promote  the  execution  of an  important project of 
common  European  interest or to remedy  a  serious disturbance 
in  the  economy  of  a  Member  State; 
(c)  Aid  to facilitate  the  development  of certain economic 
activities or  of certain economic  areas,  where  such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions  to an  extent contrary 
to  the  common  interest  ••• ; 
(d)  Such  other categories of aid as  may  be specified by decision 
of  the Council  acting by  a  qualified majority on  a  proposal 
from  the Commission." 
- 74- PE  37.463/II/B/rev. It should be  especially noted  that the aids  mentioned  in sub-paragraphs 
(a)  to  (c)  to not depend  on  the  agreement  of  the Council,  and  further-
more  that aids  (a)  and  (b)  arc not,  like  (c),  limited by  the proviso 
that they must not affect trading conditions. 
The  fear  that the British government's  plans  for  industry could be 
hindered by  narrow  interpretation of the Treaties would  therefore 
seem  to be without  foundation,  the steel  industry being  a  possible 
exception since the  corresponding provisions  of  the  ECSC  Treaty are 
concerned more with  industrial readjustment  (Article  56)  than with 
the  promotion  of existing  industries.  But it is precisely  in the 
steel industry that any  government  might be  well  advised not to act 
independently but to  incorporate its future  development plans  in  a 
common  European  programme.  The  Western  European  steel  industry must 
be  seen  in  the broad context of  the world  economy  as  a  single field, 
and  as  such it can  only preserve its prosperity by  common  future 
planning. 
(b)  The  introduction or  a  coherent  industrial policy was  first proposed 
by  the  Commins ion  in  I 'J70  in  a  Ml!morandum  from  the  Commission  to  the 
Council  (European  Parliament Working  Document  No.  15/70  of  2l.L1. 1970). 
According  to this,  industrial policy consists of the coordination of 
the effects of various  other  sectors  of economic  policy  on  industry: 
establishment of  the  Common  Market,  removal  of  the  technical  and  other 
obstacles to trade  remaining after  the abolition of customs  duties, 
competition policy,  taxation policy,  right of establishment,  corporation 
law,  patent  law,  general harmonisation  of legislation,  regional policy, 
social policy,  environment policy,  energy policy,  technological policy, 
transport policy. 
The  Conmmni ty  ins Li lut.ions  did not however  succeed  in  launching  any 
special action  on  intluntrial policy  on  the basis of the  1970 memorandum. 
2.  The  situation created by  the accession of  the new  Member  States and 
developments  in  1973/1974 
It was  not until the  Paris  Summit  - in which  the  new  Member  States were 
already participants - with its call for  the creation of a  'common 
industrial base  for  the Community'  that new  initiatives were  set in 
motion.  The  Commission  presented the Council  in May  1973  with a 
'Memorandum  on the  Technologic<:~l and  Industrial Policy  Programme' 
(Bulletin of the  European  Communities,  Supplement  7/73)  and  on 
24  October  1973  with  <1  'Programme  of Action  in the Field of Technological 
and  Industrial  Policy'  (SEC(73)  3824).  In  these documents  the  Commission 
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the  following  points: 
- removal  of technical barriers to  trade; 
- gradual  opening  of markets  for  public contracts; 
- removal  of  legal and  fiscal barriers which  impede  the  linking 
up  of undertakings; 
- European-scale promotion of competitive  advanced  technology 
undertakings; 
- conversion and  modernisation of  industrial concerns  in  economic 
difficulties; 
- control of concentrations. 
In  addition,  certain forms  of cooperation with  third countries  in  the 
area  of industrial and  technological policy were proposed. 
As  a  first practical industrial policy measure,  the  'Office for  Inter-
Company  Alignments'  in the Community  was  set up  in 1973,  and has 
since met with keen  interest.  Enquiries  from  undertakings  seeking 
cooperation with  undertakings  in other  Member  States have  come  mainly 
from  the Federal Republic  of Germany  and  the United  Kingdom. 
3.  Prospects  for  coming  years 
Present Community proposals  and  actions  obviously cover  for  the  time 
being_only a  part of what  a  real  common  industrial policy could be. 
For  instance,  it is only  the  advanced  industries  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  industries  in difficulties  on  the  other which  arc dealt with. 
A  really coherent industrial policy would,  however,  have  to concern 
itself not only with the best and  the worst but with all industries. 
The  world industrial growth situation also makes  this essential. 
Raw  material  supplies will play an especially important role for 
European  industries  in  the coming  years  and  decades. 
This  is  a  problem to which  satisfactory solutions can be  expected only 
in  the context of common  European action  to ensure  the prosperity of 
all European  industrial nationn. 
The  European  Community constitutes an attempt to rationalise the 
industry of the greater part of  a  continent.  It is therefore necessary 
in evaluating British participation or non-participation in this 
Community  to consider certain points  on  a  world scale. 
Geographically,  the structure of  the world  economy  is still determined 
by  the  great centres of  industrial activity which were  formed  during the 
industrial revolution around  the centres of the steel industry. 
- 76  - PE  37.463/II/B/rev. (The  steel  industry itself had its sites near coal  or ore deposits 
or at favourable  transport cost nodes  for  the  two  rnw materials.) 
The  three great centres of gravity of  the steel industry in  the world 
still align the rest of  the  economy  towards  themselves:  the  United 
States,  the  Soviet  Union  and Western  Europe.  The  core of Western 
European  industry consists of  the  economic  concentrations  in Britain, 
Benelux,  North-East France  and  West  Germany. 
If geographical  rationalisation by the creation of  a  larger market  is 
at issue,  this can  only  make  sense if the countries  named,  Yhich  form 
the core of  the Western  European  economy,  are united  in this  larger 
market.  If one  of  these countries is not  included,  the rationalisation 
effect cannot  fully  come  into play.  'rhis  would be  a  .disadvantage not 
only  for  the country concerned  but also for  the other countries  of 
the  economic  heartland.  How  the  other countries which  do  not  form 
part of  the heartland relate to the  Common  Harket is a  considerably 
less  important question.  An  economic  frontier which  separates  the 
peripheral countries  from  the heartland has  less  grave  effects  than 
an  economic  frontier which  runs  right through  the heartland.  Western 
Europe  cannot strengthen its economic  power  and  improve  its prosperity 
by  rationalisation unless  Britain,  France,  Benelux  and  Germany  are 
united in this market.  The  participation of the other countries is 
more  their  own  problem  than  the Community's.  Great Britain should 
at any  rate be quite clear that she  would  not merely be  facing  the 
prospect of austerity for herself if she  leaves  the Common  Harket 
but preventing other countries  from  exploiting  fully  the possibilities 
of European prosperity. 
- 77  - PE  37.463/II/B/rev. C.  ENERGY  POLICY 
Introduction 
1.  The  three Treaties  establishing the  European  Communities  do  not 
contain  any  explicit measures  on  a  genuine  common  energy policy. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  deals  only with coal  and  coke  as  energy  sources 
and  aims  to  increase  and  rationalize  production  and  ensure distri-
bution without discrimination to the various  Member  States.  The 
EURATOM  Treaty deals with  nuclear  energy  and  aims  through  the  deve-
lopment  of the  atomic  energy  industry to contribute  to an  increased 
standard of  living  in  the  Member  States.  The  EEC  Treaty does  not 
deal  explicitly with  a  common  energy  policy  for  the  Community. 
2.  Despite  the  fact  that  there  was  a  lack  of any  definite objective  in 
the  Treaties  as  regards  energy policy,  it soon  became  clear that 
the  aim  of  the  EEC,  Lhe  rreation  of  a  common  market  with  uniform 
conditions  of compcl.ltion  for  the  Member  States'  undertakings,  neces-
sitated a  certain degree  of harmonization  of  the  energy  policy of 
the  Member  States.  Energy  products  represent  a  large part of the pro-
duction costs  of  many  commodities,  and  if each  country  follows  its 
own  energy  policy  independently of the  other  Member  States,  this  is 
bound  to  influence  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  the  conditions of 
competition between  undertakings  and  thus  create  imbalance  in the 
common  market. 
3.  Another  important  factor  behind  the  Con@ission's  proposals  for  a 
common  policy in  this sector  is the  risk entailed by the  Communities' 
increasing  dependence  on  outside  sources  for  its energy  supplies. 
The  degree  of  Community  dependence  on  outside  energy  sources totals 
63%  (1973)  and  the  United  Kingdom  dependence  amounted to approx.SO%. 
As  early as  1968  the  Commission  drew attention to  the  dangerous  de-
gree  of  dependence  that had  been  reached  and  since  then  has  submitted 
proposals  aimed  at warding off its detrimental effects. 
The  situation at  the  time  of  enlargement  of the  Community,  developments 
during  the  first year  and  the  effects of membership 
As  mentioned  above,  the  major  sources  of energy are each dealt with  in 
a  separate  Community  treaty - ECSC  coal,  EURATOM  atomic  energy while 
the  principles of the  EEC-treaty  apply  to oil and  natural  gas.  This 
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achieve. 
Before discussing  more  general  developmGnts  in  the  energy  policy sector 
in relation to  the  principles  laid down  in  the  EEC  Treaty,  it would  be 
advisable briefly to  sum  up  the  situation  in  the  separate sectors 
covered by  the  ECSC  Treaty and  the  EURATOM  Treaty. 
A.  ECSC  •rreaty 
In  order  to create  a  free  market  in  goods,  customs  duties  and 
quantitative restrictions  on  trade were  abolished  in  the  early 
1950's.  The  rules  on  prices policy  in the  Treaty have been  of 
considerable practical  significance.  They  compel  undertakings in 
the coal  and  steel sector to publish  the conditions and  prices 
of sales by undertakings  in the Member  States to buyers within 
the  Community  and  prevent  them  from  fixing  more  than  one  price 
for  each  commodity  or  from  discriminating between  buyers. 
The  object of these  rules  is to ensure  that buyers  have  sufficient 
knowledge  of  the current  market  situation and  receive  fair  compe-
titive treatment. 
In  regard  to competition,  the  Commission  has  introduced strict 
control of mergers  between  undertakings  in  the coal  and  steel 
sector  and  has  made  all agreements  between  undertakings which 
restrict competition  subject  to its approval. 
The  cases  dealt with by  the  Commission  indicate a  strict attitude 
towards  the  formation  of cartels  in  the  sales  sector. 
As  regards  coal,  which  underwent  strong competition  from oil in 
the  1960's,  the  Commission  approved at the  end  of  1969  a  merger 
between  coal  producers  in  the  Ruhr,  who  were  responsible  for 
approximately  50  per cent  of Community  production at that  time. 
The  Treaty contains  a  general  prohibition of state  support  for 
the coal  and  steel  industry.  In  spite  of this,  the  Member  States 
principally involved  in  cooperation  on  energy policy agreed  on 
subsidies  to the coal  industry in  accordance with  Con~unity direc-
tives.  In  1965  Member  States were  allowed  to grant  subsidies  for 
the closure of unprofitable pits,  for  expenditure connected with 
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2.  ECSC  aids! 
1 
Two  kinds  of aid can be granted under  the Treaty by  the  ECSC: 
di.rect  financial  aid  and  loans  at reduced rates.  'rho  loans  are 
intended  for  the modernisation  and conversion  of certain undertakings 
in  the coal  and steel sector,  the creation of  new  jobs  and  the 
construction of housing  for  workers  in coal and steel  area~.  Direct 
financial  aid  is given  for  vocational  retraining of coal  and  ~teel 
workers. 
Dy  tho  oncl  o[  1')73  mora  tlmn  1.:!>2(,  million  hall  been  allocated by  tho 
European  Coal  and  Steel Community  since its creation to  financing 
industrial  investments  in coal  and  steel undertakings,  social housing 
ochemes and  programmes  for  the  re-employment  of workers  made  redundant 
by  the closure of coal  or  steel undertakings. 
When  the  ECSC  was  established,  the coal  and steel sector was  in 
difficulties:  its structures were  out  of date,  markets  were 
dwindling  and  redevelopment was  necessary.  The  revival of the  iron 
and steel  industry can be  largely attributed to the efforts of  the 
ECSC.  In  the coal  industry  the  aim of  the  ECSC  has been  simply  to 
ensure  that the progressive running-down  of production  and  the 
closure of  a  large  number  of mines  is  achieved without social 
repercussions.  This  work  is still going  on,  but is being  increasingly 
reconsidered  in the  face  of  the threatening energy shortage. 
Investment aid 
Under  the  terms  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  the Commission  of  the  European 
Communities has  been  promoting  investment  programmes  by  granting 
loans  to undertakings  or by  guaranteeing  other  loans  which  they may 
contract.  The  purpose  of  these  investments  is  to help  increase 
production,  reduce  production costs  or  facilitate  the marketing of 
products. 
Since  1958  the  ECSC  has  been  able  to contribute to the conversion 
of undertakings  or  the creation of new  jobs  when  undertakings  arc 
forced  to close  down. 
Sec  also Addenda  to Chapter III, Regional  Aid 
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intended  for  coal  and steel workers.  Grants  arc also made  for  the 
modernisation  of existing housing.  112,455  dwellings had been 
completed  by  the  end  of  1972. 
Here,  aid  from  the  ECSC  is used  mainly  to offset reductions  in 
wages,  to cover  the costs  of vocational retraining,  to help workers 
to resettle and  to provide  an  income  for  those  who  are waiting 
to be re-employed. 
To  finance  all these  operations,  the  ECSC  floats  loans  on  the 
national  and  international money  markets.  The  total  sum  made 
available  through  ECSC  loans  from  the beginning of its financial 
operations  in  1954  to the  end  of  1973  amounted  to  £625  million. 
In  1973,  13  loans  were  made,  to  a  total  of  £103  million.  Some 
operations  arc  financed  from  the Community's  own  resources  (levies 
on  coal  and  steel production). 
3.  The  effect of  membership  for  the United  Kingdom 
(a)  The  United  Kingdom being  the major  coal producing country of the 
nine  Member  States,  its accession to  the coal and steel community 
has  presented substantial opportunities to the British coal  industry. 
Generally,  membership  enables  the country to play its part in urging 
a  European  energy policy based  on  the  optimum use  of  indigenous 
resources. 
In  1972,  British coal production  exceeded  100 million tons,  out 
of which  about  two  and  a  half million tons  used  to be exported  to 
Community countries. 
These  exports  did not  increase during  the first year after accession, 
but the  future  development  of  the Community  energy policy would 
seem  to provide opportunities  for  the  export of British coal  to 
other  Member  States,  whose  total demand  for  imported coal in  the 
last years has  been  about  30  million  tons  a  year. 
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workers  it is not yet  possible  to  make  an  estimate of the 
effects of the  first year  of accession.  The  figures  are  to 
be  based  on  an  examination  of the coal  industry and this 
examinotion  has  not  yet been  made. 
The  Commission  has  so  far  given  its approval  to  the  granting 
of  a  low  interest rate  loan  in order  to  finance  part of  the 
programme  for  the  building  of housing  intended  for  British 
steel  and  coal workers. 
This loan  of  about £1.6 million at 1%  for  five_ years will be 
granted to  the  National  Coal  Board  for  the partial  financing 
of modernization  work  to be carried out  on  about  6,000 houses. 
However,  provisions  arc being prepared  for  a  Community 
contribution  towards  the  longstanding British  scheme  of <wsi-
stance  for  redundant  or  redeployed coal  miners. 
This  arranqement  is  similar to  that by  which  the  Commission  is 
already paying  out  £3 million  over  five  years  to alleviate the 
effects  on  workers  of the  reorganisation of the  British steel 
industry. 
A  comprehensive  system of social aids  for  workers  in  the coal-
ming  industry who  have  been  made  redundant  or  transferred has 
been  in  operation  in  the United  Kingdom  for  a  number  of years. 
The  Community  arrangement will  make  it possible  for  the  Commis-
sion to reimburse to  the United  Kingdom  government  and  the Natio-
nal  Coal  floard  part of  the cost of this  system. 
'l'hus  the  Commission  will  be  able  to contribute to  the  aids 
which  arc  given  to workers  in  the  United Kingdom coal  industry 
such  as: 
- wage  guarantees  for  redundant  industrial workers  over  55 
years  of age  and  new  industrial workers  who  retire early 
due  to redundancy at or  over  50; 
- earnings  supplements  for  employees  who  are  required to trans-
fer  to  lower  paid  jobs; 
- lump  sum  payments  to redundant  employees  aged  40  years  and 
over  (the .community  contribution will be hi';lf  the  amount 
with  a  maximum  of  750 u.a. (£313)): 
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allowances  during vocational  training as well  as  the cost of 
the  training itself. 
It is proposed  to conclude  an  agreement  for  a  trial period of  3 
years  on  this basis.  The  services of the  European  Commission 
will work  out with  the  representatives  of the United Kingdom 
government  the  arrangements  for  implementing  the  agreement. 
Jn  ordt't'  :c.: ·lticvP  it~;  nllicctivcs- the croation of conditions  for 
the  <'nl;ll>linllmenL  and  qrowlh  ol  nnelcar  industries- F.URJ\TOM  nooks  to 
promote  '1nd  coordinate  nuclear  research  and  to s·.tpplement national 
research with  a  Community  programme.  The  aims  of the  Euratom Treaty 
are as  follows: 
- to  promote  and  co-ordinate nuclear  research  for  peaceful purposes 
and  to  complet:tent  this national research with  a  Community  programme 
of research  and  training; 
- to ensure  lhe  dissemination  of technical  information; 
- to  establish uniform health safety standards; 
- to  facilitate capital  investment; 
- to ensure  that all users  in  the  Community  receive  a  regular  and 
equitable  supply of ores  and  nuclear  fuel. 
The  Community  research programme 
The  main  activities of the  EURATOM  h~been based  on  plurannual 
research  programmes.  The  guidelines  for  the  first  five-year  programme 
were  included  in an  annex  to  the  treaty and were carried out mainly as 
foreseen.  This  has  not occurred m the case of the  second  five-year pro-
gramme  which  was  reduced,  mainly  for  economic  reasons. 
This  reduction reflected conflicts of interests between the  Member 
States with  the effect that  EURATOM  based its activities  on  one-year 
programmes  from  1967-1973. 
By  the  early 1970's  the  Six had  spent about  £160  million on nuclear 
research at the  Community Joint Research Centre  an·'l  some  £32  million 
on  research contracts  awarded  to  state undertakings  or private  firms. 
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the  Community. 
Some  months  after UK  accession,  the third major  Community  research 
programme  was  launched,  with  a  budget of approximately £100 million 
over  a  four-year  period covering both nuclear  and non-nuclear work. 
This  programme  is in  two  parts:  a  common  programme  of activities of 
interest  to all  Member  States and  financed  from  Community  funds,  and 
a  comp  1  cm(~D  t:u ry  proqrummc,  to which  Member  Sta  tcs can  make  financial 
contributions  in  proportion  to their interest in  the  research projects 
which  it embraces.  Some  projects  ('direct'  projects)  are conducted by 
the  Community,  while  others  ('indirect'  projects)  arc contracted out 
to national  research  institutions. 
The  common  programme  includes direct projects  on  the handling and dis-
posal  of radioactive wastes,  research  in plutonium,  hydrogen  produc-
tion,  reactor  safety,  applied data processing,  the  Central  Bureau  for 
Nuclear  Measurements,  and  environmental  protection. 
As  regards  the  indirect projects,  those contracted out to national 
institutions,  the  most  important  are  projects  on  fusion  and  plasma 
physics,  the  Dragon  agreement  and  environmental  protection  (pollution). 
Other activities 
Besides  the· multi-year  research  programme,  EURATOM  is gathering  infor-
mation  on  nuclear  developments  in  the  Member  States and  passing  on 
this information  to would-be  users  in the  Community  under  exclusive 
licence or  other  arrangements. 
EURATOM  has  evolved extensive  safety standards  in order to  safeguard 
workers  and  the general  public  from  dangers  arising  from  accidental 
exposure  to nuclear  radiation,  etc.  The  Joint  Research  Centre  is 
studying  the  problems  of radioactive waste disposal. 
The  Treaty  provides  that undertakings which  are  of  fundamental  impor-
tance  to the  development  of nuclear  industry  may  be  given  the special 
status of  'joint undertakings'.  This  means  that the undertaking  may 
receive  fiscal  or other privileges or  may  even  be  financed  directly 
by  the  Community.  A  few  undertakings  - mostly nuclear  power  stations 
of advanced  design  - have  been  granted this status. 
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safeguards over  nuclear materials. 
As  part of Community  planning  for  the  security of long-term energy 
supplies,  EURATOM  has  for  a  number  of years  been  studying the  pro-
blems  of supplies of enriched uranium,  which  is the basic  fuel  in 
most  existing or  planned  commercial  reactors.  At  present  the  USA 
has  a  virtual  monopoly  of supply,  and  recently a  report was  drawn 
up which  recommended  the  establishment  of a  European  enrichment 
capacity using  two  different methods  - the  'ultra-centrifuge'  pro-
cess,  being  developed  in cooperation  by  the  British,  Germans  and 
Dutch  (URENCO)  and  the  gaseous  diffusion method,  promoted by  the 
French-led consortium,  Eurodif.  This  proposal,  recently adopted by 
the  Council,  is  a  vital part of Community  long-term energy planning. 
The  effect of membership  for  United  Kingdom 
compared  to the  Member  States' total budgets  for  nuclear  research  the 
EURATOM  budget  is of modest  size.  Before  enlargement  the  Community 
budget  for  nuclear  research  only  amounted  to about 
States'  total  activity in  this  field. 
6%  of the Member 
•rho  preponderance  ol  nation<1l  research has  been  increns£Jd  by  tho 
accession of  the  UK  in so  far  as  British nuclear research activity 
roughly  corresponds  to the total nuclear research expenditure of the Six. 
Even  though  EURATOM  activities are based  on  relatively limited 
financial  resources,  the  research carried out within  this  framework 
is a  vital part of the  long-term energy planning  for  Europe.  For  exam-
ple,  the  hydrogen  research carried out at the  Joint  Research  Center 
might  in  some  30  years  change  the  energy situation. 
To  assessthe effect  for  a  member  state after  one  year  of accession 
is hardly possible taking into account  the  long-term character of 
the measures.  The  approval  of the  new  four-year  programme  was  a  major 
achievement  during  the  first year  of  membership and  for  the  United 
Kingdom with its highly developed  nuclear  industry it is of impor-
tance  to have  been  involved  in this European  long-term energy  planning 
and  to have  taken  part in  the  exchange  of nuclear  information between 
the Member  States. 
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rect actions'  have  so  far  been  contracted  to  the  United Kingdom,  it 
seems  that in the  corning  years  these activities will connect  the 
United  Kingdom  even closer with  Euratom  research. 
C.  EEC 
First guidelines 
In  December,  1968,  the  Commission  produced  a  memorandum  to  the Coun-
cil entitled "First guidelines  for  a  Community  energy policy".  In 
this comprehensive  document  for  the  first  time  proposals  for  a  common 
energy policy were  spelled out  in  their entirety.  The  aims  were  to 
provide reasonable  and  steady prices  and  to accomplish  a  diversi-
fication of supplies  in order  to ensure security of supplies.  It 
was  argued  that  the  policy  should be based on  the interests of the 
consumer,  since  increases  in  energy prices affected the competitive-
ness  of industry and hence  the cost of  living.  The  Commission  paper 
was  broadly based  on  the  same  ideas  as the British White  Paper  on 
Fuel  Policy  from  1967.  Among  its major  recommendations  were  a  common 
oil  supply  programme  aimed  at adequately diversified  sources of im-
portation.  Distortion within  the  Community  should be  removed  by  the 
free  movement  of  supplies  and  the  elimination of barriers  due  to the 
activities of  the  Governments  of Member  States or  technical obstacles. 
The  need  to harmonize  taxes  in  the  energy  sector was  stressed,  as 
well  as  the  need  for  Community  aid  in  reorganizing the coal  industry. 
Developments  before accession 
The  document called for  periodic  forecasts  of demand  for  each  energy 
source,  stockpiling of oil supplies  as  a  buffer  in the event of cri-
ses  and  application of the Treaty's rules  of competition  in  the 
energy sector.  This  last proposal  was  based  on  the  fact that the oil 
industry is dominated by  a  few  large companies.  On  the basis of this 
Commission  memorandum,  the  Community  took  the first steps  towards  a 
common  energy policy before enlargement. 
In  the  field  of Community  supplies  policy,  the  main  requirement  of 
which  is that the  Community  should possess  an  overall  view of the 
supply situation,  some  progress  was  made  in  1972.  On  18th  May,  the 
Council  adopted  a  regulation requiring  information  to be  given to 
the  Commission  on  imports  of hydrocarbons.  This  regulation  made it 
possible  for  the  Commission  to  follow  developments  in  the  Member 
states at all times  and to produ~e proposals  when  the situation 
required. 
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Commission  of  investment  projects  in  the oil,  natural gas  and elec-
tricity sectors.  This  has  enabled  the  Commission  to have  a  general 
view of planned  investments  in  the  energy  sector as  a  whole,  notifi-
cation of  investments  in  the coal  and  atomic  energy  sectors being 
already  provided  for  under  the  ECSC  and  EURATOM  Treaties. 
As  regards  the  security of supplies,  measures  were  taken  as  ea~ly as 
1968  in  the  form  of  a  directive  requiring  the  Member  States to main-
tain a  minimum  level  of oil stocks equivalent to  65  days'  consump-
tion.  This  directive \'las  later amended  to raise  the  required levels 
of  stocks  to  90  clays'  consumption,  with effect  from  1st January,  1975. 
/\H  ra1·  <t::  111<'  l:<lJ!I!no.u.._!_~l:U:~!·UY..!I_I_<~r.ls.~~  .lH  concerned,  a  cHrectivc has been 
passed  on  the  right  of  establi~1ment and  freedom  to provide  services 
within  the  fields  of extraction of minerals,  mineral  oil and  natural 
gas. 
Developments  after accession 
Developments  in  the  energy  policy sector after the  enlargement  of the 
Community  fell  under  the  shadow of the oil crisis of the  past months. 
However,  in  May  1973  the  Council held an  exhaustive discussion  on 
energy  problems  on  the basis  of  two  communications  from  the  Commission 
concerning the  problems  and  resources  of energy policy for  the period 
1975-1985  and  necessary  progress  in  the  common  energy  policy sector, 
together with  a  memorandum  of April  1973  on  guidelines  and urgent 
measures  in  the  common  energy  policy sector. 
This  memorandum  indicated guidelines  for  relations between  energy 
importing and  exporting countries,  as well  as  the  organization  of 
the  Community  market  in oil and  provided  major  guidelines  for  atomic 
energy  policy,  coal policy,  natural gas  policy and  environmental 
factors. 
/\t  its meeting,  the  Council  supported the Commission's  guidelines 
in principle  and  requested precise proposals before  the  end  of the 
year. 
The  Council  also dealt with  important  sectoral  problems.  It agreed 
on  a  Council  Directive  on  measures  to mitigate.the effects of diffi-
culties  in  the  supply of crude oil and  petroleum products,  in pur-
suance  of which  the  Member  States must  provide  themselves  by  30th 
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counteract difficulties arising  from  the  shortage  of oil supplies. 
A  special consultation procedure is provided  for  in order  to ensure 
the coordination of measures  taken when  difficulties actually arise. 
The  Council  also agreed  on  a  Regulation  in  support  of Community  pro-
jects.  Under  this regulation,  which  came  into  force  on  14th November, 
1973,  the  Community will be  able  to grant  support  for  the  pursuit 
of  "Community  Projects"  directly connected with  prospecting,  produc-
ing,  storing  ancl  transporting hydrocarbons  and  which arc of  fundamen-
tal  importance  in ensuring  supplies.  Support  can  take  the  form  of 
minor  participation by  the  Community  in  the  financing  of projects 
by granting  loan  guarantees,  loans  or  subsidies  repayable  under  spe-
cial conditions.  The  Community  budget  for  1975  makes  provision  for  an 
amount  of  .£10  million  to be  allocated within  the  framework  of this 
regulation. 
The  oil crisis  showed  the difficulties  for  the  nine  Member  States  in 
achieving  Community  energy policy measures. 
At  an  e·arly stage of the crisis - RS  well  us  bcfor0. it - the Commission 
submitted  to the Council  proposnls which  could have mitigated its 
effects. 
The  problems  of the crisis were  on  the agenda  of the  Copenhagen  Sum-
mit  (December  1973)  which  asked  for  proposals  for  cooperative solu-
tions  of the  problems  involved. 
The  European  Parliament  has  often  - most  recently at its plenary 
sessions of July and December 1974  - passed  important  resolutions  on 
the  necessity  for  real progress  in  the  energy policy. 
What  has  so  far  been  decided by  the  Council after the crisis is the 
drawing  up  of  energy balance  sheets covering all key  features  of 
the  Community  energy  situation and  the setting up  of an  Energy  Com-
mittee with·a threefold task.  It is to ensure  the coordinated appli-
cation by the  Member  States of the  measures  adopted by  the  Community; 
it is to organize  information  and  mutual  consultation of the Member 
States and  the  Commission  on all the conditions under  which  the  Com-
munity's  energy  requirements are  covered and  on  foreseeable  changes; 
lastly it is to assist the  Commission  to work  out  the  proposals.  The 
Committee  consists of representatives  of the  Member  States and  is 
chaired by  a  member  of the  Commission. 
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bruary 1974,in which  13  oil consumer  countries  participated,  was  a 
major  achievement after the crisis.  The  Member  States  - apart  from 
France  - agreed  to  take  part  in  the work  of a  coordinating group to 
direct and  to coordinate  the  development  of  future  actions  such  as 
the  conservation  of energy and restraint of demand,  a  system of allo-
cating oil supplies  in  times  of  emergency  and  severe  shortages,  the 
acceleration of development  of additional energy  sources,  so  as  to 
diversify energy  supplies  and  the acceleration of energy  research. 
With  respect  to monetary  and  economic  questions,  it was  decided  to 
give  impetus  to  the work  being undertaken  in  the  IMF,  the World  Bank 
and  the  OECD  on  the  economic  and  monetary  consequences  of  the current 
energy situation,  in particular to deal with balance of payments  dis-
equilibria.  1\mong  other  things,  the  role of international oil compa-
nies  was  to be  examined  in detail. 
The  energy crisis revealed the  full  extent  of the vulnerability of 
the  Community's  energy  supply  system.  During the crisis itself 
there was  scant cause  for  optimism about  the  chances  of taking 
joint action  in the  energy  sector. 
On  the  other hand,  taking  a  longer  view,  this pressure  from  outside 
may  have brought  home  more  clearly the need  to coordinate energy 
policy  - both within the  Community  and  in a  broader  international 
context. 
'l'hun,  in  S<'pl(~mlwt~  l<J7tl,  tlw  Counc.i..l  approved  the  principles  set 
out  in  the  Commission'[;  communication  proposing  new  longer-term 
objectives  for  an  energy  policy.  In  that  document  'Towards  a  new 
energy  policy strategy for  the  European  Community'  the  Commission 
seeks  an  energy  policy that applies  the  lessons  learned  from  the 
energy crisis. 
It proposes  the  implementation  of  a  rationalization policy designed 
to reduce  consumption  in  1985  by  10%  in relation to the amount  ini-
tially estimated. 
In the  same  period it estimates that  the  Community's  dependence  for 
energy  on  outside  sources  - especially oil  - must  be  limited to 40% 
in  1985  as  compared with  63% at present. 
1\  number  of measures  must be  taken  for  the  achievement  of these  ob-
jectives by  1985. 
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tained at its present  level. 
Natural gas will have  to  account  for  a  far  larger  share of energy 
supplies:  25%  in  1985  as  compared  with  about  2%  at present. 
Finally it is assumed  that the  n~clear power  capacity of the  Member 
States will be  expanded  so  as  to  be  able  to  supply  about  17% cf 
energy requirements  by  1985,  and  that approximately half the elec-
tricity requirements will be  met  by nuclear plant. 
Looking  ahead,  the  Commission  also  sets out objectives for the  struc-
ture  of energy  supplies at the  end  of the  century. 
These  objectives arc  based mainly on  nuclear energy,  which,  it esti-
mates,  will satisfy at least  5~/o of energy requirements  by  about  the 
year  2000,  and  on  gas,  which will meet  almost  a  third of requirements. 
As will have  been  seen  from  the  above,  the  Community's  energy policy 
is still in the  initial stages.  Compared  with  the principles and  ob-
jectives set by the  Commission  - and  often  supported  by  the  European 
Parliament- the  Council's actual decisions have  so  far  been rather 
sporadic. 
Ultimately,  if the principles,  suggestions  and  ideas  contained  in  the 
series of proposals  from  the  Commission  to the  Council  arc  taken as  a 
whole  the  following  broad outline  for  a  possible  future  Community 
energy policy emerges: 
(a)  The  primary objective of a  Community  energy policy is to  safeguard 
continuous  supplies under  satisfactory conditions. 
This is to be  achieved  by: 
- bringing to  completion the  common  market  in  the  energy  sector; 
- measures  by  the  Member  States coordinated at Community  level 
(concerted measures)  or measures  by  the  Community  institutions; 
- treaties and  cooperation  witl1  third  countries. 
(b)  Achievement  of  the  common  market  in energy requires  in particular: 
- the  abolition of non-tariff  (especially technical)  barriers to 
trade; 
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energy  sources. 
(c)  Measures  for  safeguarding supplies  must cover: 
- information  on  the  Community's  energy needs  and  supply levels; 
- development  of common  supply  programmes; 
- a  policy on  stockpiling; 
- a  policy on  consumption  in  the  event  of shortages; 
- a  diversification of supply  sources  (including the development 
of new  sources); 
- development  of domestic  energy  sources; 
- development  of procedures  for  improving utilization and  for  sav-
ing  energy. 
(d)  The  cooperation of enterprises  in  safeguarding  supplies can be  ob-
tained through: 
- information,  guidance,  illustrative programmes; 
- promoting  suitable investment by means  of financial aid and 
other measures; 
-the foundation  of  "Community undertakings"; 
- instructions and  controls; 
- cooperation  between  the  authorities and  undertakings  in  the  ener-
gy  field. 
(e)  The  safeguarding of continuous  supplies under  satisfactory conditions 
must  be  facilitated at international  level by: 
- trade and  cooperation  agreements  with  supplying countries; 
- cooperation with  the  most  important consumer countries. 
The  implications of membership  for  the  UK 
In assessing  the effect  in  the  energy  sector of  UK  membership  of the 
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affect the British policy on  North  Sea  oil. 
In  a  report to  Parliament by  the  Secretary of State  for  Energy,  in 
May  1974,  it is said that the  forecasts  of future oil 
production must  be  subject to considerable uncertainty,  since 
so much  exploration remains  to be  done,  but that the  success  of 
1973  may  mean  there is a  good  chance  that  in  1980  Britain can 
produce oil equivalent  to her  demand.  What  are  the  implications 
of  EEC  membership? 
Firstly,  it is clear that the  fact that the  UK  is a  Member  State 
of the  Community  docs  not  influence her rights of  ownership of 
the  North  Sea  oil deposits. 
According  to Article  222  of the  EEC  Treaty,  the Treaty shall  in 
no way  prejudice the rules  in  Member  States governing  the  system 
of property ownership.  In addition,  the  protocols to the  Treaty 
clearly specify the  sovereign rights enjoyed by  Member  States  over 
economic  activities  on  the  Continental Shelf,  and  in particular 
over the  exploitation and  exploration of oil resources.  It follows 
that  these natural resources belong entirely to the  Member  States 
concerned,  which  may  therefore derive  the  full  economic  advantages 
from  them  (for  example,  dues,  taxation and balance  of  payments 
benefits).  It is of course  the case that  in the exploitation of 
these  resources,  account  must  be  given to the various  provisions 
of the Treaty which  apply to different aspects  of  industrial and 
commercial activity,  particularly those  governing the  principles  of 
freedom  of movement  of goods  and  of establishment,  although  these 
rules  do  not  diminish the benefits to the  Member  States concerned 
already referred to.  The  Treaty does  not  exclude the possible 
nationalization by  a  Member  State of any  sector  of economic  activity, 
although nationalized industries  arc of course also subject to the 
provisions  of the Trcatyl). 
The  question  then arises as  to whether  the  UK  - insofar as  the 
forecast  that Britain can  produce  oil equivalent to her  demand  in 
1980  proves correct  - will have  any  interest in  a  Community  policy 
for  this sector. 
l)  See  the Commission's  answer  to Written Question  No.  489/73  by 
Lord  O'Hagan,  OJ  No.  C  49/3,  24.4.1974 
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by  the  Secretary of State where it is stated that  'the prospects 
raise  the question  of how  the supplies can best be  used  over  time. 
It is said that although  the  advantages  from  production at any 
level would  confer  enormous  benefits and  last for  a  considerable 
time,  they will not last forever,  and it is  therefore especially 
important  to make  the best possible  use  of  them.' 
According  to expert estimates  the best possible use  of North  Sea 
oil will not be  achieved by  sole dependence  on  it.  The  UK,  like 
other countries,  needs  both heavy crude oil  (e.g.  for power  stations) 
and  light crude oil  (for refined products). 
The  North  Sea  deposits consist of light crude,  and the most 
economically viable  form  of exploitation would be  to  use it 
exclusively  for  the manufacture  of  refined petroleum products,  which 
implies  exports  of light crude  to balance  imports  of heavy crude. 
This  situation must certainly be  taken  into account  in assessing 
the  UK's  interest in  a  Community  oil policy. 
A  possible future  implication  for  the  UK  in this connection  is that 
the Council's  Regulation of November  1973  concerning support for 
Community  projects  in  the hydrocarbon sector will  enable the  UK 
to obtain  support  for  projects which are  important  for  the 
Community's  hydrocarbon  supplies  - including,  therefore,  the 
extraction  of  North  Sea  oil. 
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1.  Situation in  the  Community before  the  accession of the  new  Member 
States 
Article  74  of the  EEC  Treaty  commits  the  Member  States of the 
Community  to  establish a  common  transport policy.  Articles  75-84 
of  the  same  Treaty,  Article  70  of the  ECSC  Treaty  and Article  10  of 
the  Convention  on  the  transitional provisions  to the  ECSC  Treaty 
lay  down  a  series of provisions  concerning questions of transport 
policy which  do  not,  however,  collectively constitute the  common 
transport policy. 
The  common  transport policy is  therefore  to  be  created by  the 
Member  Slaten w.ithin  thP  frumework  of  the  Conmlllnity  institutions. 
I1owev1~r,  becau:JC  of mujor  fundamental  differences  on  the  general 
strategy of  the  transport policy and  its most  important basic decisions, 
the  Member  States were  unable,  until the  end of 1972,  to establish a 
coherent  common  transport policy.  The  new  Member  States which  joined 
on  1  January  1973  were  thus  only  required  to adopt  a  few  isolated 
regulations  in  the  area of  transpor~ policy,  which are  summari~ed 
briefly below. 
Of  greatest importance  for  the  transport policy sectox,  however, 
is the  fact  that its general orientation has  only recently been  laid 
down  in  the  'Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  on  the 
development  of  the  conm1on  transport policy'  of 24  October  1973,  nnd 
t·.hat  tlw  1ww  Mc~mbi~r  SLaLc~:l  w.i  11  comH)(lllcntly  l.Jc  able  to  influence,  on 
an  entirely equal  footing  with  the  Six,  its future  development. 
The  individual measures  in  force  on  31  December  1972  were  as 
follows: 
(a)  In the  framework  of  the  ECSC  Treaty: 
Abolition of tariff discrimination based on  country of origin 
or destination. 
- Partial abolition of support tariffs in internal transport. 
- Application of direct international rail tariffs  (abolition of 
border-to-border tariffs) • 
- Publication  (or notification to  the  Commission)  of tariff rates 
for  rail and  road  carriage. 
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Abolition of tariff discrimination based  on  country of origin or 
destination. 
- Liberalisation of road  transport,  including transport by light goods 
vehicle,  in border areas. 
- Consu]btion  procedure  covering all national transport legislation 
and  infrastructure investments  of European  significance. 
- Expr~rimental introduction of  a  Community  quota  for  the  carriage of 
goods  by  road. 
Experimental  introduction of a  bracket tariff system  for  the  carriage 
of goods  by  road. 
Hurmonisation  of  certain social provisions  in  road  transport 
including the  introduction of  a  recording device. 
- Harmonisation of permissible  fuel quantities  in vehicle  tanks  in 
international transport. 
- Harmonimtion of rules  governing  compulsory third-party insurance  in 
road  trunsport  and  abolition of border  checks  of  the  'green  curd'. 
- Certain  rules  governing  international bus  transport. 
- Harmonisation of  legislation on  the  responsibilities of transport 
undertakings  as  a  public service,  on  aids  to  transport undertakings 
and  on  the  stn.ndardisation of railway accounts. 
- Harmonisation  of  u  large  number  of differing technical regulations 
governing  the  construction of motor  vehicles,  not yet,  however,  the 
most  important:  maximum permissible dimensions  and weights. 
- Review  and  continuing assessment  of the  costs  of transport infra-
structures,  not yet,  however,  the  introduction of  a  system of 
charging  for  the  use  of these  infrastructures or  the  harmoni~ation 
of specific transport  taxes. 
Many  of  the  above  measures  adopted  by  the  Six  included  long  transitional 
periods,  so  that,  by  1972,  the effects of  Community  legislation in 
these  cases  had still not become  apparent  in the Six,  experience had 
not been  gathered  and  an  assessment of  the  success of the measures  is 
not yet possible. 
2.  Position and  development  in  1973/74  in  the  light of the  accession of 
the  new  Member  States 
The  provisions  in  the  transport sector which  the  new  Member  States 
automatically adopted  on  signing  the Treaty of Accession  do  not  for  the 
most part conflict with the  transport policies already being pursued in 
these  countries.  Transitional periods  for  the  introduction of 
Community measures  were  laid down  '"here  necessary  to enable  legislative 
and  other measures  of adjustment to be  adopted. 
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by  the  individual measures  already adopted  and  certainly by  the 
'Communication  to  the  Council'  of  24  October  1973,  come  closer to  the 
ideas of the  governments  of the  new  Member  States  than  to  tho  ideas 
prevailing  among  certain of  the  old Member  States.  The  new  Member 
States will have  an  equal  chance  to make  their voices  heard  in the  further 
development  of  the  common  transport policy.  In  1973  two  problems  gained 
more  attention than  their  importance  actually  justifies,  as  a  reault 
of  the  haphazard discussion on  the various  individual Commission 
proposals which  had hitherto characteri·:ed  the  development of the 
common  transport policy. 
The  first question  concerns  the  Community quotas  for  the  internat-
ional  carriage of goods  by  road.  The  United  Kingdom  demanded  a  greater 
share  of  the  Community  quota  than  the old Member  States were  at first 
prepared to grant.  However,  this  system was  introduced on  an 
experimental basis  and would  in any  case  increase  the  opportunities 
for  international  road transport,  since  the  Community  quota would  be 
applied  alongside  existing bilateral quotas.  Moreover,  tho  Commission 
has  already proposed  lliUL  Lhc  Communi.ty  quota  be  enlarged  and 
bilateral quotas  gradually absorbed  into  the  Community  quota.  The 
continual  enlargement of the  quota will kad to  a  position in which 
the  international carriage  of  goods  by  road  becomes,  for all practical 
purposes,  free  of quota  restrictions  - that is,  when  the  quota  becomes 
larger  than  the  demand  for  licences. 
The  other problem which  accidentally gained prominence  in  1973 
as  a  result of  the  'policy of  small steps'  which had been  followed 
until  1972  concernedthe  maximum weight  and  dimensions  of goods  vehicles. 
This  problem is of great significance both  for  the  motor  vehicle 
industry and  for  road  construction plans.  The  old  Member  States,  how-
ever,  have  already agreed on  a  maximum  axle weight  of  11  tons,  whereas 
initially,  in  1958,  some  countries were  proposing  8  tons,  and  others 
13  tons.  The  United  Kingdom  is proposing  a  figure  of  10  tons.  The 
difference still to be  resolved  amounts  to  only  1  ton.  Obviously,  as 
regards  road building and  general  environmental  nuisance  on  the  other 
hand,  and  the  technical rationalisation of transport on  the  other,  the 
difference  between  8  and  13  tons  (almost  two-thirds  more)  is very 
significant.  However,  the  difference of  1  ton  cannot be  considered of 
such  importance  as  to  considerably outweigh  the  advantages  of  a  rapid 
decision  for  the  development  of  the  transport policy and  for  the motor 
industry's  plans  over  the  possible disadvantages  to  the  environment 
Wich  would  tc  caused by  up  to  10 per  cent  larger vehicles.  It is  in 
the  interests of  the  United  Kingdom  as  a  motor  vehicle producer that 
a  decision  be  reached  as  soon  as  possible. 
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and  capacities  remain  to be  taken,  and,  with  the  discussion of  the 
'Communic~tion from  the  Commission'  of  24  October  1973,  the  Community 
is  actually  just beginning with  the  development  of  ito  tr~nsport 
policy. 
The  effects of existing unrelated  Community  mc~sures in  the 
transport sector  on  the  tr~nsport situation  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  on  the  latter's international transport  ~ctivities  c~nnot as 
yet be  statistically demonstrated,  partly because  statistics  for 
1973/74 arc not yet  avail~blc,  but partly also because  no  effects  can 
yet be  expected,  since  many  of the  provisions  have  yet to enter into 
force. 
3.  Prospects  for  the  futuro 
Sincu  Llw  United  lUngdom,  like  Dcnmarlz  o.nd  Ireland,  occupies  a 
relatively peripheral or  uncentro.l  geographical position relative to 
the  main  industrial centres  of continental western  Europe,  its access 
to  the  continental  m~rkct is dependent not only  on  developments  in 
tariff policies,  but  also  on  developments  in  the  field of transportation 
techniques  and  costs.  Clearly,  the  United  Kingdom  (like  the  other  new 
Member  States)  would  be  less able  than  the  continental  countries  to 
benefit  from  a  simple  free  tr~de  ~rca,  since  its exports  to  and  its 
imports  from  the  continent arc  subject  1:o  higher  transport costs 
than  is  trade  among  the  continental industrial  countries  themselves. 
(Italy,  in this  respect,  is obviously  in  a  similar position  to  the 
United  Kingdom)  . 
The  United  Kingdom  must  therefore•  hilve  the  gn~atest interest in  the 
achievement  of  a  common  transport policy.  Every  step  towards  harmonisat-
ion  and  l.iberal.isation  - that is,  an  all-round simplification  - of 
traffic between  the  Member  States results  in  an  over-proportional 
trude  advantage  in  the  form  of  cost relief for  the  United  Kingdom. 
Even  if the  United  Kingdom  should  find itself forced,  in  the  course  of 
the harmonisation  of  the  trunsport policies of the  Member  States,  to 
compromise  and  adopt  ccrtuin meusures  which  do  not  correspond  to its 
existing political intentions,  the  effects of  the  coJT>mon  trunsport 
policy must  nevertheless work  out purticularly strongly to its 
advantage.  The  question of  Community  finance  in  the  transport sector 
docs  not arise,  since  no  common  Fund or other measures  requiring 
joint finance  arc  envisaged.  What  is possible is the  j.oint  financing, 
through  the  European  Investment  Bank  or  the planned Regional  Development 
Fund,  of certain transport-related construction projects.  vn1cthcr, 
moreover,  Community  funds  will be  made  available  for  a  joint programme 
to  finance  transport infrastructure  - e.g.  closing gaps  in internal 
Community border  areas  - cannot at present be  foreseen.  As  far  as  can 
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and  from  the  'Communication'  of  24  October  1973,  the national budgets  of 
the  Member  States will enjoy  considerable relief as  a  result of the 
common  transport policy,  since  one  of its major  aims  is  the  creation of 
profitable railways  and,  in  the  framework  of the  charges  system  for  the 
use  of transport infrastructures,  the  Member  States'  road building 
budgets  should also  be  balanced by  revenue  from  transport users. 
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Regional  Aid 
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(Referred to  in the Sections  on  "Social Policy",  "Regional Policy" 
and  "Energy  Policy"  in Chapter III) 
(a)  Loans  to Undertakings 
Article  54  of the  ECSC  Treaty provides  that:-
"The  High  Authority may  facilitate the  carrying out  of  investment  pro-
grammes  by granting loans  to undertakings  or  by guaranteeing other 
loans  which  they may contract 
(i)  Under  these  provisions,  the  National  Coal  Board has  obtained:-
1.  A  loan  of  £3.5  million at  a  special rate  of  interest  of 
8  1/2')(,  for  the  Borden  and  Blackhall Colliery,  Durham,  agreed 
on  4th  June. 
2.  A  loan of  £18 million to  improve  the  Coal  Board's  pool  of 
movable  equipment  (£10  million of which  is to be  paid at 
the  end  of July) . 
3.  A  loan of  £1.6 million to aid in the rehabilitation of old 
miners'  houses  at  a  nominal  rate  of interest  (1%)  for  25 
years.  (About  6,000 houses  are  involved.) 
4.  Loans  amounting to  £14  million  for  four  collerics to improve 
tho  qu~lity of  steam  coal  and  coking capacity.  (These  have 
not  yet  finally been  approved.) 
The  above  loans  total over  £35  million. 
(ii)  The  Steel  Industry in Britain is also benefiting from  loans 
under Article  54.  Several  disbursements  arc  pending including 
£25.8 million for  two  projects at Scunthorpe  for  coke  ovens,  a 
part of  which  loan will  be  at  a  special rate  of interest of 
approximately  6%,  and  another project aimed at reducing pollu-
tion  for  which  the  Community  is providing a  loan of £1.2  million. 
Altogether,  loans  to the  British Coal  and  Steel  Industries  under Article 
54  have  amounted  to approximately  £72  million.  In addition,  there  are 
other applications  for  loans  being considered,  and the overall  total 
is  roughly £120 million. 
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Article  56  of  the  ECSC  Treaty provides  that where  redundancies  occur  on  a 
large scale  because  of the  introduction of  new  technical  processes  or 
changed market  conditions,  grants  may  be  made  "for the  creation of  new  and 
economically sound activities capable  of re-absorbing redundant  workers 
into productive  employment." 
and,  also,  for:-
"(a)  the  payment  of  ticlcover  allowances  to workers 
(lJ)  t·hf'  po~yment.  of  ,·csf'lllemPnl  <tllowances  to workers 
(c)  the  financing  of vocation<tl  retraining for  workers  having to 
change  their  employment." 
These  provisions  have  been  supplemented by Conventions  which  empower  the 
Commission  to contribute to grants  made  by national  Governments. 
Already over  £1  million have  been  allocated this  year  to the British Steel 
Corporation in grants  for  steelworkers  made  redundant. As  theaforc~~nt6oncd 
Conventions  provide  that  grants  may  be  paid retrospectively to 1st January, 
1973,  workers  who  have  been  made  redundant  since that  date will  be  eligible 
for  grants. 
Under  Article  56,  in addition to grants,  loans  may  also be  made,  and the 
British Steel Corporation plant at Ravenscraig is to receive  a  loan of 
£14.8 million,  of which  £3  million will  be  at  a  subsidized rate of 
interest. 
As  regards  the  British Coal  Industry,  applications  for  grants  under Article 
56  have,  for  various  reasons,  been  somewhat  slow in being submitted,  but 
it is believed that  several  are currently being considered. 
(c)  Research  Grants 
Article  55  of the  ECSC  Treaty provides  for  the  Community to make  grants 
for  technical  and  economic  research,  both to promote  production and 
increased usc  of coal  and  steel and  research into occupational  safety in 
the  industries. 
For  Britain,  the  figures  for  grants  received  to-date  ure  os  follows:-
COAL 
1973 
'l'cchnic<tl  Hesearch 
£375,000 
1974  (estimates)  £800,000 
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Safety <tnd  Health 
£130,000 
£286,000 
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- Reseilrch  into respiratory diseases  at  Edinburgh 
Univ<'l"s i ty  (1.:400,000); 
- Development  of  a  "triggered barrier''  for  the  suppression 
and  prevention of spontaneous  combustion. 
STEEL 
1973 
Technical  Research 
£450,000 
£600,000  1974  (estimate) 
(d)  Grants  following  Industrial Disasters 
The  following  are  examples  of grants  made  by the  Community recently to help 
victims  of disasters  occurring in British industry:-
- Seafield Colliery,  Kirkaldy 
- Lofthouse Colliery,  Yorkshire 
- Flixborough Chemical  Plant 
£2,000 
£3,000 
£23,000 
(e)  European  Investment  Bank  Loans 
The  European  Investment  Bank  was  established under Article  129  of the 
EEC  Treaty by  a  Protocol  to that Treaty.  Its capital is  fixed at 
2,025,000,000 units  of  account  and it makes  loans  for  investment  projects 
"to the  extent that  funds  are  not available  from  other sources  on 
1  reasonable  terms" 
The  following  arc  examples  of  loans  made  to British industries:-
1 
1.  £14.7  million to the  British Steel Corporation,  Teeside 
2.  £14.7  million to British Steel Corporation,  Llanwern 
3.  £3.5  million to the  Industrial  and Commercial  Finance  Corporation 
(ICFC)  to assist small  and medium-size enterprises 
4.  £10 million to finance  the building of an electric power  station 
at Peterhead. 
Article  18  (1)  of the Statute of the  Bank 
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PE  37.464/rev. SECTION  I  - TRADE 
1.  Introduction 
(a)  General 
Britain's accession  to  the  EEC  will affect her  trade  in many 
ways.  She  is now  one  of nine  countries  whose  aim  is not only to  remove 
the  obvious  trade barriers between  one  another,  such  as  quotas  and tariffs, 
but to facilitate  the  free  movement  of goods  within the  Community  by 
standardizing  the  legal position in regard  to  such matters  as  valuation 
of goods  for  customs  purposes,  rules of origin and warehousing.  Eventually 
it is hoped  that the  abolition of anomalies  and  differences  in national 
rules will remove  most,  if not all,  of the  irritants with which  exporters 
and  importers  are beset when  trading  with  a  foreign country.  Moreover, 
cooperation  and  rationalization between  industries within the  Community 
will be  encouraged,  thus  enabling  them  to strengthen their competitiveness 
in markets  outside  the  Community.  It is reasonable  to  assume  that the 
increase  in Britain's trade with her  eight partners between  1972  and  1974 
will continue  to grow  as  trade barriers  come  down  and Britain integrates 
more  fully with  the  Community.  This  is likely to result in the diversion 
of  some  trade  away  from  Britain's traditional trading  partne~towards the 
Community. 
Britain's  trading position with regard to countries outside  the 
Community will be  changed  in  so  far  as  she will gradually apply  a  common 
external tariff agreed  to by  the  Community.  Britain's movement  towards 
this tariff will  plny  some  part  in c1iscournging  imports  from  some  third 
counl!"it'n  which  fornH'rly  h<Hl  ~q>('l'Lll  tr<1clin9  r•'lations with  the  UI<. 
The  chu.nges  in  UK  trade with various  trading areas  are  shown 
in the  table below. 
- 1  - PE  37.464/I/rev. Table  Imports  (percentage  of world  total) 
Exports 
[ 1970  UNITED  KINGDOM  TRADE- 1971  1972  1973 
RELATIVE  SHARES  BY  AREA 
EEC  partners  Imp.  27.0  29.7  31.6  32.8 
Exp.  29.2  29.0  30.1  32.4 
Commonwealth  Imp.  23.9  22.3  19.3  17.5 
Exp.  2]  0  ()  21.9  lfl.C)  16.6 
EFTA  Imp.  12.6  13.0  14.5  15.0 
Exp.  13.2  12.6  13.8  14.0 
USA  Imp.  13.0  11.1  10.5  10.2 
Exp.  11.6  11.7  12.4  12.2 
Soviet Eastern  Imp.  3.9  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Europe 
Exp.  3.2  2.7  2.8  2.6 
The  movements  tow~rds trade with  the  Community  and  away  from  trade 
with  some  third countries  should  produce  a  noticeable  change  in Britain's 
trade patterns.  Her  trade with the  Community  is examined  first 
document.  The  study is  then  confined  to the  Commonwealth 
in this 
(particularly countries  in Asia),  EFTA,  Mediterranean  third countries  and 
Comecon countries.  In the first two  cases Britain had  special relations 
with the  countries concerned before  accession and in the  second  two  cases 
the  Community  is attempting  to  frame  a  broad trading policy towards  them. 
Britain's first move  towards  the adoption of the  Community's 
common  external tariff or,  in  some  cases,  its generalized  system of 
preferences  took  place  on  1  January  1974.  It is  too  soon,  therefore,  to 
draw  any  general  conclusions  as  to the effect of this  move  alone  on 
external  trade,  as  the  change  has  only been  in operation  for  a  little more 
than  twelve  months. 
A  final  point is that Britain's bargaining position in 
international negotiations has been considerably strengthened since  joining 
the  EEC  as  she  is  now  a  member  of  one  of the most  powerful  trading groups  in 
the world.  The  Community  when  acting  on behalf of its members  carries 
considerably more  weight  than  any  individual  partner could,  acting alone. 
- 2  - PE  37.464/I/rev. (b)  External  trade 
Article  113  of  the  Treaty provides  that  the  common  commercial 
policy shall be based  on  uniform principles,  particularly in regard to 
changes  in tariff,  the conclusion of tariff and  trade  agreements,  the 
achievement  of uniformity  in measures  of liberalization,  export policy and 
measures  to protect trade  such  as  those  to be  taken  in case of dumping  or 
subsidies. 
Article  114  provides  that  ngreemcnts  with third countries which 
li0 within  thn  conm1on  commc'rcial  rolicy nrc  to be  concluded by the Council 
on  behalf of  tlw  Conununily. 
Moreover,  since 1961  each  Member  State is obliged to keep  the 
Commission  informed of any bilateral negotiations it may  have  with  a  third 
country,  or of any  steps it may  take  to  liberalize trade. 
Trade  relations mainly  encompass  the  negotiation and conclusion, 
on  a  bi- or multilateral basis,  of tariff and  trade  agreements  with  third 
countries;  they  also refer,  as  the  case  may  be,  to the  autonomous  management 
of the  EEC  external mechanisms  of commercial  policy as  well  as  to the 
administration of trade  issues  in  the  framework  of an  international 
orqani?.ation. 
Since  its estublishment  the  EEC  has  developed  an  extensive  network 
of bilateral trade  agreements  with over  40  countries. 
Moreover,  the  EEC  institutions have  taken  steps  to harmonize  the 
trade regulations of  Member  Stutes  vis-<1-vis  third countries  in  such matters 
as  import  und  export restrictions,  export credit and  insurance.  They have 
also,  when  applicable regulated autonomously  the  EEC  import rules vis-a-vis 
some  third countries:  for  example,  they have  granted unilateral  and 
generalized preferences  to  developjnc:r  countries  and  hove  laid down  the basis 
for  an  autonomou~; conm1on  conunercial  policy vi!3-a-vis  third countries  that 
have  no  official relations with  the  Community  institutions  (i.e.  most 
state-trading countries). 
Lastly,  the  common  commercial  policy has  included studies, 
discussions  and  negotiations  on  various  trade matters within  the  framework 
of  international  economic  organizations  such  as  the  UN/ECE,  OECD,  UNCTAD,  etc. 
The  EEC  participated in the earliest GATT  multilateral  trade 
negotiations,  the Dillon  Round,  under  which  tariff cuts of about  10%  were 
- 3  - PE  37.464/I/rcv. made.  It sub<;equently  took  part  in  the  Kennedy  Round  negotiations  v1hich 
led  to effective tariff reductions  of between  36  and  39%.  The  result was 
that during  the  1960's  the  Community's  customs barriers were  lowered by 
nearly  SO%  and  the  Community  has  emerged with  the  lowest and most homogeneous 
tariff of all the major  industrialized countries. 
The  EEC  is at present participating in the  Nixon  Round 
negotiations  which  commenced  in  September  1973  in Tokyo.  The  main 
objectives of these  negotiations  are  (i)  to consolidate  and  to continue 
the  liberalization of international  trade and  (ii)  to  improve. the 
opportunities  for  developing countries  to participate in the  expansion of 
world  trade. 
In  the  present negotiations  the  Commission  acts  on behalf of the 
EEC.  By  joining  the  Community  the  UK  is part of a  group which,  since it 
accounts  for  about  30% of world  trade,  exerts considerable  influence  on 
GATT  negotiations. 
In  December  1969  the  Council  adopted  a  series of uniform rules 
applicable  to  the conclusion of  trade agreements  with third countries.  In 
principle since January  1970  such  agreements  can only be  negotiated and 
concluded - in  accordance with  the  above  mentioned rules  - by  the  EEC 
institutions. 
These  various  measures  were  designed  to harmonize  the  instruments 
of commercial  policy  in  the  hands  of  Member  States  and  to lead  to  a  fixed 
common  policy operated directly by  the  Community.  Member  States realized, 
however,  that such  a  situation could  involve  a  loss  of their  powers  and 
their  approach  to  ;my  chonCJO.  was  vc'ry  c<tutious.  Consequently,  they have 
regarded  the  common  comnwrcial  policy laid down  by  the  Community  as  being 
confined to mattcrrt explicitly covered by Article  113  of  the  Treaty. 
Member  States have  sought  to circumvent  the provisions  of Article 
113  by entering into bilateral cooperation  agreements  with third countries 
which  arc broader  in  scope  i1nd  have  wider  political connotations.  They  can 
generally be  divided  into  technical  and  economic  and  industrial agreements. 
Their  aim  is to  establish and  develop  industrial cooperation  in  the 
furtherance of  trade  in such  fields,  for  example,  as  the  joint development 
of  new  production processes,  joint marketing  and  joint production of spare 
parts. 
In July  1974  the  Council  of  t-li nio.ters  Zlpproved  the  establishment 
of an  information  anc]  t'nrwul Lat ion  prcn'<'clur•·  o11  hi lal:<'t'<tl  coopcrotion 
- 4  - PE  37.464/I/rev. agreements.  It will  apply,  inter alia,  to national  agreements  with state-
trading countries  and  with oil producing countries. 
This  procedure will ensure  that  the  Commission  is kept  informed 
of cooperation agreements  entered  into by  Member  States  and  that it has 
an  opportunity of consulting  Member  States  in regard  to  them. 
1\qt"f'<'lll<'lll ::  ;1tt·c·.tdy  <'<liH'1 ll!l<'d  lly  Hc•mb.•t·  ~ll~il tt'll  l>Pfort'  tlH'  nntry 
into  force  of  this  proccdurl'  wi 11  b<•  conununicnted  to  the  Commins ion. 
2.  UK-EEC  Trade 
Between  the  establishment of the  European  Community  in 1958  and 
the  year  1973  the  value of  intra-Community  trade  increased ten  fold,  that 
is,  more  than  twice  as  fast  as  that of world  trade as  a  whole.  The  stimulus 
given  to  trade between  the  Six took  place gradually and its full effect was 
felt only after the  removal  of quotas  and  customs  duties  and  the  introduction 
of more  integrated  trade  flows. 
The  accession of  the  UK  gave  a  fillip to  a  trend  towards  increasing 
trade with  the  Six which  had  started long  beforehand as  the  following  table 
shows. 
(Source: 
UK  trade with  the  Six  Overseas  Trade  Statistics of  the  UK) 
Value  in  f  million 
1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  19'71  1972  1973  1974 
Exports  to  the  980  1046  1044  1296  1530  1753  1926  2231  3074  4260 
Six  (fob) 
rmpor tfl  from  t·]H•  !)<)'}  1104  17G4  1 'l':i7  1609  1 82 2  2106  2726  4189  6336 
Six  (c if) 
~-----
Note:  (l)  'rhcsc  export  nnd  import  figures  are  not  precisely comparable because 
the  import  figures  include  inf;urance,  freight  and  other  charges 
(accounting  for  roughly  10  per cent of  the  values  stated)  and  the 
export  figures  do  not. 
(2)  After  1967,  the  figures  reflect the  effects of  the devalu2tion of 
sterling. 
Entry  into  the  European  Community  opened  up  considerable 
opportunities  for  UK  exporters.  'rhe  other eight members  of  the  Community 
comprise  a  market  which  in  1973  represented one-third of total  world  imports. 
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customers  of the  UK  and  Germany  takes  more  UK  exports  than any  other single 
country except  the  US. 
Over  the  past  two  years  UK-EEC  Trade  has  grown  faster  than that with 
the rest of  the world.  If the  previous  experience of  intra-Community  trade 
is repeated,  UK  trade with  the  Community  should be  further accelerated during 
the  coming years. 
Nevertheless  the  UK  trade balance with  the original  Six  EEC  Members 
and  with  the  rest of  the world  over  the  past  four  years  gives  scant comfort. 
Trilde  with  IrPlilnd  and  D"nmark  has  b0en  excluded  from  th0  table as 
relationships between  tlwm  and  the  Ul\  cHd  not  change  as  a  result of 
membership.  Trade  arrangements  under  the  Anglo-Irish  Free  •rrade  Agreement 
continued  to operate  during  the  transitional  period  and  Denmark  as  a  former 
member  of  EFTA  largely preserved her  pre-accession trading relationships 
with  the  UK. 
The  UK's  balance of  trade with  the  Six deteriorated between  1969 
and  1974  as  follows: 
The  SiX 
Rest  of World 
1969 
£.m 
1970 
f:m 
1971 
£m 
1972 
£m 
1973 
£m 
------ -----·---·--·-----------------
7<J  69  - 180  - 495  -1115 
-1006  - 976  - 460  - 897  -2284 
1974 
£m 
-2076 
-4407 
Direct action on  the  external balance  is regulated by  the  GATT 
(General  ~greement on Tariffs  and  Trade)  which  the  UK  signed  soon after  the 
war.  This  ~greement is  fundamental  to her  position as  a  trading nation and 
is quite  separate  from  the  EEC.  In effect it inhibits  the unilateral 
introduction of quotas  or tariff changes  and  delimits very precisely the 
opportunitie>s  opr•n  to nations  in bolanc0  of  pilymcnts  difficulties to  take 
corrr•ctivt>  t~clion ill  t llt'  <'XP<'mH'  ol·  t ll<'ir  t:racli.ng  partnrrs. 
There  were  special  reasons  not  connected with  Community membership 
for  the  deterioration in the  UK  trading position.  Between  1972  and  1973  the 
greater  portion of  the  adverse  trade balance  can  be  ascribed  to  a 
deterioration in the  UK's  terms  of trade between  these  two  years  following 
an  increase  in world  commodity  prices  and  the depreciation of sterling. 
In  the  short term  such  a  depreciation tends  to reduce  the  value of exports 
and  increase  the  value  of  imports,  thereby causing  a  deterioration of the 
- 6  - PE  37.464/I/rev. balance.  'l'here  is also  a  delay before  the  increased price competit.iveness 
of  exports  leads  to  the  increase  in export deliveries  needed  to redress  this 
b<:~lnnce. 
There  was  also  a  boom  in  demand  for  consumer  goods  which could  not 
be  satisfied by  UK  manufacturers  and  the  gap  was  filled by  imports  from 
Europe. 
The  demand  for  consumer  goods  and  the prices of many  primary 
products  cased  in  1974 but  the  continuing  increase  in oil prices  and 
depreciation of sterling still influenced  the  UK's  trading position. 
Between  1973  and  1974  increases  in  the price of oil  added  nearly 
£150m  to  the  UK  trade deficit with  the  Six.  If this  factor  is  ignored most 
of the deterioration occurred  in only  four  significant sectors.  These  are 
agricultural  products,  cereals,  chemicals  and  iron and steel. 
The  adverse  trade balance  for  food  and  live animals  rose  from 
£291m  in  1973  to  £687m  in  1974.  This  partly reflects  a  fall back  from  the 
earlier situation where  the  UK  was  exporting  large quantities of beef to the 
Six  to  take  advantage  of  the comparatively high  prices  then available  in that 
market.  Titis  aspect  is dealt with  more  fully  in  the  section of  the  study 
relating  to Agriculture.  A  further  reason  was  that  UK  importers  switched 
to  the  Community  for  some  agricultural  products  such as  sugar  and wheat 
at  a  time  when  world  prices were  higher  than  Community  prices. 
For  example  in  1972  wheat  imports  from  the  US  accounted  for  199~ 
of  total wheat  imports  while  imports  from  the  EEC  were  25%.  By  1973  the 
corresponding  percontages  were  14%  from  the  US  and  40%  from  the  EEC. 
Although  the  UK  thus  bought her  imports  of cereals  and  sugar more  cheaply 
in  Europe  than  anywhere  else  in  the world  the effect was  to increase  the 
deficit with  the  ~~EC  the  diminish it with  the  rest of  the world. 
'l'he  UK  1tas  be('!l  a  traditional  importer  of butter  and  cheese. 
Between  1973  and  1974  the  deficit in imports  of dairy products,  principally 
butter  and  cheese,  from  the  Six  increased by  about  £100m.  This  was  due  in 
part to  the  switching of sources  of supply of butter to Europe. 
Britain benefited  from  an especially favourable  price  for  purchases  of this 
product  from  the  Community.  The  difference between  the  Community  price  and 
the  price guaranteed  to  the  UK  producer  was  covered by accession compensatory 
amounts.  It was  to the  advantage  of the  UK  to  seek  supplies within  the 
Community  when  the  price of  New  Zealand butter on  the  London  market  rose  and 
exceeded  the  price guaranteed  to  the  British producer. 
- 7  - PE  37.464/I/rev. The  deficit in chemicals  is almost wholly accounted  for  by plastics. 
I~re the  increase  in  the deficit rose  from  £79m  in  1973  to over  £~·om in 
1974.  This  was  due  to  a  world  shortage  of plastics aggravated  in the  UK 
by plant breakdowns.  Manufacturers  finding  supplies  limited in the  UK  turned 
to Europe  as  the  most  convenient alternative source. 
In  1974  the  deficit in  trade  in iron and steel rose by  over  £200m. 
The  Dritish Steel Corporation,  because of strikes  and  technical  problems, 
war;  unable  to satisfy even  home  demand  and  exports  consequently suffered. 
Despite  the high  proportion of normal  productio~ a~hiev;;d in all 
industries  during  the  period of the  three-day week  there  can be little 
doubt  that export orders  were  irretrievably lost over  this period. 
Following entry,  customs  duties between  the  UK  and  the  Six have 
so  far been  progressively reduced  as  follows: 
1  April  1973 
1  Jan. 
1  Jan. 
1974 
1975 
Reduction  % 
20 
20 
20 
Cumulative  Reduction  % 
20 
40 
60 
It could be  argued  that the  lowering  of tariff barriers was  to 
the  disadvantage  of  a  country such  as  the  UK  which had  an adverse  trade 
l.JnlnncP  for  sonu•  years  b0for0  joining  the  Community  and  th<lt  as  a 
consequence  tlH'  incrt·<t~>t•d  11tlvt~r~;c•  tratle balance  was  due  to  the  simple  fact  of 
accession.  nut  this would  l.Je  to  ignore  the  fact  that the  lowering  of 
customs  l.Jarriers  had  a  minimal  effect compared with that  produced by 
increasing  inflation,  the  marked  depreciation of the  pound  in relation to 
other currencies  and  the  spectacular rise in  the  price of commodities. 
It should be  rt>mcmbered  that  the  Community  is proportionately more 
important  as  an  export market  to  the  UK  than  the  UK  market  is to  the 
Community.  Nearly  a  third of  UK  exports  go  to  the  Common  Market  whereas 
exports by  the other eight member  States  to  the  UK  represent  less  than  10% 
of their  total exports.  rt is  the  UK's  interest to ensure  continued access 
to  thi!>,  tlw  world's  larqest  importer  nnd  a  market  which  is right on her 
tl0ot·st <'P· 
'l'lw  t't>mmunity  nim:;  not  only  <tl  rt·c•t•  ll"dd<•  bt•lw<'<'ll  mc•ml>c•r  1il;"tlt'll 
but also  nt  fair  competition.  The  EEC  is  thus  taking  nteps  to  iron out  non-
tariff l.Jarriers  to  trade  and difficulties  and  anomalies  which hinder  the 
normal  flow  of  trade between  member  countries  ~rising from  differences 
relating to  such matters  as  banking  and  insurance,  company  law  and  road 
transport,  to  name  a  few. 
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towards  standardization and  simplification of  procedure  and regulations 
in these  fields  and  the  important point is that the  UK  has  representation 
at every  level in the  Community  counsels where her  views  can be  put forward 
forcefully and effectively. 
Outside  the  EEC  Britain would  have  no  hand  in shaping  policy in 
these matters.  Yet  she  could  not  ignore  standardized rules  and  procedure 
laid down  by  such  a  powerful  ~rading group on her  own  doorstep.  The  UK 
would  have  the  option of accepting  a  fait accompli  and  adapting her  own 
procedure  to  that of the  Community  or putting  obstacles  in the 
way  of her  trade with  the  EEC.  In  trading matters  a  dominant group usually 
holds  the  whip  hand  in dealing with  a  relatively small  neighbour. 
To  sum  up,  it is  too  soon yet to assess  the  value  of  UK  membership 
to her  trade.  The  adverse  UK  trading position since accession ill dE  mainly to 
internal  and  external  factors  which  have  no  direct bearing on her membership. 
1973  and  1974  were  exceptional years  and  a  proper  assessment of  UK-EEC  trade 
can  only be made  over  a  longer  period when  trade has  settled down  and 
assumed  a  normal  pattern. 
3.  Relations  with  sonw  countrie~; 
(a)  EFTA 
EFTA  was  established in 1960  to enable European countries which 
were  not  members  of the  EEC  to develop their mutual  trade  in industrial 
goods.  The  seven  members  of EFTA  (Austria,  Great Britain,  Denmark,  Norway, 
Sweden,  Switzerland and  Portugal)  set out to establish an  industrial free 
trade area  in which  the members  would  dismantle  the barriers  to trade in 
industrial goods  among  themselves but maintain  their  own  tariffs  and  their 
own  independent commercial  policies  towards  the  rest of the world.  Finland 
became  an  associate member  in  1961  and  Iceland  joined  in  1970  as  a  full 
member.  To  this  end  tariffs and  quotas  between member  states were 
progressively reduced until they were  largely abolished by  1967. 
EFTA  failed to create  a  single agricultural area.  Consequently, 
industrial members  reaped greater benefits  from it than agriculturally 
orientated members  such as  Denmark. 
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EEC,  negotiation~;  took  place with  the  other  EF'l'A  members  in order  tu seek 
a  solution to  the  problems  with  whih  they  would  be  faced  following 
enlargement  of the  Community. 
On  22  ,July  1972,  t'xaclly six month;;  after  the  signat.un!  of  the 
Act  of  Accession  to  the  EEC  by  the  ilppliC"ant  countries,  the  Conununity 
concluded  negotiations  with  five  remaining  member  countries of EFTA 
(Austri<l,  Iceland,  Portugal,  Sweden  and  Switzerland)  and  with  Finlu.nd,  an 
associate member.  After  the  negative result of  the  Norwegian  referendum 
of  September  197  2,  Norway  u.pplied  to  negotiu.te  u.n  agreement  as  she  W<W  still 
a  member  of  EFTA. 
The  agreements  of  22  July  1972  mu.intaim'd  the  free  trade  areu. 
already established within  EFTA  and  extended it gradually to  trade between 
the  enlarged  Community  and  the countries  remaining  in EFTA.  'l'hL:  W<-ls  done 
by  reducing tariffs between  EFTA  and  the  Cotrununi ty at the  satn('  ro.tcc  <ts 
reductions  were  made  between  old  and  new  members  of  tl1e  Co~~unity. 
'I'his  free  trade area relates mainly  to  industrial  good,;  and with 
some  limited exceptions  does  not  cover  agriculture. 
With  the exception of marginal  changes  of  no  great  importance,  the 
tariff position governing  trade between  Uw  UK  and  EFTA  remain  unchanged 
at present.  consequently,  any  changes  in  trade between  the  UK  and  EFTA 
could not  br;  •\ttributcd  to tariff diff(,rcnces  <Jri~;ing  from  mc•mbcr~;hip of 
the  EEC. 
At  prc~;ent  UK-EFTA  trade  is  less  than half  that with tlw  Cormnunity. 
(b)  Trade  with Mediterranean  Countric~ 
At  the  time  of Britain's  acces~>ion to  the  EEC,  the  Conununity  hud 
concluded  agreements  of association v:ith Greece,  Turkey,  Tunisia,  Morocco, 
Malta  and  Cyprus  and  trade  agreements  with  Israel,  Spain,  Yugoslavia, 
Egypt  and  Lebanon. 
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by  the  Community  of  a  common  policy covering wider  aspects of relations 
with Mediterranean third countries  including both the  liberalization of 
trade  and  cooperation  in development.  This  arises  in part  from  the 
necessity to reconcile  defence  of the  interests of European agricultural 
producers  with  the pursuit of  a  policy of agreements  with Mediterranean 
countries primarily exporting competing  agricultural  products.  There  were 
also difficulties relating to financial  assistance  and  the  social aspect. 
In July  1974  the  Council  approved  the text of the  EEC 
Mediterranean policy  to be  submitted to the Mediterranean countries. 
Article  108 of the Act  of Accession  to the  EEC  provided that the 
new  Member  States  apply  the provisions of agreements  with  Greece,  Turkey, 
Tunisia,  Morocco,  Israel,  Spain  and  Malta  taking  into account  any 
transitional measures  set out  in adjusting protocols  to  the  agreements. 
These  transitional measures  were  designed to ensure  the 
progressive  application by the  Community of  a  common  trade  regime  governing 
its relations with co-contracting third countries  in the Mediterranean 
region.  Such  protocols have  been  concluded 'Vlith  Morocco,  Tunisia,  Egypt, 
Cyprus,  Turkey  and  Lebanon. 
Mediterranean  trade  is of considerable  importance  to  the original 
Six Members  of the  Community  who  arc  the  main  suppliers  and  the  main 
customers  of Mediterranean countries.  British trade  in this  area does  not 
have  the  same  relative  importance.  Indeed her  trade with the  Republic of 
Ireland is almost as  great as  her  trade with all the Mediterranean third 
countries with which  the  EEC  has  a~soc~at~on  t  d  - ~  ~  or  ra  e  agreements  (see  Tables 
I  and II attached)·  Israel  and  Spain  account  for  about half Britain's trade 
in this  area. 
The  position  in regard  to purticular Mediterranean countries is 
set out  in the  following  paragraphs. 
Greece 
Shortly after the  EEC  was  established an  association agreement 
under  Article  238  of the  Treaty was  concluded.  Th'  ~s  agreement  involved 
development  and  financial  assistance with  a  view to  the  establishment of a 
customs  union  and possible ultimate accession to  the  EEC. 
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with Greece  h<:w  bc•c•n  'frozen'  ;:mel  ib>  11pplication  h;:w  lJPt'n  limited to routine 
administration  such as  th0  reduction of  customs  duties,  fixing  of 
equalization duties,  etc. 
Following  the  change  of Government  in Greece  in July 1974  steps 
to reactivate  the association arc  at present being examined.  In the  absence 
of  a  protocol of adjustment with Greece,  the  UK  took  no  action on 
1  January  1974  to  increase tariffs to third country levels. 
Turkey 
In  1964  an  association agreement was  concluded with Turkey.  This 
agreement  provided  for  financial  aid and tariff reductions with  a  view to 
establishing  a  customs  union  and  ultimate  accession to the  EEC.  1  January 
1973  marked  the beginning of  the  transitional stage  (expected  to last for 
twelve  yean;). 
A  :;upplt'mcnLary protocol Hi9nc'd  in  197 3  extended association to 
the  new  M~mber States,  and  provided  for  transitional measures  (to  lapse 
by  19J7  at the  latest).  In  the  industrial sector  the  UK  agreed  to grant 
Turkish  imports  duty  free  entry  from  January  1974 with  a  few  exceptions. 
It will not be  possible  to  introduce  concessions  in Turkey's 
favour  in regard to certain products until negotiations  under  the  Community's 
overall Mediterranean  policy have  been concluded. 
Tunisia,  Morocco  and  Algeria 
In  1969  asnociation  ugrecmcnts  with  Morocco  and  Tunisia  were 
concluded by the  Community.  These  agreements,  which  arc at present being 
renegotiated,  are  confined  to  trade matters  and  envisage  the  establishment 
of  a  free  trade  area. 
Since  the  independence  of Algeria  in  1962,  trade preferences 
granted by  some  Member  States  to Algerian products have  no  formal  legal 
basis. 
The  conclusion of an  agreement with this country is at present 
being negotiated  in conjunction with  the  agreements  with Morocco  and  Tunisia. 
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Community's  Generalized  System of  Preferences by  imposing  40% of the 
preferential rate on  imports  from  these countries. 
Malta  and  Cyprus 
Association agreements  with  these  countries  are purely commercial 
and  envisage  the establishment of  a  customs  union.  In the case of Malta, 
in the  absence  of any adjustment ofthe  agreement  following  enlargement of 
the  Community,  the  UK  imposed  40%  of the preferential rate of the generalized 
system of preferences  on  1  January 1974. 
A  supplementary protocol  to  take  account of  the  enlargement of the 
Community  was  signed with Cyprus,  under  which it maintains  the  Commonwealth 
regime.  Tariff changes  are  not  contemplated before  1977. 
Spain  and  Israel 
Preferential agreements  with both countries  came  into effect in 
1970.  These  agreements  envisage  the ultimate  establishment of  a  free  trade 
area.  In regard to  these  countries  the  UK  took  no  action on  1  January  1974 
to  increase tariffs to  third country levels,  although  protocols  of 
adjustment  had not been concluded.  On  the  conclusion of  such protocols,  the 
UK  would  move  to preferential rates;  consequently the  rules governing  trade 
with Spain  and  Israel,  Britain's  two  most  important trade partners  in the 
Mediterranean remain  unchanged. 
Egypt  and  Lebanon 
Preferential  trade  agreements  with  these  countries were  concluded 
in 1972.  These  agreements  foresee  an ultimate  free  trade area.  Supplementary 
adjustment  protocols  relating to  EEC  enlargement are  in operation in regard 
to both countries.  Consequently  the  UK  moved  towards  the  imposition of the 
Community's  generalized  system of preferences  by  imposing  40% of the 
preferential rate  on  1  January  1974. 
Yugoslavia 
A  non-preferential  agreement between  the  enlarged  Community  and 
Yugoslavia  was  signed  in  1973.  This  agreement  applies equally to  the  UK 
and  the rest of  the  EEC.  It did  not  change  the  rules governing  trade. 
- 13  - PE  37.464/I/rev. Changes  in trade between  the  UK  and  the Mediterranean countries, 
as  shown  in the attached table,  do  not result  from  tariff changes  following 
Britain's accession,  as  any  such  changes  were  only  introduced on 
1  January  1974. 
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TADLE  I 
UNITED  KINGDOM'S  EXTERNAL  TMDE  HITH  MEDITERRANEl\N  COUNTRIES 
Value  of  Imports  (c.i.f.) 
£  million 
1970  1971  1972  1973 
Greece  19.6  16.1  17.3  46.8 
Turkey  15.6  15.0  16.9  33.9 
Morocco  16.2  15.6  16.1  23.1 
Tunisia  2.49  2.0  2.35  3. 5( 
Algeria  21.2  17.0  22.9  45.7 
Malta  5.8  7.3  9.5  11.2 
Cyprus  20.4  22.8  21.7  28.6 
Israel  44.9  53.7  57.2  69.9 
Spain, Canary  125.6  149.0  163.2  203.9 
Islands and 
Spanish portls 
in North 
Africa 
Value  of Exports  (f.o.b.) 
I 
1970  1971 
I 
57.3  72.0 
35.9  38.6 
12.6  12.8 
4.31  4.81 
16.8  27.8 
I 
25.7  23.0 
26.1  29.1 
96.1  117 .o 
143.2  16BA 
£  million 
-
1972  1.973 
r--1 
I 
67.61  99.2 
60.1 ! 81.8 
13.3 j  16.2 
6.Ei  7.55 
33.8  37.9 
20.3  25.1 
32.7 '  40.4 
134.6  187.2 
200.5  199.3 
10.Yugoslavia  21.7  18.4  22.1  24.5  45.5  62.0  43.0 I 56.2 
11.Arab  10.8  15.8  12.6  23.7  18.5  20.2  18.4  27.1 
Republic  of 
Egypt 
8.011  12.Lcbanon  3.12  3.87  6.50  22.99  26.23  35.3j  41.96 
TOTALS:  307.41  336.57  368.35  522.87 lso5.oo  601.94  665.80,819.91 
(for  comparison  sec  Table  II below) 
TABLE  II 
UNITED  KINGDOM'S  EXTERNAL  TRADE  HITII  THE  REPUDLIC  OF  IRELAND 
Value  of Imports  (c.i.f.)  Value  of Exportr;  (f.o.b.) 
£  million 
1970  1971  1972  1973  i  1970  197~  L..'?.:E  197=2_ 
I 
l 
Irish  341.4  507.2  444.8  526.6  381.1  501.2  469.3  625.7 
Republic 
l 
Source:  DEPARTMEN'r  OF  TMDE  AND  INDUSTRY,  LONDON 
- J-5  - PE  37.464/I/rcv. (c)  COMECON 
The  significance of the  development of economic  relations with 
Eastern European  Countries  was  recognized shortly after the  EEC  was  set up. 
Since  then  Hember  States have  entered into  a  number  of bilateral trade 
agreements  with  State  trading countries  in Eastern Europe. 
Since  1  January  1973  under  the  Treaty provisions  for  a  common 
tr<tde  policy,  trade  agreements  can  no  longer be  concluded by  individual 
Member  States with  State-trading countries.  Existing bilateral agreements 
expire at the  end of  1974  unless  they are  expressly extended with  the  full 
knowledge  of  the  Community  authorities. 
The  refusal  of Communist  countries  to recognize  the  Community  is 
a  major  obstacle  to  the  conclusion of  agreements  between  the  Community  and 
such  countries  as  envisaged  in Article  113.  The  fact that as  from 
1  January  197 3  t·1ember  States  were  no  longer  free  to cone lude  new  trade 
agreements with state-trading countr ics  hccs  contributed to  a  proliferation 
of  cooperation  agreements  with  such countries. 
The  United  Kingdom  concluded  a  number  of bilateral trade 
agreements  with East European countries  in 1972.  These  agreements  expire 
at the  end  of  1974  with  the  exception of  two  agreements  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Bulgaria which will  remain  in operation until the  end of 1975. 
These  agreements  have  no effect on  the  common  commercial  policy of the 
Community.  A  table  showing  the  value  of trade between  the  UK  and Eastern 
European  countries  is  sc•t  out below.  It should be  remembered  that the 
cxtl'nt  of  r;nch  lT;)<k  j  :o  v0ry  ::nwll,  bc'i ng  1 c:w  lhnn  4'){,  of  UK  imports  and 
less  than  3%  of  UK  exports. 
UNI'rED  KINGDOM'S  EXTERNAL  TRADE  WITH  SOVIET  UNION  AND  EASTERN  EUROPE 
Value  of  Imports  (c.i.f.)  Value  of Exports  (f.o.b.) 
f.  million  £  million 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1970  1971  1972  ).973  --
SOVIET  UNION  I  AND  EASTERN  354.3  343.5  396.2  549.9  259.1  253.1  275.6 
I 
323.3 
EUROPEl  I 
SOURCE:  DEPARTHENT  OF  TRADE  AND  INDUSTRY,  LONDON. 
1This  group  of countries comprises  Soviet  Union,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Poland,  East  G2rmany,  (incl.  East Berlin),  IIungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Albania, 
Bulgaria  and  Rumania. 
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beyond  the  scope  of  the  present study.  In general,  however,  it may be  said 
that agricultural  imports  into the  UK  from  Eastern Europe  have  been hit by 
Britain's entry into the  Common  Market. 
(d)  Commonwealth  General 
The  erosion of Britain's  Commonwealth  preferences did not commence 
with her entry into the  EEC.  After  the  establishment of  EFTA,  industrial 
trade within that group was  conducted  on  terms  at least as  favourable  as 
those  for  British imports  from  the  Commonwealth  (and  more  so  for  textiles). 
The  Kennedy  Round  of tariff reductions  agreed  under  the  aegis  of GATT 
reduced  the  most  favoured  nation duties  and  hence  the benefits of 
Commonwealth  preferences  on  many  products.  Finally,  the  introduction in 
Britain in 1972  of  a  Generalized  System of Preferences  extended duty-free 
entry to all manufactured goods,  with  some  exceptions  relating to textiles, 
footwear  and  processed agricultural goods,  imported  from  all developing 
countries.  The  main class of  goods  on  which  substantial  Commonwealth 
preferences  remained after  1  January  1972  was  agricultural  processed  and 
semi  manufactured goods  not  included  in the G.S.P. 
To  illustrate the  shift in trade it should be  noted that in 1970 
the  Commonwealth  accounted  for  around  22%  of  UK  trade while  the  EEC  accounted 
for  about  28%.  By  1973  the  Commonwealth's  share had  fallen  to  17% while 
Britain's trade  with  the  EEC  was  double  that with  the  Commonwealth. 
Since  1  January  1974  the Community's  Generalized  Scheme  of 
Preferences has  been  adopted by  the  UK.  It differs  from  Britain's original 
G.S.P.  in that it covers  only  a  limited range  of processed agricultural 
goods,  since complete  coverage  would  conflict with  the  requirements  of the 
common  agricultural policy or  to  an  unacceptable  degree  dilute the  rights 
of the  Community's  associated countries under  the  association convention. 
On  the other  hand,  the  Community's  G.S.P.  docs  provide duty-free  quotas  for 
a  wide  range  of yarns,  fabrics,  made-ups,  carpets  and  footwear,  which were 
not  included  in the  UK  scheme. 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  laid down  in the Treaty of 
Accession or  attached thereto,  the countries which  enjoyed  Commonwealth 
preferences  in the  UK  market may be  grouped  into three categories: 
(a)  20  developing countries  in Africa,  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  Pacific  Ocean 
and  the  Caribbean; 
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Malaysin  and  Singapore) ;  and 
(c)  the  developed countries  of  the  Commonwealth  such  as Canada. Australia 
and  New  Zealand. 
Under  protocol  22  of the Treaty of Accession,  the  countries  in 
category  (a)  were  offered the option either of participating in a  new 
convention of association governing relations between  the  Community  and  the 
Associated African  and  Malagasy  States,  or of concluding other arrangements 
(special  convention or trade  agreements)  with  the  Community.  All of  them 
chose  the  first option  and have  just completed negotations  on  a  new 
convention of Association  (for  further details  see  Section II - Relations 
with different developing countries  and  regions). 
Increased commodity  prices have  shifted the  terms  of trade  in 
favour  of the  primary products  of  the  developed  Commonwealth countries to 
a  degree  that could not have  been  foreseen  when  Britain negotiated her 
original  terms  of entry to the  EEC.  Indeed  Britain has  found it cheaper  to 
purchase  some  foodstuffs  within  the  Community  than  from her  traditional 
suppliers.  Because  their economics  were  more  highly developed,  their 
efforts nt divcrsificntion of  trndc  have  been highly successful  and 
alternative markets  have  been  found  in  the  US  and  Asia.  Consequently,  the 
countries  in category  (c)  have  not been significantly affected by Britain's 
accession to the  Community. 
The  stage-by-stage  alignment of the  UK's  tariffs with those of 
the  Community  threatened to  injure the  export prospects  of the  countries 
in category  (b)  by eliminating the  remaining preferences  which  they,  along 
with categories  (a)  and  (c),  enjoyedover  non-Commonwealth countries,  both 
developed  and  developing.  The  Community's  G.S.P.  itself,  however,  offered 
a  compensatory  advantage  in the  form  of  newly  preferential access  (to  an 
unlimited extent in the case of most  industrial goods  and  some  agricultural 
products,  and  in  the case of textiles etc.,  to  the  ex.tent of the relevant 
G.S.P.  quotas)  vis-a-vis both developed  Commonwealth  - category  (c)  and 
developed  non-Commonwealth  countries,  in the  much  larger market of the 
six. 
Recognizing,  however,  that this might  not prove  to be  adequate 
compensation  for  the  six Commonwealth countries of Asia,  and that in any 
case disturbances  in the existing patterns of trade were  likely to occur, 
the  nine  Member  States,  at the  time  the Treaty of Accession was  concluded 
subscribed to  a  Joint Declaration of  Intent pledging  the enlarged  Community 
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examine  with  them  such  problems  as  might  arise in  the  field of trade 
with  a  view to  seeking  appropriate  solutions  thereto. 
As  a  first stage  in  implementing  the  Joint Declaration of  Intent, 
the  Community has  made  concessions,  primarily under  the  G.S.P.  in respect 
of  a  number  of products  of specific interest to  these countries.  ~~e list 
includes  agricultural  and  processed agricultural products  (cashew nuts, 
virginia  flue-cured  tobacco,  prawns  and  shrimps,  desiccated coconut,  coconut 
oil,  packaged  tea  and  processed pineapples),  industrial goods  (footwear, 
plywood  and  sports goods)  and  cottage  industry products  (handwoven  silk 
and cotton,  and handcrafts).  The  concessions  have  been  in operation since 
the beginning of 1974. 
Further evidence of the  Community's <btermination to  strengthen its 
trade relations with  Commonwealth  Asia  is provided by  the conclusion of 
agreements  on  jute products with  India  and Bangladesh, under  which  the 
Community's  duties  on  imports  have  been  reduced  by  40%  and will be  reduced 
by  a  furthc•r  20';(,  on  ,Januin-y  ·1  97!>,  while  tlw  tJnitod  Kingdom  ha~;  been  allowed 
not  to  introduce  in  1974  the  partial duty  that it nhould  have  imposed  as  a 
stage  towards  alignment  \~ith the  Community's  external tariff.  A  similar 
agreement  on  coir products  has  also been concluded with  India. 
The  most  positive development  in  trade relations with  the  South 
Asia region has  been  the  conclusion of  a  commercial  cooperation agreement 
with  India which  came  into operation in April  1974.  It provides'  for  the 
establishment of  a  joint commission  to  promote  future collaboration on 
trade questions  and  provide  a  means  to diversify and  expand  trade between 
the parties  and with third countries.  Agreements  along  similar  lines  arc 
expected to be  negotiated  shortly with  Pakistan,  Bangladesh  and  Sri Lanka, 
and  at  a  later stage with  the  Asian group,  of which  Malaysia  and  Singapore 
are  members. 
The  measures  already  introduced by the  Community  have  prevented 
a  disruption of trade between  Commonwealth  Asia  and  the  United  Kingdom 
in the  products  and  product groups  which would most  obviously have  been 
affected by  the  tariff alignments. 
Some  problems  remain,  however,  The  adoption by Britain of the 
Community  G.S.P.  is potentially harmful  to certain manufactured goods 
exported  to Britain from  India,  Pakistan  and  Malaysia,  as  these  goods  arc 
subject  to  very  low tariffs within quota  limits only.  In  India  47% of all 
- 19  - PE  37.464/I/rev. exports  ~r~  in manufactured  goodn  and  in  renpcct of Pakistan  the  figure  is 
4S'Y,..  MorPnVPI',  t·h•·  t•xpol"l  of  !:om<'  aqricul  tur<~l  qoocln  from  these countries 
Lo  nriLlin will  I><·  liiJI;lVOlll'illlly  ilrl,•c•lt•d. 
Hong  Kong,  a  colonial territory and  a  member  of  the  Commonwealth 
is  not  included  in the  countries mentioned  specifically in the Joint 
Declaration of Intent added  to the  Treaty of Accession.  Manufactures 
account  for  over  90%  of its exports  to Britain and  these  exports  are  likely 
to be  adversely affected because  preferential access  extended to it will be 
severely restricted by  the operation of  the tariff quota  system. 
Britain's present  policy is  to  seck ways  of  facilitating the  trade 
of  the Asian  Commonwealth  countries,  some  of which  are  among  the  countries 
in the world that arc hardest hit by  the  price  increases  in oil and  other 
raw materials.  She  considers  that it is  unreasonable  that  India  and 
Bangladesh  should be  disadvantaged  in  the  UK  market  for  jute  and  coir  in  the 
period during  which  the  Community  tariff is being  lowered.  Britain is also 
seeking  substantial  improvem2nt  in the  position of Hong  Kong  where  at present 
the  UK  has  to discriminate  against  one  of its  own  territories. 
In its proposal  for  the  1975  G.S.P.  the  Commission  has  included  a 
number  of products  and  has  increased  the quotas  for  a  number  of other 
products which arc of special interest and  importance  to  the  countries  of 
Asia.  The  Commission  has  also  taken  note  of the British request  for  a 
substanti~l  improvement  in  the  position of  I~ng Kong  and  is at present 
examining  ways  in  which  this  might  be  achieved. 
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1.  Association with the  AASM  and  enlargement  of the Association 
The  Treaty of  Rome  (1\rt.  131-136 and  Implementing  Convention)  laid down 
rules  for association between  Europe  of the  Six and  non-European countries 
and territories which  had  special relations with certain Member  States. 
This association consisted mainly of a  trade  system and  a  development  fund. 
Since  most  of the  countries concerned  became  independent  soon after the 
Treaty of  Rome  came  into force,  negotiations were  opened  (in  1962)  to decide 
the bases  for  a  new  agreement.  These  negotiations  ended  in the  signing at 
Yaound6  on  20  July 1963  of a  convention covering  a  further period of five 
years. 
This association with  18 African  States and  Madagascar  (AASM)  covered three 
areas:  institutions,  trade  and  financial  and  technical cooperation  (800  million ua.). 
At  the  end of this period  a  new association agreement  was  signed  on 
19  July 1969,  again at Yaounde. 
The  association's procedures  and  institutions were  virtually unchanged, 
the only innovation being the  fixing  of an  expiry date  (31  January 1975) 
provision being  made  for negotiating the  new  agreement  18  months  before that date. 
The  trade  arrangements provided  for  a  furtl1er  reduction in the  external 
tariff for certain tropical products without  compensatory price maintenance 
measures.  At  the  same  time,  the  terms  governing allocation of aid  from  the 
EDF  and  EID  (totalling 1,000 million u.a.)  were  made  more  flexible  and  designed 
to accelerate the  economic  independence  of the AAsri. 
Article  109  of the  1\ct  of Accession  (rart  Four,  Title III,  Chapter  2) 
stipulates that the  'status quo'  principle  should  apply to the  United  Kingdom's 
relations with the  l\1\SM  and  those  of the  independent  commonwealth countries 
with the original  si:x:  members  of the  EEC.  The  status quo  arrangements  apply 
until  31  January  1975,  i.e.  until the  expiry of the  Yaounde  Convention  and the 
Arusha  Agreement  (Art.  115  of  Part  Four  of the Act  of Accession).  Eighteen 
months  prior to that date,  the  independent  commonwealth countries listed in 
Annex  VI  of the  Treaty were  entitled to open  negotiations alongside the  AASM 
with  a  view  to association with  the  Community of the  Nine. 
It cannot  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  situation following  accession  has 
introduced any changes in the  United Kingdom's  relations with the  commonwealth 
and with the  AASM.  The  table below is given merely for information. 
1Mauritius  joined the  AASM  in 1973 
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and  the  developing countries as  a  whole 
Year 
1971 
Imports  1972 
1973 
1971 
Exports  1972 
1973 
1\1\SM  excluding 
Mauritius-1973 
52.3 
80.1 
76.9 
49.3 
45.0 
37.9 
(in  £m) 
Commonwealth 
2,191.5 
2,148.5 
2,719.1 
2,009.2 
1,837.6 
2,064.6 
All  developing 
countries 
(Class  2) 
2,294.6 
2,411.3 
3,492.3 
2,185.7 
2,411.3 
2,594.1 
Sources:  SOEC,  Overseas  Trade  of United  Kingdom. 
Negotiations  on  the  renewal  and  enlargement  of the association 
officially began  in July 1973  and were  completed  on  1  February 1975. 
The  following outlines  the  convention which will  be  signed in Lome:
1 
(a)  Participating countries:  on  the  Community side,  the  EEC  and the 
nine  Member  States.  On  the l\CP2  side,  the  following  46  countries: 
The  !C)  countries  alrc<Hly  asnoci<Jted  with  the  Community  under  the 
Yaound6  Convent jon:  l\unmdi,  Cameroon,  Central  African Hepublic, 
Chnq,  Congo,  Dahomey,  Gabon,  Ivory Co<Jst,  Madagascar,  Mali, 
Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Niger,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Somalia,  Togo, 
Upper-Volta  and  Zaire; 
The  21  Commonwealth  countries,  including 
12  in Africa:  Kenya,  Uganda,  Tanzania  (associated with the 
EEC  under  the  Arusha Agreement),  Botswana,  Gambia,  Ghana, 
Lesotho,  Malawi,  Nigeria  (Lagos  Agreement),  Sierra Leone, 
Swaziland,  Zambia, 
G  in the Caribbean:  8ahamas,  Barbados,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Jamaica, 
Trinid<Jd  <Jnd  Tobago, 
3  in the  Pacific:  Fiji Islands,  Western  Samoa,  Tonga; 
6  other African States:  Ethiopia,  Guinea,  Eastern Guinea,  Guinea 
Bissau,  Liberia  and  Sudan. 
Angola  and  Mozambique  could  join the  Convention  later. 
(b)  system  of trade  and  commercial  cooperation:  The  EEC  guarantees  open 
access  to industrial  products  from  the  ACP  and to numerous  agricultural 
products  (representing  84%  of  current agricultural exports) ,  and  a 
preferential regime  for  other agricultural  products.  The  ACP  States 
do  not  owe  any reciprocity to the  EEC,  but  treatment at least as 
favourable  as  that  of the  most  favoured  nation. 
1
Thc  convention will  not  come  into force  until ratified. 
2  f  0  1\  rtcan,  caribbean and  Pacific countries. 
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minimum  level  of export  revenues  for  the  ACP  for  a  list of products, 
~s  lonq  ~s  c~cl1  product  under  consideration  represents  an  appreciable 
pcrcent<l<Je  of il  country's  total  exports.  'l'he  list of  products  is as 
follows:  ground-nut,  coffee,  cocoa,  cotton,  coconut,  palm-tree and 
palm-cabbage,  leathers  and skins,  timber  products,  bananas,  tea, 
sisal,  iron ore,  and several  derivative  products  of those mentioned. 
An  ACP  country can ask  for  a  'financial transfer'  if its  revenues 
for  a  given  product  drop  by  a  certain percentage  in comparison with 
a  reference  period.  The transfers are  repayable  by the least 
deprived ACP  countries,  non-repayable  for  the  34 most  deprived countries. 
(d)  Special  regime  for  sugar:  The  EEC  undertakes  to import  1.4 million 
tons  annually,  and the  supply countries  undertake to supply this 
quantity.  Within  the  volume  quoted,  the  EEC  guarantees  a  minimum 
price to be  negotiated annually within the  range  of prices  guaranteed 
to Community producers.  The  sugar  protocol  is  of indefinite duration, 
with the possibility of annulment  from  the  duration of the  convention 
(5  years)  by means  of  2  years'  notice  (the  minimum  duration is,  there-
fore,  7  years). 
(c)  Financial  and technical  cooperation:  The  endowment  of the  new  EDF 
for  the  ACP  will  be  2,625m  u.a.  (expressed  in special drawing rights) 
plus  375m  u.a.  in endowments  from  the Stabilisation Fund  and 
390m  u.a.  in  loans  from  the  European  Investment  Bank.  The  ACP 
will  be  closely associated with the preparation and  processing of 
projects to be  financed  and  in the  management  of aid in general. 
(f)  Industrial cooperation:  This  is an  innovation,  covering research and 
technology,  contacts  between commercial  operators,  encouragement  of 
investments,  etc.  The  various activities will  be  guided by an 
Industrial Cooperation Committee,  assisted by  an  Industrial  Development 
Centre. 
(g)  Institutional  framework:  The  'Lom6  convention between the  EEC  and the 
ACP'  is  of  5  years'  duration,  and with  a  leaning towards  becoming 
permanent.  The  Convention will  be  jointly managed,  under  the 
rcsponsibility of  a  .Joint  Hinisterial Conference,  assisted by a 
Committee  of Ambassadors.  The  management  organs will be  accompanied 
by a  consultative assembly,  composed  on  an  equal  basis of Members  of 
the  European  Parliament  and  representatives  appointed by the ACP 
countries. 
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view  of the  time  required  for  tho  ratification of tho  now  convention, 
transitional measures  had to be  provided  for  the  period after  31  January 
1975.  The  arrangement  adopted  comprises  two  phases: 
a  first  phase  guaranteeing tho  status  quo  whore  necessary to preclude 
a  legal void between  previous  commitments  (Yaound6  Convention, 
Arusha  Agreement,  provisions  relating to the  overseas  countries  and 
territories,  the  countries  and territories referred to in Article 
24  of the Act  of Accession  and  tho  States referred to in Article  109 
of the Act  of  Accession)  and the  new  convention; 
a  second phase  to apply  from  a  date  jointly agreed by the  EEC  and 
ACP  in anticipation of certain provisions  of the  future  convention, 
particularly in tho  commercial  field. 
2.  Lagos  and Arusha  agreements 
The  negotiations with Nigeria  led to an  agreement  signed  on  16 July 
1966  in Lagos,  setting up  an  association  (without technical  and  financial 
co-oporaUon)  between  the  EEC  <:llld  that country.  The  agreement  has  never 
come  into force  since il hau  not  been ratified by all the  Member  States  and 
Nigeria,owing  to  the  Biafran war. 
The  negotiations with Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanzania  ended in the  conclusion 
of  a  first agreement at Arnsha,  on  26  July 1968,  which  was  likewise  never 
ratified.  However,  it was  renegotiated without difficulty in July  1969  and 
formally  signed  on  24  September  1969.  Tho  Arusha Agreement  io  due  to expire 
on  31  January  l975,i,c. at  tho  same  time  as  the  second Yaound!1  Convention. 
This  agreement  covern  l\vo  areas.  In  trade,  it provides  for  the estab-
litlhmenl:  of  a  free  lxade  a1·e;1,  bul:  wj t:h  Bignll _i.canl  limitations.  'rhcro  is 
no  proviHion  for  cit:hct~  technical or finuncial  assintancc.  As  regards 
institutions,  it includes  an Association Council  and  a  parliamentary committee. 
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or  economic. 
As  far  as the  implementation of this agreement  by the  enlarged  Community 
is concerned,  the  same  status quo  arrangements  exist as in the  Yaounde  associm±an. 
3.  Relations with the  Commonwealth 
The  community of the  Six had  relations with certain independent African 
countries  (Arusha  agreement)  and with  some  independent  Asian  Commonwealth 
countries.  These  included India and  Pakistan. 
The  Declaration of Intent of 22  January 1972  dealt with the  development  of 
trade  relations with these  Commonwealth countries,  i.e.  Ceylon  (Sri  Lanka),  India, 
1  .  k'  1  d  .  Ma  ays~a,  Pa  ~stan  an  s~ngapore. 
The  conclusion of the  trade agreement with India (signed  on  17  December  1973) 
demonstrates  the  Community's  desire to  develop its relations with  the  non-
asnocialed 'l'hird  World  countries.  One  of the  essential  features  of this agree-
ment  is  th<:~t  a  Joint  Committee  is made  responsible  for  exploring ways  of 
promoting real  economic  and trade cooperation between  the  enlarged  Community 
and India. 
The  agreements with India  on  woven  fabrics of  jute and coir,  signed in 
December  1973,  and with Bangladesh  on  woven  fabrics  of  jute replace  similar 
arrangements  made  by the  Community  of the  Six.  Although  less important than 
the  trade agreement with India,  these agreements  solve certain problems  arising, 
mainly,  from  enlargement.  They also enable  the  exports of the  two  countries 
concerned to benefit  from  the generalized tariff preferences  for  the products 
2  referred to above  . 
4.  Relations with the  Latin American  countries and  the  developing  non-
Commonwealth Asian countries 
The  Community's  non-preferential trade  agreements with Argentina,  Brazil 
and  Uruguay  apply also to the  enlarged  Community  under Article  4  of  the Act  of 
Accession,  which  stipulates that  agreemems or conventions  entered into by any 
of the  Communities with  one  or more  third countries are binding  on  the  new 
Member  States. 
The  agreement  with~. signed  on  14  October  1963,  has  been  extended 
annually.  It covers  a  limited number  of products  (exemption  from  CCT  duties 
on  wool  carpets,  dried apricots,  raisins and caviar). 
The  agreements with  Thailand  (on  trade in handmade  goods  and  handwoven  silk 
and  cotton fabrics),  the  Philippines and Indonesia  (on  trade in  handmade  goods) 
came  into force  on  1  January 1973.  Their application was  extended to the 
enlarged  Community by the  regulation of 28  December  1973  (individual annual 
quota  doubled) • 
1 Because  of events  since it was  drafted,  the Declaration  now applies also to 
Banglade.sh 
2For  further details,  see .section  III,  1  •Generalized preferences",  and  Section I, 
2(d),  "Commonwealth  General" 
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1.  Generalised preferences 
Protocol  No.  23  of  the Act of Accession relates to  the application by 
the  new  Member  States  of  the  generalised preference  scheme,  and  authorises 
them  to defer opplication until  1  January  1974. 
•rhus,  on  18  December  1973  the Council  of  the  European  Communities 
;Hlopled  the necessary  requlatiorw  ancl  decisions  granting  generalised 
pre[croncen  for  1')74  i.n  respect  of  semi-finished  and  manufactured  qoods 
originating  in  the  developinl) countries.  These  decisions  were  intended  to 
eliminate most  of the adverse  effects  of the alignment  of  the national 
tariffs of  the  three  new  Hember  States  to the  Community  tariffs  on  the bulk 
of products  from  the  developing countries covered by  the  generalised 
preference  scheme.  The  decisions were  also designed to meet  the  need  to 
protect the  interests  of  the  developing countries which  are  (or  may  become) 
associates,  and,  at the start of  the  negotiations  implementing  Protocol 
No.  22  of the Act of Accession,  demonstrated  the Community's  desire to 
maintain  a  balance  in its relations with  the developing countries  of Asia 
and Latin America.  For  u  number  of products  (mainly agricultural)  the 
improvnmPntt1  wnt'f'  Lnlroc!ucecl  in  implemcmt<tt:ion  of  the Joint Declaration  of 
lttl.<'lll  ·lltJH'X<'d  t<>  lito  1\t'l  <>I  1\,·co~•niPtl.  'l'lley  <'otwornod  tho  1\ninn  dovoloping 
countries:  Lhal:  is,  l'u.kinL1n,  nan~JlatleBh,  India,  Sri  Lanka  (Ceylon), 
Singapore  and  Malaysia. 
Since  these proposals  were  submitted by  the  Commh;sion  and  adopted by 
the Council  in  December  1973,  the Commission has  announced  that the 
scheme  proposed  for  1974  should be  improved  and has  itself acknowledged 
its deficiencies. 
The  1975  scheme  is therefore specially designed to remedy  the  following 
shortcomings: 
- There  nrc no  restrictions  on  duty-free access  for  products  \oJhich  constitute 
an  extremely  small  proportion of  the developing countries'  exports, 
while products which  they do  export in greater quantity arc restricted 
by ceilings  and  quotas;  the  number  of products  subject to quota&  must 
therefore be  reduced considernbly and  the ceilings raised; 
- Certain relatively industrialised countries,  which  are  in  a  much  stronger 
competitive position than other developing countries,  monopolise  the 
preferences  accorded  to certain products.  This  applies particularly to 
Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,  Brnzil,  Argentina  and  Yugoslavia.  The  share  of 
each quota  or ceiling available to  any particular country must,  therefore 
be  reduced  (lowering  the  'cut-off'); 
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limited;  the list of products benefiting  froill  preferences needs  to be 
extended  and  the preferential margin widened,  in particular allowing total 
exemption  for  goods  already enjoying  low preferential rates. 
The  Commission's  proposals  in this connection  were  submitted to 
the  Council  and  to the European  Parliament  in July 1974.  Parliament 
delivered  a  favourable  opinion at its sitting of  17  October  1974,  and 
the  proposals  were  adopted  by the  Council  on  2  December  1974.  The 
proposals  are  very important  in the  overall  context  of the  Con~unity's 
development  cooperation  pol icy in the  trade  sector;  however,  they also 
provide  the first  instance  of  one  of  the  British  'renegotiation'  demands 
being met  through the  normal  Community  procedures. 
The  United  Kingdom  had  asked,  among  other things,  for  improved access 
to the  Common  Market  for the products of certain Asian  Commonwealth  developing 
countries.  The  Commission's  initiative  (which,  as we  saw earlier,  was  not 
connected with  ~!r  Callaghan's  statements,  for it had  been  announced  a  long 
time  before  and  had  been  in the process of elaboration  for  several weeks) 
meets this request.  It is not,  therefore,  a  matter of  'renegotiation',  but 
simply of British participation in the working out  and  discussion of the 
Commission's proposals. 
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Agreements  on  individual producto  are  in line with  UN  and  UNCTAD 
recommendations  but  may  be  applied only in the case of products which concern 
the  developing countries,  such as coffee,  cocoa,  tea,  tin,  etc.  The  Co~munity 
is involved in the preparation and drafting of the terms  of the agreements, 
in tlll!  n~gotj  ationo on  them  and  in  their adminiotration. 
The  preferential  arrangements of the  Community of the  Six  for  sugar  from 
the  AASM  catered for  only  a  small quantity and  even part of that was  re-exported 
to tho  AASM  owing  to lack of processins industries. 
On  12  July 1973  tho  Commission  submitted to tho Council  a  Memorandum 
on  tho  Community's  futuro  sugar policy.  This  memorandum  proposed  a  co~nn 
policy on  three points,  with three corresponding deadlines: 
(a)  position with respect to the International Sugar Agreement  due  to 
expire in December  1973; 
~b)  offers to be  made  to the developing countries pursuant to the undertakings mXb 
in Protocol  No.  22  of the Act of Accession,  given that the present arrangemcnto 
under  the  Commonwealth  Sugar Agreerront  are  due  to expire  in December  1974; 
(c)  definition of tho  Community's  future  internal arrangements,  the transitional 
arrangements  applying  only up  to the  end of the 1974-75  season. 
Point  (b) ,  namely the policy on  sugar  from  the  developing  countries 
referred to in Protocol  No.  22  of the Act of Accession,  will be  considered 
in greater detail below. 
Since  1951  a  preferential agrcemon·t has existed between  the United 
Kingdom and  a  number  of trade associations  in tho  sugar-exporting 
Commonwealth  countries. 
Providing guarantees  on quantities  and prices,  this agreement has 
contributed considerably to the  economic  development of the  sugar-exporting 
countries.  It covers  an  overall quantity of approximately 1,675,000 t(in 
terms of white  sugar) for export to the United Kingdom,  including the quantity 
estimated  for Australian sugar  (330,000  t).  With  due  regard to the letter 
and spirit of Protocol  No.  22  of the Act of Accession,  as well  as  the Jo;nt 
Declaration  of Intent concenning the  development of trade relations with the 
Commonwealth  developing countries in Asia and particularly the provisions 
relating .to India,  and to the  sugar interests of the AASM  (Madagasc~E 
and  congo-Brazzaville  )  and of the  overseas countries and territories 
(Surinam),  future  negotiations will have  to take into account tho preoont 
commitments which  amount  to approximately  1,400,000  t  (in white  sugnr) 
made  up  as  follows: 
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from  developing countries: 
(white sugar equivalent) 
west  Indies  and  Guyana 
Mauritius 
Fiji Islands 
East Africa 
British Honduras 
India 
Swaziland 
(Southern Rhodesia 
(b)  Quantities  importedl  from  Surinam: 
Total 
696,000  t 
375,000  t 
138,000  t 
7,000  t 
20,000  t 
25,000  t 
84,000  t 
1,345,000  t 
23,000  t)2 
4,000  t 
(c)  Quantities  of potential imports  from  AASM  sugar  producers/exporters 
Madagascar 
Congo 
Total  : 
(d)  Total  of quantities  under  (a),  (b)  and  (c) 
13,000  t 
38,000  t 
51,000  t 
1,400,000  t 
In short,  the  Community  would import  a  quantity of 1.4 million 
tons  of sugar  annually  on  reasonable  terms  from  India  and  the  countries 
referred to in Protocol  No.  22.  The  European  Parliament has  delivered  an 
opinion  in favonr  of this  propos<ll. 
In  the  framework  of  its discussions  on  sugar  the  Council  of  the  European 
Communities  met  on  18  June  1974  to  continue its exchange  of views  on  the 
market  situation and  the  problem of distribution of  sugar  from  the developing 
countries  referred to in Protocol  No.  22  of  the Act  of Accession. 
3.  Food  aid 
The  discussions that  took  place  between  the above-mentioned countries 
and  the  Community  on this  subject within the  framework  of the  negotiations 
on the enlargement  of the association resulted in  a  compromise  on 
1  February 1975.  This  compromise  is outlined in Section II(l) (d)on  page  16. 
1 
2 
June/July  1973 
Quantity suspended 
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enlarged Community  in terms  of  cereals  totwls  1,287,000  tons  for  1973-74, 
45% being handled  through  Community actions  and  55%  through national actions 
by  the  individual  Member  States. 
The  appropriations  earmarked  in  the  1975 budget  amount  to  £94  million 
and  relate to the  supply of cereals,  dairy products,  sugar  skimmed  milk  powder 
and butter oil.  About  45% of  this aid goes  to non-associated states  in Asia 
and  the Middle-East. 
Seeking to  improve  the policy of  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  and 
make  it more  systematic the  Commission  submitted to the  Council  on  21  March 
1974  a  communication  on  EEC  food  aid policy1 
This  document  exposes  some  of the  shortcomings  of the  present arrange-
ments, such  as  the  modest  volume  of  <:tid  in relation to  the  need,  excessive 
dopondoncc  in  tho  case  of  dairy  proclucb;  on  tho  common  agricultural policy, 
and,  above all,  the  lack of  lonq-1 enu  ta1pp ly  conm1i tmonts,  which  precludes 
proper  planning  of aid and  docs  not  contribute  to  tho  development  of  the 
receiving  countries. 
Tho  European  Parliament  and  other bodies  in  tho  Member  States had already 
emphasized  these deficiencies  and  expressed  a  desire to sec  them  remedied. 
The  plan proposed by  tho  Commission  takes  account  of  these  findings. 
These,  bri0fly,  arc  its  main  points  : 
- Continuity of  food  aid supplies  to be guaranteed by  the establishment of 
a  medium-term three-year  indicative programme  (minimum  and  maximum 
quantities  for  each  product).  This  programma  would  provide  a  broad  frame-
work  for  determining  the  annual  contribution; 
- The  range  of  products  might  be  extended.  In addition to the  products 
supplied traditionally  (cereals,  skinuncd  milk  powder,  butter,  sugar),  other 
products  such as processed cereals,  egg  powder,  etc.  which  have  proved  useful 
in various  food  aid  schemes,  especially in  emergencies,  could bo  supplied. 
Those  would  not  be  subject to medium-term quantitative programming; 
Increased size  of  the  commitment,  in order  as  far  as  possible to moot  the 
increased need  for  food  aid predicted for  the  developing  countries; 
- Aid will be  supplied directly to tho  countries which  ask  for it as well  as 
indirectly through  organizations  such  as  the World  Food  Programme  which  is 
1  Doc.  37/74 
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- ln the  case  of cereals,  aid has hitherto taken  the  form partly of actions 
by the  Community itself,  and partly of  actions by the States,  and  the 
Commission  proposes  that all food  aid should be  in the  form  of  Community 
actions.  It takes  the precaution,  however,  of providing  for  alternative 
solutions  in the  event of  a  Member  State objecting; 
- Procedures  for  administering  the  aid will be  made  more  flexible  to  reduce 
delays. 
'I'he  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social committee  approved 
the  commission  proposals  on  12  and  17  cTuly  1974  respectively.  The  Ministers 
of the  Member  States with  responsibility for  cooperation debated this  subject 
at  length at the  Council meeting of 16  July 1974.  The  United  Kingdom  and 
Danish  delegations in particular cast doubts  on  the  impact  of this  form  of 
aid on  the  development  of the  recipient countries and would  have  preferred 
productive agricultural investments to be  encouraged.  The  Commission 
endeavoured  to convince  them  that malnutrition was  an  insurmountable barrier 
to  economic  development  and that  the world  food  shortage was  liable to continue 
for  several more  years. 
The  Community  undertook to continue to provide aid during  coming  years 
by  supplying  a  variety of products  adapted to the  requirements  of the 
populations in need.  It did  not,  however,  make  any other commitment  on the 
size or nature of  such aid. 
- 31  PE  37.464/III/rev. 4.  Special  Aid  Fund 
In  March  1974  the  Commission  took  the  initiative in proposing  a  plan 
to counteract the  effects of certain international price movements  on  the 
developing countries most affected by  the  rise  in  the prices of oil, cereals, 
fertilizers,  etc.  This  plan had been presented to the United  Nations 
Assembly by  Mr  Scheel,  the  then  President-in-Office of the Council  of  the 
European  Communities,  in  the  debate  on  raw materials. 
The  Community  has  proposed  the  establishment of  a  world  fund  of the 
order  of 3,000 million dollars  to be allocated  to the countries most 
affected. (between  25  and  30 countries).  Not  only  the traditional donor 
countries but all the  rich countries would  huv e  to contribute to this  fund. 
The  3,000 million dollars might be contributed as  follows: 
$500 million by  the Cormnunity, 
$1000  million by  the rest of  the  industrialised world, 
$1500  million by  the  oil producing countries. 
On  25  June  1974  the Council  of  Foreign Ministers  delivered an  opinion 
in  favour  of  the Community contributions  (<I  sixth of  the  total)  to such  a 
fund,  on  condition  that  the other contributors  accepted  u  similar commitment. 
Because  of  the deterioration of  the  situation  in  the  developing 
countries most  affected by  the  increase  in prices  of  raw materials  and  in 
the absence  of world-wide  commitment  to contribute  the total amount proposed, 
the Commission  proposed  that the Council  should release £62.5 million as 
the first  in~tallment of  the  $500 million proposed.  The  Council  adopted  the 
proposal  on  3  October  1971. 
On  22  January  1975  the Council  released a  second  instalment  of 
$100 million,  a  third of which will  be  paid into the  special  account 
of  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations. 
5.  Fund  for  non-associated developing countries 
At  the  30  April  1974  meeting  of  the Council  of Ministers  responsible 
for  Development,  the British delegation had proposed  the  establishment of  a 
fund  for  the non-associated countries.  After  illngthy  discussions,  a  draft 
resolution was  drawn  up  on  14  June  1974  expressing the Council's  agreement 
in principle  to  financial  and  technical aid  for  the  non-associated developing 
countries  and stating that the  amounts  and  details of  implementation of 
such aid would be  determined at a  later stage. 
This  resolution was  confirmed  on  16  July  1974,  omphasis being put 
nevertheless  on  the  prio:r·ity  <·o  be  <Jiven  to commitments  to be  undertaken 
in  the case  of  the associations currently under  negotiation. 
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In 1971  the  Commission  submitted to the  other  Community institutions 
a  memorandum  on  a  community  development  cooperation policy.  This  document 
was  followed  in  1972  by  a  programme  for  a  first series of actions.  On  the 
basis of this memorandum  and those  submitted by the  Member  States,  and in 
conformity with the broad guidelines  defined by the  Conference  of Heads  of 
State or Government  in  1972,  a  working party has  been  instructed to  submit 
a  final  report  to the  Council. 
~t its meeting of  5  November  1973  the  Council  decided the  first 
priorities for  the  EEC's  overall development  cooperation policy  (that is, 
aid policy to the  !hird world as  a  whole,  independently of the  association 
policy and  regional actions). 
So  far,  nine  resolutions and  one  recommendation  have  been  approved 
by the  Council  and  several  have  been  put into effect.  They cover: 
1.  he  improvement  of generalized preferences;  the  1975  scheme  referred 
to in III.  1  above  deals with this; 
2.  Agreements  on primary products;  in view of the  trend of the markets in 
raw materials,  this matter should  be  reviewed; 
3.  The  harmonisation  of national  and  Community  development  cooperation 
policies;  the  council  has  adopted  a  series of conclusions  on  specific 
subjects,  all connected with  financial  aid,  and  has  drawn  up  the 
general guidelines  for  harmonizing policies; 
4.  The  volume  of public  development  aid;  Member  States will  jointly set 
themselves  the  objective  of effectively increasing public aid  (0.7% of the 
GNP)  and  agree  to isolate as  far  as possible the  flow of aid  from  any 
budgetary and balance of payments  difficulties; 
5.  The  conditions  governing public aid;  in other words,  confirmation of the 
OECD  Development Assistance  Committee's  1972  recommendation  on  improving 
the conditions and procedures  for  granting aid; 
6.  The  problem of the  debt burden of developing countries;  the main  need is to 
avoid an  excessive  growth in private  export credits which  are  often the cause 
of developing  countries'  excessive  debts.  To  counteract this,  public aid 
will be  increased on  terms  favourable  to the  developing countries affected. 
There is also  a  plan to provide  technical assistance to help  developing 
countries to introduce  (or  improve)  national mechanisms  for  recording and 
controlling outstanding export  credits; 
- 33  - PE  37.464/III/rev. 7  and  B.  'l'he  regional integration of developing countries and  the promotion 
of their exports;  here,  technical assistance is called for  in both areas. 
These  two  resolutions,  of which the  first corresponds to a  particular 
objective  of the  Community,  and the  second complements  Community ventures 
in the tariff field,  will  soon  be  implemented by a  series of specific 
measures  on behalf of countries or groups of countries in Asia  and  Latin 
America.  Appropriations  shown  in the  draft budget  for  1975  amount  to 
BSO,OOO  u.u.; 
9.  Pinancial  and  technicnl nsssistnnce to non-associnted developing  countries; 
this resolution,  which  goes  further thnn  the  technical nssistance mensures 
mentioned in 7  and  8  ~bove,  completes the  Community's  range  of instruments 
and is a  vitul factor  in making  the  Community's  world policy  'global'.  In 
view of the  innovative  nature of this resolution,  further work will be 
required of the  community in order to determine  the possible  size  nnd  form 
of  such assistance to non-associated countries before it cnn be  implemented. 
In addition to these  nine  resolutions,  the  council has  adopted  u 
recommendation  on  the  geographical distribution of aid;  exchange  of 
information will be  necessary to make  the distribution of national  and  Community 
aid more  complementnry. UNITED 
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IMPORTS  (CIF) (in millions cf £s) 
1967  1968  1969  1970 
Horld total  6436.7  7897.5  8315.0  9036.8 
EEC  total(9)  1706.9  2062.8  2151. 6  2440.2 
EFTA  1  1135.8 
USA  1170.2 
Corr.monwea 1 th  2158.2 
EXPORTS  FOB  (in millions  of  £s) 
1967  1968  1969  1970 
Hor1d total  5229.6  6433.9  7339.4  8061.1 
EEC  total(9)  1391. 1  1740.2  2065.7  2355.7 
EFTA  1  1063.6 
USA  932.7 
Corr..::Jonwea1th  1695.4 
Source  Overseas  Trade  Statistics of the  lf~ 
(Department of Trade  and  Industry 
1-t  1 
~  e~=1uding Denmark  . 
1971 
9821.1 
2916.1 
1268.5 
1091. 6 
2191.5 
1971 
9181.4 
2660.1 
1160.0 
1074.6 
2009.2 
KINGDOM 
1972  1973 
11155.4  15854.4 
3523.5  5197.1 
1613.1  2369.9 
1170.9  1610.3 
2148.5  2719.1 
1972  1973 
9745.7  12436.0 
2939.7  4030.0 
1348.9  1746.4 
1207.4  1512. 9 
1837.6  2064.6 
~nnex I 
Percentage  change  in imports 
I 
imported  I 
1974 
from:  1970-1  1971-72  1972-73  1973-74 
23116.7  1-i'orld  +  9  +  14  +  42  +  46 
7722.3  EEC  (9)  +  20  +  21  +  47  +  49 
2423.5  EFTA1  +  11  +  27  +  47  +  2 
2241.4  USA  - 7  +  7  +  38  +  39 
3290.5  Com.'Tlonwealth  +  2  - 2  +  27  +  21 
Percentage  change  in exports 
1974  I exported 
to:  1970-1  1971-72  1972-73  1973-74 
16494.3  Horld  +  14  +  6  +  28  +  33 
5507.9  EEC  (9)  +  13  +11  +  37  i+  37 
1818.5  EFTAl  +  9  +  16  +  29  +  4 
1757.0  USA  +  15  +  12  +  25  +  16 
2710.4  Co::rmomvealth  +  19  - 9  +  12  +  31 w 
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IMPORTS  (CIF) (in percentages of the total) 
from:  197CJ  1971 
lvorld total  li"C r,=' 
J  ""''~  100% 
EEC  (9  members)  27.00  29.69 
EFTA  (1)  12.57  12.92 
USA  12.95  11.11 
Commonwealth  (2)  23.88  22.31 
EXPORTS  '(FOB)  (in percentages  of  ~he total) 
from:  1970  1971 
World  total  100%  100"/o 
EEC  (9  members)  29.22  28.97 
EFTA  (1)  13.19  12.63 
USA  11.57  11.70 
Commonwealth  (2)  21.03  21.88 
Source  OVerseas  Trade  Statistics of the  UK 
(Department of Trade  and  Industry) 
(1)  excluding Denmark 
(2)  See list of  Co~~onwealth countries,  next page 
Annex  l(a) 
1972  1973  1974 
100"/o  100%  100% 
31.59  32.78  33.41 
14.46  14.95  10.48 
10.50  10.16  99,69 
19.26  17.50  14.23 
1972  1973  1974 
100"/o  lO<Yio  100% 
30.16  32.41  33.39 
13.84  14.04  11.03 
12.39  12.17  10;65 
18.86  16.6  16.43 Annex  1  (b) 
The  Commonwealth  Countries  comprise: 
Gibraltar 
Malta 
The  Gambia 
Sierra  Leone 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
I<enya 
Tanzania 
Zambia. 
Malawi 
Rhodesia 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Swaziland 
St Helena 
Seychelles 
Mauritius 
Cyprus 
India 
Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Hong  Kong 
Maldives 
India  Seas  Islands 
Brunei 
1\.ustralia 
Papua  and  New  Guinea 
Nauru 
New  Zealand 
Niue  and  Tokelau 
Fiji 
Tonga 
- 37  -
Western  Samoa 
Cook  Islands 
Commonwealth  Pacific Islands 
Canada 
Bermuda 
Bahamas 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands 
Cayman  Islands 
Jamaica 
Antigua,  etc. 
Dominica,  etc. 
Barbados 
Trinidad and  Tabago 
Belize 
Guyana 
Falkland  Islands 
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Annex  2 
UNITED  Kil~GDOl1' S  EXTERNAL  TRADE  WITH  SOHE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
value of  Imports  (c.i.f.)  £  millions  Value of Exports  (f.o.b.)  £  millions 
Hong  Kong 
India 
Pakistan  1 
Bangladesh 
Sri Lanka 
Ha1aysia 
Singapore 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
Kenya 
Brazil 
Uruguay 
Argentine 
Republic 
SOURCE 
1970  1971  1972 
128.4  164.8  184.7 
105.3  111.2  112.2 
35.2  33.8  34.8 
- - -
36.5  29.3  22.3 
46.5  42.8  46.6 
33.5  37.5  39.6 
17.54  19.28  18.78 
24.0  24.7  22.4 
27.0  30.1  29.1 
62.7  69.7  86.3 
8.6  6.6  6.3 
65.5  57.0  76.5 
Ove~seas Trade  Statistics of the  UK 
(Department of Trade  and  Industry\ 
1973  1970  1971 
263.4  99.5  104.3 
148.6  72.9  138.4 
31.0  49.5  50.4 
16.7  - -
23.0  18.5  15.9 
94.8  60.4  64.7 
85.38  62.5  73.1 
20.8  9.91  15.63 
30.32  19.5  23.7 
38.7  52.7  65.5 
157.4  61.2  84.3 
10.2  6.4  7.5 
106.1  44.0  53.5 
-
1  The  figures  for  Pakistan 1970-1972  include  those  for East Pakistan,  now Bangladesh 
1972  1973 
100.9  126.9 
141.2  132.9 
35.5  34.3 
- 18.2 
11.9  10.2 
62.2  78.2 
77.4  100.6 
9.29  4.91 
17.4  21.8 
55.6  60.9 
84.2  111.8 
4.6  4.6 
51.4  41.7 !l9.dcnqg~ 
Parliamcntury Question  in the  European  Parliament 
rc  :  the  U.K.'s  trade defi<;:it with  t11e  Community 
Oral  Question  to  the  Commission of  th,e  European  Community  asked  by 
1  Mr  Scott-Hopkins  in the  European  Parliament on  19th February  1975 
"The  Chairman -. The  next  question  is  No.  11  by  Mr  Scott-Hopkins.  It 
reads  as  follows:-
It has  been  suggested  that  the deficit  in trade  in  1973  and  1974 
between  Brit~jn on  the one  hand  und  the  eight other member  states on  the 
other  is  caused  by Britain having  become  a  member  of the  Community.  Does 
the  Commission  consider that this point of view  is  justified? 
I  call  Mr  Gundelach  to  unswer  this question. 
Mr  Gundelach -.  The  overall  trade balance of  the  United  Kingdom  has 
worsened  in  the  last three years.  This overall deterioration of the  United 
Kingdom's  external position is, of course, also  reflected  in the United 
Kingdom's  trade balance  with  her  Community  partners,  but  less  so  than with 
the rest of the world. 
In  1972  the deficit  ln  tho  United  Kingdom's  trade with  the  other 
eight metnbers  of the  EEC  accounted  for  42% of the  total deficit of her  trade 
balance,  but  in  1974  only  about  32%  of the  total deficit could be  ascribed 
to  trade with  the other members  of  the  EEC. 
This  is due  to the  fact  that  in the  first  two  years of membership  the 
rate of growth  in  United  I< i ngdom' s  exports  to  the  EEC  was  considerably higher 
than  the  rate of growth  in  her  exports to the rest of  the world,  wl1ereas  the 
rate of growth  in  her  imports  from  the  EEC  was  only slightly higher  than 
the  growth  in  imports  from  the rest of the world. 
Taking  an  average of the  two  years.  the yearly growth of exports  to the 
EEC  was  38/:'.;  in  contr<lst  to  a  27%  rise  in  exports  to  the  rest of the world; 
The  correspondiny  figures  for  the  growth  in  imports  were  48%  from  the  EEC 
and  44'X,  from  the  rest of  t1Jc  world. 
These  facts  do  not  indicate that the deterioration  in  thetrade balance 
is  due  to membership  of  the  EEC.  For  years  the  United  Kingdom  has  moved 
towards  closer trade rclationswith the  EEC  countries  for  obvious  geographic 
and  economic  reasons ,  a  proc!:?ss  which  was  accelerated  in the first  two  years 
of membership,  as  my  figures,  in particular on  export  increases,  indicate  . 
It may  be  useful  to  recall the  principal factors  responsible  for  this 
worsening  in  tll?.  Unitr>d  I{ingdom's  ovcr..all  r:xternal  account  : 
1  The  text of the  Question  and  reply  and  subsequent  exchanges,  which  arc of 
interest to  the  reader,  are  appended  in full.  The  question was  asked  after 
the Directorate General  for  Research  and  Documentation had  sent the present 
document  to  press. 
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unprecedented  rapid  growth  in  demand  and  output.  In these circumstances 
one  would  normally  expect  a  deterioration  in  the  trade balance,  both  in 
relation to other  EEC  Members  and  to  the rest of  the world. 
In  1974,  the  miners•  strike  and  the  three-day week  prevented  domestic 
output  from  satisfying domestic  demand,  so  that  once  more  exports  were 
dampened,  and  imports were  imperative  to keep  the  economy  going.  This  is 
particularly true  in  the  case of steel  and  chemicals.  Then  again,  as  prices 
of many  foodstuffs  were  lower  in  the  Community  than  on world markets,  the 
United  Kingdom  importers  switched  increasingly to  EF.C  sources of supply. 
Her  trade deficit  in agricultural products with  the  Six  alone  increaned 
by over  £  500 million. 
Given  the  size of the  switch  and  the  magnitude  of the price differentials, 
the  United  Kingdom's  total  food  bill would  cleqrly have  been  higher if the 
United  Kingdom  had  not  been  a  Member  of  the  EEC.  To  make  the point quite 
clear,  had  L1w  Uni.Lcd  J<ingdom  not  been  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  Common 
Agricultural  Pol icy,  her overall  trade deficit  .in  the  last  two  years  would 
have  been  even  higher. 
Last  but  not  least,  the  increasing deficit  in trade with  the  EEC  reflects 
the  higher cost of  imports of refined oil products,  in particular  from  the 
Netherlands  and  from  Belgium.  Had  the  United  Kingdom  not been  a  member  of 
the  EEC,  she  would still have  imported  a  part of her required oil products 
from  the  Continent. 
'l'he  trade  statist.ics  and  tlw  factors mentioned  influencing  the  United 
Kingdom's  traclP  llulancP  thus  demonstrate  that  the deterioration  in the  trade 
h;~liiiH't'  i:1  by'"' m<'.lll:l  dllt'  '"lilt' llnitt•cl  1\inqdom'tJ  tnl'ml){·rnhip  of  tlw  EEC. 
Mr  Scott-Ilopld ns  - 1  am  grateful  to  the  Commissioner.  Will  he  confirm 
that  the  basic purpose of  the  Treaty,  which  is to  increase trade  between 
Member  States,  has  to  a  large  extent been  fulfilled  and  that it has been 
greatly to  the  advantage  of the  United  Kingdom  to have  become  a  member  of 
the  EEC  ? 
Will  the  Commissioner  say  a  little more  about  the  saving which  nas 
accrued  to  the  British housewife  in  foodstuffs,  which  represents  an  increase 
of £  500 million  in  the deficit  ?  Will  the  Commissioner  give  figures  showing 
how  the  saving has  been  achieved  ?  Will  the  Commissioner  say what  has  been 
the  trade deficit with  the  Commonwealth  during  this period  ? 
- 2  - PE  37.465/rcv. Hr  Gundclach  -.  'l'hc  figures  clearly demonstrate  tha't  t1w  basic purpose 
of the  Treaty,  which  is  freer trade,  has  worked,  though  not  always  to  per-
fection,  to  the  benefit of the  United  Kingdom  economy. 
I  should  not  like to give  a  figure  for  the  savings  which  have  accrued 
to  United  Kingdom  house•,rives  but,  as  I  said,  they arc  com;ider<tb.le.  In 
some  basic  foodstuffs  the price on world  markets  in  the period  under  review 
has  been  several  hundred per cent higher  than  in  the  Community  - less  so 
recently than previously,  but  the  savings  have  not  been  inconsiderable. 
In  answer  to the question on  the development  of trade  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  Commonwealth  countries,  vlith  your permission, 
Hr  President,  I  should  like to quote  a  reliable  source  .  According  to 
what  Hr  Shore  said earlier this week  in the  House  of  Commons,  tlw  United 
Kingdom's  food  trade deficit with  the  Commonwealth  was  £  32  million  in 
1972  and  £  637  million  in  1973  and  £  580 million  in  1974.  If we  arc  speaking 
about  a  rise  in  exports  to  the  Commonwealth  countries,  we  find  tl1nt  exports 
to  Commonwealth  countries rose  in value  by  12  per cent  in  1973  und,  on  the 
figures  for  the first eleven months,  by  about  30 per cent  in  1974.  The 
average  for  the  increase of exports  to  the  Com:nunity  for  the  tvm  yc'-lrs  is 
38 per cent,  and  the  average of 12  per cent  and  30  per  cent  comes  to between 
20 per cent  and  22  per cent  for  exports  to  the  Commonweal tl1. 
Hr  Dykes  -.  I  thank  the  Commissioner  most  sincerely for  that compre-
hensive  and  reassuring reply.  As  last year  about  32  per cent of trade was 
in respect of United  Kingdom  exports  to  the  Community  and  United  Kingdom 
imports  from  other  Community  countr  ics,  doc[;  not  the  Commiss :ioner' s  answer 
indicntc that  a  lot of <1rtificiul  anxiety has  bc~:n generated  about  the 
mythology of the  trade deficit with our  trading partners  ?  Will  he  sny 
why  he  thinks  this ctrtificial anxiety han  been created  in certain qu<:.rters  ? 
Hr  Gundelach  -.  If there  is general  anxiety concerning  the  United 
Kingdom's  overall balance of payments deficit,  that is  a  real  anxict.y. 
The  figures  show  that anxiety  nbout  the  developments with  the other members 
of the  EEC  s1JOuld  be  less serious than  the  anxiety  about  the  United  J~ingdom'  [; 
relationship with  the rest of the world  and  thut  the  anxiety  is consequen-
tly artificial.  Why  that nnxiety has  been  expressed  is  a  matter of internal 
politics on which  I  would  not wish  to pronounce. 
President  - I  cull Sir Brandon  Rhys-Williams. 
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British industry learns  to adapt  itself to  take  advantage of membership 
of the  larger market,  the  trading balance will move  towards  equilibrium  ? 
Hr  Gundelach  -.  Yes,  I  certainly think  so.  As  I  said,  because of 
the geographic  proximity of continental  Europe  to  the  United  Kingdom  and 
because of the  economic  and  dynamic  forces  of European markets,  even before 
membership  there was  a  marked  and  natural  development  of trade  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the rest of the  EEC  countries.  In  particular there  was 
a  drive  towards  an  increase  in  British  industrial  exports  to what  is the 
normal part of the  home  market,  the big,  solid home  market 111ithout  which 
no  modern  industry can compete  in other parts of the world.  The  existence 
of this market  - and  it is becoming  freer  and  freer,  and  the  exporters 
and  industrialists arc becoming  more  and  more  accustomed  to operating  in 
this market  - would  tend  to  uccelcratc the  increase of exports which  we 
have  already  seen over  the  last two  years  and  therefore  a  movement  towards 
a  more  healthy  trade balance between  the  Community  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
This  can  help  the  United  Kingdom  to  finance  its deficit to  the rest of 
the world,  which,  due  Lo  imporls  of raw materials,  will  never  dioap;:Jcar. 
President  - I  call Mr  Kirk. 
Mr  Kirk -.  Would  the  Commissioner  be  good  enough  to  send his  answers 
to Hr  Peter  Shore,  because  he  obviously has  not heard  them before  ? 
Mr  Gundelach  - I  am  sure Mr  Shore will  learn  about  this. 
President  -.  I  call Lord  O'Hagan. 
Lord  O'Hagan  -.  Would  the  Commissioner  accept  that the  Commission  as 
a  whole  has  an  obligation to  explain to  the people of Hember  States  the 
real consequences of membership  of the  Community  ?  Would  he  accept  my 
congratulations  and  those of this  House  for having started on  the demolition 
of this myth,  v.nd  will he  give  an  undertaking  that he  and his  colleagues 
will continue  to demolish  this myth  ? 
- ·I  -For  example,  if the  Commissioner  or  some  of his colleagues were  to 
receive  an  invitation to give  evidence on  this matter  to  the  House  of Lords 
Scrutiny Committee  to make  sure that the British Parliament  was  well  infor-
med,  would that opportunity be  taken,  as well  as others,  to come  and  explain 
the truth of this position to  the  British people  ? 
Mr  Gundelach  -.  I  believe it is the duty  and  obligation of this 
Commission  and  its individual Members  in appropriate  fora  in all the Member 
States to explain the  development of the  Community  and  put  the  facts  as  we 
see  them  as objectively as possible to  the peoples of Europe  and  to the 
peoples of individual  Member  States. 
We  shall continue  to  do  so  whenever  the  appropriate occasion occurs 
to  do  this,  as  we  do  in this House. 
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